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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and contribution 
Public firms are today faced with high information demands from investors who want to better 
understand a company’s business and assess its future perspectives. Consequently, firms’ 
investor relations (IR) efforts, which aim to ensure appropriate corporate communication and 
interaction with financial markets, have received great attention from practitioners and scholars. 
An ongoing debate on the characteristics of successful IR activities has also appeared in the 
press. Articles on topics such as “How to best communicate with shareholders” (Forbes, 
05/03/2016)1 and “Strategy talk key to investor relations” (Financial Times, 02/27/2011)2 
emphasize the actual relevance of the IR function for all involved parties.  
From a scientific point of view, IR primarily contributes to the alleviation of information 
asymmetries between firms and investors.3 However, recent surveys among IR professionals 
indicate that the tasks of these professionals are not only restricted to information provision but 
also cover stock marketing duties as well as strategic assignments.4 In summary, the “role and 
responsibilities of the Investor Relations Officer (IRO) have changed dramatically over the last 
15 years” (Bloomberg 09/28/2015).5 As such, a deep analysis of this crucial corporate function, 
which should ultimately facilitate a firm’s financing on capital markets, appears to be necessary.  
Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2000) as well as Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that the base 
level of investor protection and consequently the richness of the information environment 
typically differ across countries due to divergences in their legal and financial systems.6 The 
magnitude of the IR function’s economic relevance may therefore also be subject to deviation 
related to firms’ origins, as Karolyi and Liao (2017) indicate with regard to firms’ global IR 
activities.7 However, to the best of this author’s knowledge, no extensive research on this issue 
has been conducted to date. In this light, deeper empirical insights on the relevance of IR in 
different legal and market environments could help firms to structure corresponding activities in a 
more efficient and cost-saving way. 
                                                          
1 Forbes (05/03/2016): https://www.forbes.com/sites/robinferracone/2016/05/03/how-to-best-communicate-with-
shareholders/#4df59b865c19. 
2 Financial Times (02/27/2011): https://www.ft.com/content/26c0a0e8-4112-11e0-bf62-00144feabdc0. 
3 cf. Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1438. 
4 cf. IR Magazine (02/22/2016): https://www.irmagazine.com/articles/people-careers/21276/five-functions-investor-
relations/. 
5 Bloomberg (09/28/2015): https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/the-changing-face-of-investor-relations/. 
6 cf. La Porta et al. (2000), p. 3; Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 91. 
7 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 28. 
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Recent empirical studies such as Kirk and Vincent (2014), Agarwal et al. (2015), Karolyi and 
Liao (2017) investigate the relation between IR and several corporate characteristics and 
outcomes. However, most of the previous studies do not consider the IR contribution over longer 
periods of time, which could actually make it possible to evaluate the economic effects of 
improvements or downturns in already established IR activities as well as to further address the 
endogeneity concerns that plague research on IR.8  
To obtain a better understanding of the IR function and its facets, interviews with IR practitioners 
from German DAX 30 companies were conducted in the run-up to the present thesis.9 These 
dialogues revealed that communication with investors is particularly important in relation to 
specific value-relevant corporate events, which could feature a high level of information 
asymmetry between firms and investors. Such events typically comprise merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activities or capital measures. The importance of information disclosure in M&As and 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) has been also emphasized in several previous studies,10 
although no empirical evidence exists concerning whether the quality of IR actually affects firm 
performance during these major corporate events. 
In conclusion, it can be stated that while some research on IR has been conducted in the past, the 
above-outlined outstanding issues still have to be addressed to obtain a comprehensive overview 
of this versatile corporate function. However, the major challenge that appears in relation to IR 
analysis is finding an appropriate measure to determine its quality. In this context, 
communication with IR practitioners additionally revealed the existence of external measures that 
firms also intensively use to evaluate the quality of their interactions with market participants; 
these measures include IR rankings and awards that are based on the perceptions of analysts and 
investors and are granted by specialized survey providers. Similar proxies are also applied by the 
authors of some previous empirical studies, including Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Bushee 
and Noe (2000) in relation to the US market. The present thesis follows this suggestion. 
In general, the aim of this thesis is to empirically assess the economic relevance of IR quality in 
listed companies that are subject to different legal and financial systems. This study relies on a 
proprietary panel data that covers over 2700 yearly IR rankings from 2006 to 2014 for German 
and UK firms, which according to La Porta et al. (2000) are faced with divergent legal and 
financial frameworks (civil law and bank-based system vs. common law and market-based 
                                                          
8 cf. Healey and Palepu (2001), p. 407. 
9 Due to confidentiality agreements, the dialogue partners are not mentioned by name. 
10 See Healey and Palepu (2001), pp. 420–421, for a summary. 
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system).11 As such, the empirical analysis of the sample should make it possible to appropriately 
address the specified research objective, while extensively controlling for endogeneity concerns 
using fixed effects (FE) and instrumental variables (IV) approaches. An analysis is first 
conducted with regard to firm performance, stock liquidity, stock volatility, capital costs, and 
analysts’ forecast characteristics. The impact of IR quality on M&A and SEO performance in 
both countries is also investigated, which addresses the lack of empirical evidence on IR effects 
in relation to such events. In summary, the present thesis offers new and fundamental insights 
into the value of corporate communication with financial markets providing contribution to the 
existing scientific literature on IR. An outline of the remainder of this thesis is presented in the 
following section.  
 
1.2 Outline 
The rest of the present thesis is structured as follows. The essential characteristics of IR are 
discussed in chapter 2, which starts by introducing the theoretical framework of the agency 
relation between a firm’s managers and shareholders and elaborating the underlying issue of the 
information asymmetry between these parties. This section also deals with divergences in the 
information levels among investors themselves as well as the corresponding consequences 
concerning firm outcomes. The contribution of IR to the alleviation of each of the 
aforementioned issues, particularly through disclosure activities, is discussed accordingly. To 
complement the previous elaborations, the overall structure of IR departments and their relations 
to firms’ C-suites are further characterized. Chapter 2.2 deals primarily with IR’s stock marketing 
function and contribution to firm visibility. In this context, the role of IR in building sustainable 
relations with investors and compiling a desired shareholder base is highlighted. This chapter 
ends by examining the impact of the aforementioned IR activities on the outcomes of major 
corporate events, which typically feature intensive communication with investors. The third 
section of chapter 2 identifies the differences in IR relevance expected in countries with common 
and civil law origins, which are characterized by divergences in the base levels of investor 
protection and disclosure. Subchapter 2.3.1 begins with an introduction to the main 
characteristics of both legal environments and goes on with their projection on German and UK 
                                                          
11 cf. La Porta et al. (2000), pp. 8, 17. 
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markets. In subchapter 2.3.2, firms’ financing and ownership characteristics in market- and bank-
based system are discussed and the link to the IR function is established. The general 
implications of previous elaborations on the present empirical study are derived at the end of this 
section.  
Chapter 3.1 provides a review of existing empirical literature on the economic relevance of firms’ 
IR activities. This section further discusses potential concerns regarding the data or 
methodological framework of respective studies, which in turn should be appropriately addressed 
in the scope of the present thesis. In addition, chapter 3.2 focuses on the endogeneity issue that is 
applicable to empirical investigations of the link between IR and corporate outcomes. In addition 
to an elaboration of potential sources of endogeneity (such as omitted variables, reverse causality, 
and measurement errors), this section introduces possible methodological solutions for this issue 
that are consequently applied within the present empirical analysis. 
In chapter 4, testable hypotheses for the empirical investigation are developed based on insights 
gained in previous sections. This chapter is divided into four parts that deal separately with the 
expected impact of IR on firms’ overall market performance, different value-generating channels, 
and corporate performance in the scope of M&A and SEO activities. The hypotheses for the 
German and UK samples are formulated separately and also cover predictions regarding the 
differences between the countries. After the respective hypotheses are introduced, the following 
sections each describe in detail the calculations of variables of interest and data collection 
processes. The same information is subsequently provided for the control variables used in the 
empirical analysis. The expectations regarding the correlations between these control measures, 
IR quality and corporate outcome variables introduced in this section complement the hypotheses 
on the main relations of interest. Chapters 4.2 to 4.4 then discuss the examined variables’ 
descriptive statistics. 
Chapter 5 introduces the regression analysis and event study approach methodologies that are 
used to investigate the hypotheses derived in chapter 4. In particular, section 5.1 describes the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedure, the logistic regression, and the FE approach. 
The IV approach is discussed in chapter 5.2, which also elaborates on the two sets of instruments 
used in this thesis. The first set is derived from the study of Karolyi and Liao (2017) and relies on 
firms’ IR resources. The second set of instruments, which is also in line with these authors’ 
study, is based on measures related to geographical proximity to investors. The essential test 
procedures that should make it possible to assess the validity of the applied instruments are 
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presented at the end of this section. Finally, Chapter 5.3 deals with the event study methodology 
used to calculate the value effects attributed to M&A and SEO announcements. 
The empirical findings of this thesis are reported and discussed in chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 
presents the results related to firm performance, the cost of capital, stock liquidity, stock 
volatility, and analysts’ forecasts characteristics. The results concerning the performance 
contribution of IR in the case of major corporate events are provided in chapter 7. The hypotheses 
from chapter 4 are evaluated at the end of each section, respectively. Chapter 8 provides evidence 
on the validity of IR rankings as a measure of IR quality.  
A summary of the insights gained through the present thesis, a conclusion, and implications for 
future research are presented in chapter 9. 
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2 Fundamentals of IR activities 
2.1 Information asymmetry reduction 
In line with prevalent views on IR’s function, one of its main contributions to firm performance 
(i.e., to market valuation) is the resolution of information asymmetries between a company and 
the financial community that is typically accompanied by a reduction in a firm’s costs of 
capital.12 As such, disclosure activities in the scope of the IR function can be seen as a valid 
corporate governance (CG) instrument.13 No uniform definition of the CG concept itself is 
provided in the scientific literature. However, Tirole (2001) emphasizes that two broad views on 
CG, which are prevalent for either Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., the UK) or continental European 
countries (e.g., Germany), can generally be distinguished.14 The Anglo-Saxon view is based on 
the shareholder value concept and can be appropriately described using the definition provided by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who interpret CG as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.”15 In the context of the 
continental European view on CG, the target group whose interests should be promoted is 
expanded to all firm’s stakeholders.16 Because the interviews with IR professionals conducted as 
part of the current study and prior empirical research both indicate that IR activities are primarily 
geared toward a company’s existing or potential shareholders,17 this thesis focuses on this 
stakeholder group when further elaborating on IR as a CG instrument. 
The general CG concept is closely linked to the theoretical framework of the agency problem that 
arises in companies due to the separation of ownership and control.18 According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), an agency relationship occurs if a person (or group) conducts tasks on behalf of 
another individual(s) based on a contractual relation.19 If this pattern is applied to a firm, 
stockholders as principals delegate the authority to run a company’s business to managers, who 
represent the agents in such a relationship. The delegation of control rights to managers takes 
place, because the firm’s owners need the agents’ human capital (e.g., their expertise, networks, 
                                                          
12 cf. Agarwal et al. (2015), p. 5. 
13 cf. Chang et al. (2014), p. 389. 
14 cf. on this and the following Tirole (2001), pp. 2–4. 
15 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 737. 
16 cf. Tirole (2001), pp. 3–4. 
17 cf. Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), pp. 26–27; Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 873. 
18 cf. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 738. 
19 cf. on this and the following Jensen und Meckling (1976), pp. 308–309. 
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and time) to receive an income from their investment.20 However, an issue may arise if managers 
as utility-maximizing individuals, who are pursuing their own interests, do not fully act on behalf 
of shareholders.21 The agent objectives that diverge from owner objectives may include 
consuming perquisites (for instance, by spending corporate funds on luxury means of transport) 
or building empires and enhancing one’s own prestige (e.g., by acquiring firms that enlarge the 
company run by the manager but do not necessarily generate positive returns).22 Managers may 
also be interested in reducing the work effort, safeguarding their jobs by investing in even 
unprofitable projects for which their specific know-how is required, or preventing corporate 
takeovers that in some cases may benefit stockholders. The conflicting incentives between 
managers and shareholders are particularly problematic because the information available to both 
parties naturally diverges: shareholders are not fully informed about the aims (i.e., hidden 
intentions) or activities (i.e., hidden actions) of managers that allow agents to follow their own 
goals.23 Such information asymmetry combined with misaligned incentives of managers can 
ultimately result in owners’ wealth reduction causing so-called agency costs, which also cover 
expenditures made by the principal or agent to overcome the aforementioned issues.24 According 
to Healy and Palepu (2001), disclosure and respective institutions that encourage a flow of 
information toward shareholders play an important role in alleviating the outlined information 
and incentive problems.25 
Furthermore, Brown and Hillegeist (2007) assert that enhanced disclosure helps to abolish 
information skewness among investors themselves, which could otherwise result in the adverse 
selection problem.26 The issue of adverse selection is introduced by Akerlof (1970), who argues 
that if price-relevant information about a traded good is not symmetrically distributed among 
market participants (i.e., sellers and buyers), transaction conditions could be biased and several 
feasible transactions will not take place.27 In the context of the microstructure of capital markets, 
information asymmetry leads to concern for a market maker, who has to provide liquidity to the 
stock market by ensuring that all sell or buy orders can be executed, to face an order of an 
                                                          
20 cf. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 740. 
21 cf. Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 308. 
22 cf. on this and the following Tirole (2001), pp. 1–2. 
23 cf. Healy and Palepu (2001), pp. 407–408. 
24 cf. Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 308. 
25 cf. Healy and Palepu (2001), p. 407. 
26 cf. Brown and Hillegeist (2007), p. 446. 
27 cf. Akerlof (1970), pp. 489–492. 
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investor with superior information causing him or her a loss.28 The difference between the market 
maker’s bid and ask prices, as his or her expected profit, consequently becomes larger with 
higher information asymmetry to compensate that individual for potential losses to the informed 
traders. Within the scope of the adverse selection problem, the lower stock liquidity linked to 
higher bid-ask spreads can ultimately be accompanied by an increase in a firm’s cost of capital 
and a decrease in its market valuation.29 For instance, firms suffering from these issues that aim 
to collect funds on the capital market usually have to discount the issue price to create incentives 
for investors to participate in capital actions that in turn result in lower proceeds and higher 
financing costs. As Brown and Hillegeist (2007) note, the quality of a firm’s disclosure can help 
to mitigate the aforementioned problems attributed to an information advantage of some investors 
based on private information about the firm’s value in two ways.30 First, a higher disclosure level 
should attract more uninformed investors to trade on a firm’s stock due to its enhanced market 
visibility, which is in turn accompanied by a decrease in the relative number of informed traders. 
Furthermore, as Diamond (1985) also argues, an enhanced disclosure level should reduce 
investors’ incentives for private information searches, which typically bear substantial costs.31 
Therefore, the less information that investors can detect privately, the more symmetric the 
information distribution that should be observed among these market participants.32 To 
summarize, a firm’s disclosure tends to play an important role in alleviating the different kinds of 
information asymmetries that exist in relation to capital markets; however, to gain deeper insight 
into its functioning, the different forms of information provision have to be considered in the 
following step. 
In general, firms can communicate with investors in a variety of ways; this may include meeting 
them personally, using conference calls, or relying on more ordinary options (e.g., financial 
reports and press releases).33 In today’s capital markets, firms can also provide information to 
their addressees through information intermediaries, such as financial analysts who follow 
particular companies and forward aggregated information to investors. Firms’ provision of 
information to financial markets can basically be divided into two categories: mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. Accounting standards, stock exchange requirements, and other contractual 
                                                          
28 cf. on this and the following Glosten and Milgrom (1985), p. 72; Geoerge et al. (1991), pp. 625–626. 
29 cf. on this and the following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 92; Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), pp. 125–127. 
For further elaboration on this, see Copeland and Galai (1983), Merton (1987).   
30 cf. on this and the following Brown and Hillegeist (2007), p. 446. 
31 cf. Diamond (1985), p. 1089. 
32 cf. Brown and Hillegeist (2007), pp. 446–447. 
33 cf. on this and the following Healy and Palepu (2001), pp. 408–409, 411–414, 420, 432. 
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commitments constitute mandatory regulations prescribing the management a common language 
for the communication with investors and subsequently regulating at least the minimal level of 
quantity and quality of information that must be provided. These regulations focus primarily on 
the allocation of new (superior) information on value-relevant facts that are available to firm’s 
management. In the absence of the previously mentioned issues (such as agency conflicts) or in 
presence of perfect contracts, no need for additional (legal) regulations would exist, because 
firms would produce an efficient level of voluntary disclosure by considering its costs and 
benefits. However, market imperfections result in a need for regulatory interventions that aim to 
protect both the interests of investors and overall economic efficiency. Certainly, as different 
countries and their respective financial systems have varying characteristics, such provisions 
differ around the world and might be incomplete leaving an information gap that can in turn be 
filled by a firm’s voluntary disclosure aimed at addressing this residual information asymmetry. 
In this context, Healy and Palepu (2001) present several explanatory approaches for managers’ 
incentives to provide investors with more information than required by existing regulations.34 
Firstly, voluntary disclosure may be promoted by a fear of job loss that motivates insiders to 
supply more information, for instance to avoid the company’s undervaluation or to explain bad 
performance that can also reduce the risk of litigations with shareholders. Furthermore, because 
the remuneration of managers is frequently linked to stock performance (e.g., through stock 
compensation plans), insiders have natural incentives to improve liquidity and to prevent mis-
valuations of stocks they hold in their own portfolios by making more forthcoming disclosures to 
financial markets. 
In this regard, Kirk and Vincent (2014) emphasize that the management of communication and 
interaction between corporate executives and investors (as well as financial analysts) is the main 
task of a firm’s IR department.35 As such, IR officers are usually able to influence a firm’s 
communication policies in accordance with existing laws—which enables them to exercise a 
considerable influence on the quality and quantity of a company’s disclosure. In this context, 
Bollen et al. (2006) further stress that the functions of IR departments typically imply expanding 
and enhancing the methods and techniques used to provide information with the goal of reaching 
a broader audience in an efficient manner.36 In this context, more timely, more transparent, and 
more comprehensible corporate statements can be seen as indicators of qualitatively sophisticated 
                                                          
34 cf. on this and the following Healy and Palepu (2001), pp. 420–425. 
35 cf. on this and the following Kirk and Vincent (2014), pp. 1421–1422. 
36 cf. Bollen et al. (2006), p. 275. 
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corporate disclosure encouraged by responsible IR departments.37 In addition, Bushee and Miller 
(2012) demonstrate that IR can positively contribute not only to qualitative aspects of 
information provision, but also to its overall quantitative level.38 Their study provides empirical 
evidence of a positive link between the initiation of an IR program and the number of published 
press releases, announcements, and conference transcripts. This result suggests that the level of 
professionalism and time exposure attributed to communication with investors in the scope of the 
IR function is accompanied by a more regular and more forthcoming provision of value-relevant 
information. Furthermore, Brown and Hillegeist (2007) argue that voluntary IR activities (i.e., 
those not attributed to legal requirements) are often characterized by a forward-looking 
perspective that can be reflected, inter alia, in verbal statements concerning optimism about the 
future.39 When such insights are provided during calls (or meetings) with analysts in particular, 
they can also help to decrease the information asymmetry between corporate insiders and 
investors if this private information is subsequently forwarded to all other interested parties after 
its disclosure to a small circle of attendees. A typical example of the aforementioned setting is 
financial analysts providing forecasts and recommendations to investors after respective calls (or 
meetings).40 Financial analysts thus seem to add value to capital markets by gathering insights on 
covered firms and helping companies to transmit disclosed information to a broad base of 
addressees. On the other hand, analysts themselves benefit from a firm’s enhanced provision of 
information, because voluntary disclosure naturally reduces their search efforts and costs for 
particularly private information. As such, a better quality and quantity of information provision 
can attract more analysts to follow a firm, which in turn enhances the allocation of information 
from IR disclosure activities to investors.  
Activities related to IR were initially assigned to chief financial officers (CFOs); IR has been 
growing into a separate institution only since the 1980s.41 However, IR is usually still 
subordinated to a firm’s top executives, such as its CFO and chief executive officer (CEO). As 
such, IR departments work closely with C-level managers and sometimes perform only 
supportive functions in the scope of communication with investors and analysts. This is 
                                                          
37 cf. Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 942. 
38 cf. on this and the following Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 880. 
39 cf. on this and the following Brown and Hillegeist (2007), p. 465. 
40 cf. on this and the following Healy and Palepu (2001), pp. 416–418. 
41 cf. on this and the following Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1423. For detailed elaboration of IR’s historical 
development, see Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), pp. 26–27.  
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particularly the case for earnings calls,42 which the IR team typically organizes. During the calls, 
this team is also usually responsible for guiding question and answer sessions with top 
executives. In addition, while Kirk and Vincent (2014) assert that the establishment and 
maintenance of close relations to investors during face-to-face meetings, road shows, and so forth 
primarily fall within the remit of IR departments,43 Bushee et al. (2015) highlight that CEOs and 
CFOs are also sometimes engaged in such personal appointments—particularly if they aim to 
converse with large-scale investors.44 An executive’s objective during these meetings may be to 
promote the firm’s shares to compel fund providers to expand their investments in the company 
or invest in its stock for the first time. He or she may also aim to pave the way for capital actions 
or to provide guidance. In conclusion, IR departments collaborate with executives on interactions 
with investors if managers’ expertise and authority are required and seem to keep the remaining 
appointments at their own discretion. In this context, Dolphin (2004) claims that the IR function 
can also be seen as a marketing activity that in addition to providing information also entails 
tasks such as targeting investors and building and maintaining a firm’s reputation.45 Due to the 
significant priority of this marketing role for IR departments, it is intensively considered in the 
following chapter, particularly with respect to its potential consequences on firm performance. 
 
2.2 Marketing function 
According to Bushee and Miller (2012), an important element of IR activities is “to design a 
strategy for management communication, which is often characterized as finding the right way to 
tell the story to the right investors.”46 From this statement it can be derived that an important goal 
of IR is to identify and attract investors who are suitable for a firm’s desired shareholder base and 
subsequently to maintain relations with these individuals.47 The institutional investors who 
provide large amounts of funds to companies can constitute such a target group. Lev (2012) states 
that an increase in a firm’s market visibility through IR activities that is accompanied by an 
attraction of institutional investors should result in increased demand for a firm’s stock—and 
                                                          
42 cf. Frankel et al. (2010), pp. 223–224. 
43 cf. Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1424. 
44 cf. on this and the following Bushee et al. (2015), p. 8. 
45 cf. Dolphin (2004), pp. 25–26. 
46 Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 871. 
47 cf. on this and the following Bushee and Miller (2012), pp. 868, 870–871. 
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consequently in a higher market valuation.48 However, it must be emphasized that as financial 
markets feature different types of institutional investors, all of whom pursue different strategies 
and goals, firms have to differentiate between these groups when they compile their shareholder 
base. Bushee and Noe (2000) show within the empirical framework of their study that two types 
of institutional investors can generally be attracted by enhanced IR activities (or rather disclosure 
practices): those with a long-term investment horizon—and hence low fluctuations in their 
investment portfolios—and investors with a short-term investment perspective that results in high 
turnover within their investment holdings.49 While long-term oriented institutional investors 
commonly encourage reducing a firm’s stock volatility by potentially contributing to lower stock 
liquidity, institutional investors with a short-term horizon are often accountable for an increase in 
stock volatility that can be accompanied by higher liquidity. Both types of institutional investors 
can therefore be linked to both benefits and risks with regard to a firm’s market performance. As 
a result, it appears to be necessary for IR representatives to compile an appropriate mix of these 
investors depending on the present corporate conditions. Laskin (2006) emphasizes that the IR 
instruments that aim to achieve this goal typically go beyond the forthcoming financial 
communication, which admittedly can positively contribute to firm attractiveness for market 
participants:50 “investor relations is not about numbers any more, today’s investor relations is 
about building and maintaining relationships.”51 In this context, the overall credibility of a firm’s 
management and IR officers appears to play a crucial role in the market acceptance of 
information content provided in the scope of a firm’s communication activities.52 This applies in 
particular to a company’s forward-looking statements, which market participants evaluate 
partially based on whether they can fully rely on what a firm’s management and IR staff say. A 
close and trustful individual relationship to at least a firm’s major shareholders that is promoted 
by IR activities (e.g., meetings and calls) may enable these concerns to be overcome and help to 
ensure that the firm’s disclosure ultimately contributes to the fair value of its securities. In line 
with this, Hoffmann and Fieseler (2012) note that the IR function commonly entails image-
building activities in addition to ordinary tasks.53 Such activities typically aim to enhance the 
image of both the IR professionals and top management engaged in capital market 
                                                          
48 cf. Lev (2012), pp. 52–53. See also Healy et al. (1999), p. 486. 
49 cf. on this and the following Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 200. 
50 cf. Agarwal et al. (2015), p. 1. 
51 Laskin (2006), p. 245. 
52 cf. on this and the following Laskin (2007), p. 28. 
53 cf. on this and the following Hoffmann and Fieseler (2012), pp. 141, 146, 149–150. 
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communication. In this regard, regular briefings of corporate executives by IR officers on the 
demands of the financial community may help a firm’s management to find a common language 
with market participants. The expansion of a firm’s communication aspects to non-financial 
dimensions yields further important IR characteristics relevant for its success. For instance, IR 
staff should ensure that it is constantly available for investors to be able to address their acute 
demands, for example by offering clarifications on current corporate topics. Furthermore, the 
enhanced competence and know-how of IR officers could increase proactive communication with 
investors, positively contribute to these staff members’ image, and improve the assessment of the 
overall quality of their activities.   
Hoffmann et al. (2011) recognize the carefully cultivated relationships to investors as a market-
based asset that serves as a competitive advantage that ultimately allows a firm to materialize IR 
quality in enhanced shareholder value.54 By using an empirical framework to look at shareholder 
activism events in different companies, their study investigates whether better IR quality actually 
induces a comprehensive mutual understanding between firms and investors. According to Becht 
et al. (2009), shareholder activism can be defined as “a range of actions taken by shareholders to 
influence corporate management and boards” that, inter alia, includes threatening the sale of 
shares or using of corporate voting rights to exert pressure on executives.55 Shareholders can 
undertake such actions if a firm’s management does not meet their expectations, which may also 
be partially attributed to inadequate IR activities (e.g., the targeting of investors whose goals are 
incompatible with those of the firm or falsely assessing investor demands).56 The empirical 
results of Hoffmann et al. (2011) show a negative link between IR quality and shareholder 
activism events, which indicates that building relationships with (suitable) shareholders based on 
two-way communication can help IR departments and executives to overcome the 
aforementioned incidents. However, the IR function also includes recognizing when a specific 
relation causes high costs without having any future perspectives and consequently should be 
terminated in favor of other stockholders.   
In general, within the framework of the marketing view on IR, investors can be seen as firms’ 
customers.57 In this context, the product that firms are primarily selling to investors is their stock, 
which is typically offered by listed companies in the scope of SEOs. As described in the previous 
                                                          
54 cf. on this and the following Hoffmann et al. (2011), pp. 896–897. 
55 Becht et al. (2009), p. 3094, note 1. 
56 cf. on this and the following Hoffmann et al. (2011), pp. 899, 901. 
57 cf. Hanssens et al. (2009), p. 115. 
Fundamentals of IR activities  14 
 
chapter, enhanced firm disclosure can help to alleviate information asymmetry in the run-up to 
such capital actions and diminish the price drop that may follow an SEO announcement as a 
result of a firm’s overvaluation signal.58 Furthermore, disclosure can also be purposefully 
deployed to achieve better issuance conditions by marketing the stock before the corresponding 
offer.59 According to Lang and Lundholm (2000), the main differences between the two 
aforementioned cases relates to objectives and the design of the disclosed information. However, 
this does not mean that the disclosure attributed to stock advertising activities contains any 
misleading statements. It may simply cover a more extensive bundle of facts about the 
corresponding firm and accompany a higher information issuance frequency, which, in 
compliance with Merton’s (1987) theoretical model,60 increases a firm’s visibility for potential 
investors.61 For instance, an IR department may more frequently provide detailed disclosure 
related to a firm’s performance (including comprehensive comments of top executives) and 
initiate more proactive presentations to investors and analysts.62 Clarkson et al. (1999) and Lang 
and Lundholm (2000) provide empirical evidence for this stock marketing technique by 
identifying an increase in firms’ published statements before the announcements of SEOs.63 In 
the scope of anecdotal evidence, IR professionals support these findings by indicating that the 
extensive disclosure and related activities undertaken prior to SEOs are often used to enhance the 
awareness of investors about a firm’s stock, which results in a stock price increase and in turn 
raises the proceeds from these capital actions.64 Furthermore, how the market reacts to the actual 
SEO announcement after a period of enhanced IR activities may also depend on the quality of the 
IR strategy. Thus, whether investors feel deceived when finding out the purpose of the previous 
extensive stock exposure that can be accompanied by a share price revision or whether they 
attribute the provided information content and achieved increase in firm visibility to a higher 
market value that would simultaneously lower the risk (or magnitude) of a post-announcement 
price drop.65  
The patterns identified in IR marketing activities in the scope of SEOs also seem to apply to 
M&A transactions, particularly if the acquiring firm aims to pay for the target by offering its own 
                                                          
58 cf. Myers and Majluf (1984), p. 188. 
59 cf. on this and the following Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 626. 
60 cf. Merton (1987), p. 501. 
61 cf. Chang et al. (2008), p. 378. 
62 cf. Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 627; Demos (2013), p. 1.  
63 cf. Clarkson et al. (1999), p. 128; Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 629. 
64 cf. Lang und Lundholm (2000), pp. 630, 632, 656. 
65 cf. Lang und Lundholm (2000), p. 631. 
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stocks.66 Ahern and Sosyura (2014) provide empirical evidence of increases in firms’ disclosure, 
such as a higher number of press releases, as well as a more positive tone in publications during 
the negotiation period for M&A transactions. Their study consequently indicates that at least the 
bidders engaged in stock mergers tend to conduct active disclosure management that involves 
publications that are driven not necessarily by a firm’s fundamentals but rather by stock 
marketing purposes with regard to the conditions of forthcoming acquisitions. The empirical 
findings additionally suggest that this strategy ultimately affects the merger outcomes of the 
involved parties, reducing the acquirer’s takeover costs and accompanying a higher acquirer gain 
relative to the target gain attributed to the transaction’s announcement. Investors’ increased 
awareness of a firm results in at least a temporary boost of its stock price and at this point also 
appears to serve as the channel through which IR activities can contribute to corporate outcomes 
(in addition to alleviating information asymmetry).  
Finally, Solomon (2012) demonstrates that active disclosure management is conducted in the 
scope of the IR function also in relation to other relevant corporate announcements.67 The results 
of this study suggest that investors’ awareness of statements is positively influenced by IR 
through the initiation of greater media coverage of corporate news (e.g., through personal 
connections to media representatives). The study also provides evidence of a positive value effect 
of higher media coverage induced by IR activities in relation to positive corporate 
announcements. The concerns stated in the literature regarding the sustainability of the value 
created by the aforementioned marketing activities, which in some cases may admittedly have a 
short-term horizon, constitute an empirical question that has to be addressed using appropriate 
firm performance measures.  
The definition of IR provided by the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) summarizes the 
major fields of IR activities: “Investor relations is a strategic management responsibility that 
integrates finance, communication, marketing and securities law compliance to enable the most 
effective two-way communication between a company, the financial community, and other 
constituencies, which ultimately contributes to a company's securities achieving fair valuation.”68 
The (financial) disclosure, marketing, and communication aspects of IR have been outlined in the 
current and previous chapters of this thesis. To complement this, the influence that legal 
environments have on the operating principles and outcomes of IR is discussed next.  
                                                          
66 cf. on this and the following Ahern and Sosyura (2014), pp. 241–245, 247, 276, 278–280, 288. 
67 cf. on this and the following Solomon (2012), pp. 599, 605, 631. 
68 NIRI (n.d.): https://www.niri.org/about-niri. 
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2.3 IR relevance in different legal and market environments 
2.3.1 Implications on IR in common and civil law countries 
As described in Chapter 2.1, the disclosure activities typically performed by IR departments 
should help to resolve information asymmetries between firms and market participants. La Porta 
et al. (2000) emphasize that the disclosure of financial information can be seen as a “key element 
of shareholder protection.”69 In this context, however, previous research shows that the base level 
of investor protection differs from country to country and depends on the varying law systems in 
each economy.70 According to La Porta el al. (1998), the differences in law systems (i.e., in legal 
rules and their enforcement) are strongly linked to the origins of each country’s legal 
environment.71 Scholars generally distinguish between two legal families: common law, which 
has an English origin, and civil (or code) law, which arose from Roman law, and which can be 
further categorized in German, French, and Scandinavian origins.72 It is important to note that 
although each country certainly has its own specific legal rules and codes that distinguish it from 
other countries around the world, the basic legal principles that underlie national laws make it 
possible to generally differentiate between the aforementioned legal families.73 Common law has 
mainly influenced the legal principles of large economies such as the US and the UK, while the 
legal environments in Japan, South Korea, and naturally Germany originate from the German 
civil law.74 Furthermore, the systems of several European countries (e.g., Spain and Italy) were 
affected by French civil tradition and those of Denmark or Finland by the Scandinavian civil law. 
The evidence provided by La Porta et al. (1998) indicates that countries with legal rules based on 
the common law tradition grant more protection to investors than countries from the civil law 
family (irrespective of concrete origin).75 These researchers’ results also show that the quality of 
accounting standards, which largely depends on disclosure rules, is higher in common law 
countries than in German civil law countries. These findings can at least to some extent be 
explained by the formation of the respective legal environments. In general, civil law is shaped 
by writings of scholars and by legislators, whereas common law is coined by courts’ decisions 
                                                          
69 La Porta et al. (2000), p. 23. 
70 cf. La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1151; La Porta et al. (2000), p. 24; Ball et al. (2000), p. 2; Djankov et al. (2008), p. 463. 
71 cf. La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1151. 
72 cf. Ball et al. (2000), p. 1; La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1115. 
73 cf. La Porta et al. (2008), p. 288. 
74 cf. on this and the following La Porta et al. (1998), pp. 1130–1131. 
75 cf. on this and the following La Porta et al. (1998), pp. 1120, 1140, 1141, 1151. 
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that are in turn embedded in legislature.76 As such, judges in the common law system have to 
decide on cases that are not covered by existing legislature applying the previous decisions in 
leading cases within their judicial discretion.77 Such a handling of new cases results in an 
ongoing extension of legal principles and rules that tends to reduce insiders’ incentives to apply 
unanticipated practices that may harm investors’ interests. On the other hand, as judges in civil 
law systems are expected to follow the existing legal rules, the legal system is generally less 
dynamic compared to common law. Furthermore, such a legal environment that relies on the 
“letter of the law” instead of “the spirit of the law”78 might increase the willingness of insiders to 
act against investors’ interests using legal loopholes.79 An additional proposition based on 
historical evolution is that common law countries grant greater private property protection than 
civil law countries due to the weaker influence of the government (which also pursues its own 
political goals) on judicial objectives and experience fewer government interventions in market 
activities. Finally, according to Jaggi and Low (2000), broad-based corporate ownership and 
well-developed financial markets, which are typical outcomes of enhanced investor protection in 
common law countries, result in a higher disclosure demand from market participants—which in 
turn causes higher financial disclosure provisions in this legal environment.80 The common law 
system thus appears to facilitate private enforcement mechanisms by ensuring that investors 
obtain the required firm information and are able to appropriately act on it.81 In this context, 
Djankov et al. (2008) and Ball et al. (2000) also emphasize that high mandatory disclosure 
standards are a typical characteristic of the common law system, whereas in civil law countries 
information asymmetry tends to be alleviated particularly by closer corporate ties with key 
stakeholders.82 Given that this thesis deals with the role of IR activities in German and UK firms, 
the question of whether the identified differences in investor protection and disclosure in 
common and civil law systems also apply to the same extent to these two specific countries 
arises.  
The first indication regarding an answer to the aforementioned question can be derived from the 
empirical evidence provided by La Porta et al. (1998).83 This study’s results related to Germany 
                                                          
76 cf. David and Brierley (1978), pp. 33, 308; La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1131. 
77 cf. on this and the following La Porta et al. (2000), pp. 9–10. 
78 Anderson and Gupta (2009), p. 70. 
79 cf. on this and the following La Porta et al. (2000), pp. 9, 12. 
80 cf. Jaggi and Low (2000), pp. 516–517. 
81 cf. Djankov et al. (2008), p. 463. 
82 cf. Djankov et al. (2008), p. 463; Ball et al. (2000), p. 2. 
83 cf. on this and the following La Porta et al. (1998), pp. 1122, 1130–1131, 1140, 1142–1143, 1147–1148. 
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and the UK are in line with its general findings on common and civil law environments. They 
indicate that in contrast to Germany, the UK grants a higher protection of shareholder rights 
measured on the basis of particular legal provisions. Furthermore, the results also show that the 
UK exhibits higher quality of accounting standards, which in turn ensures that corporate 
disclosure can be reliably interpreted. Finally, the empirical analysis suggests that the ownership 
structure in Germany is more concentrated (hence, characterized by a prevalence of blockholders) 
in comparison to the UK, which in contrast tends to have a more developed financial market. As 
noted earlier with regard to common law environment, both broader ownership and a 
sophisticated financial market structure seem to be the consequences of enhanced investor 
protection and to be related to enhanced disclosure regulations. Exactly this pattern can be 
observed in the results of La Porta et al. (1998) for UK firms and the opposite for German 
companies. Similar findings are also provided by Goergen and Renneboog (2003), who 
emphasize that “investors in the United Kingdom are substantially better protected than the ones 
in Germany.”84 Furthermore, Djankov et al. (2008) widely confirm the results presented by La 
Porta et al. (1998) using more recent data as well as further alternative measures for legal 
protection.85 Even the evidence provided by Spamann (2010), who casts doubts on the reliability 
of the findings of La Porta et al. (1998) and Djankov et al. (2008) and offers a revisited investor 
protection measure, reveals that it can still be stated that the UK grants greater investor protection 
than Germany while additionally considering the development of legal provisions over time.86 In 
addition, the analysis of Aubert and Louhichi (2015) provides empirical support for the more 
forthcoming financial disclosure environment of the UK as compared to Germany by stating that 
“UK firms must disclose more detailed and timely information.”87 Hope (2003) reports similar 
findings.88     
In this context, survey results provided by Bushee and Miller (2012) indicate that if the base level 
of corporate disclosure in a country is already high, many IR professionals view changes (or 
rather improvements) in a firm’s disclosure practices as commonly unnecessary.89 This could 
particularly be because firms’ disclosure practices often already meet high standards simply 
because they follow such a country’s applicable legal provisions. In summary, the 
                                                          
84 Goergen and Renneboog (2003), p. 142. 
85 cf. Djankov et al. (2008), pp. 441, 453–456; Spamann (2010), p. 475. 
86 cf. Spamann (2010), p. 475. 
87 Aubert and Louhichi (2015), p. 24. 
88 cf. Hope (2003), p. 251. 
89 cf. Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 874. 
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aforementioned studies provide important implications on the role of the IR function in UK and 
German companies. First, information asymmetries between firms, their investors, and 
information intermediaries in the UK tend to be lower due to high (mandatory) disclosure 
requirements; as such, lesser space for additional IR contribution, for instance through voluntary 
disclosure provision, seems to exist. Consequently, IR professionals in the UK may primarily 
contribute to a firm’s success through their marketing function, which includes activities that 
particularly aim to attract investors and information intermediaries. The survey results of Bushee 
and Miller (2012) support this consideration by revealing that IR professionals assign the highest 
priority to such activities in US firms.90 The value of IR quality can thus be primarily evident in 
situations in which firms’ IR professionals have to directly communicate with market participants 
(e.g., in the scope of equity issues). On the other hand, the level of information asymmetry in the 
German market seems to be higher due to the weaker investor protection and disclosure 
environment; as a result, the alleviation of information skewness appears to play a more crucial 
role for IR within German firms. The contribution of IR quality to firm success should thus 
occur, besides the marketing function, through a reduction of the prevalent information 
imbalances that are typically reflected in financial metrics (e.g., firms’ stock volatility or 
respective bid-ask spreads). As suggested by Anderson and Gupta (2009), beyond the legal 
origins the differences in investor protection and disclosure practices can be attributed to 
countries’ financial systems.91 As the financial systems of Germany and the UK generally differ, 
their (expected) impact on the IR function is discussed in the further course of this thesis. 
 
2.3.2 Implications on IR in market- and bank-based financial systems 
According to La Porta et al. (1997), the differences in financial systems around the world are 
closely linked to the differences in legal systems described in the previous chapter.92 Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) emphasize that the German market is characterized by permanent large 
shareholders and powerful banks, due to strong creditor protection and weaker stockholder rights 
(compared to the US) that are nonetheless still adequate for large shareholders to wield their 
                                                          
90 cf. Bushee and Miller (2012), pp. 873–874. 
91 cf. Anderson and Gupta (2009), p. 61. 
92 cf. La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1131. 
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power.93 In contrast, the UK features large numbers of investors acting on the equity market due 
to the extensive protection of shareholder rights.94 The special status of major banks in Germany 
has been further promoted by their universal structure that allows them to conduct lending and 
securities business, while in the UK commercial and investment banking is typically sundered.95 
In conclusion, Allen and Gale (2000) state that the allocation of resources in the UK is dominated 
by financial markets, whereas in Germany banks play the main role in this process. The 
aforementioned differences in financing and ownership structures attributable to the different 
legal environments (i.e., civil and common law) ultimately make it possible to categorize 
countries as having either a bank-based financial system (e.g., Germany) or a market-based 
finance regime (e.g., the UK).96  
The study of Ergungor (2004) extends the view on the formation of the different financial 
systems by providing evidence that the legal traditions themselves (and not merely the contents 
of laws) already support the emergence of differences in firms’ primary financing sources.97 This 
is because civil law courts’ lack of flexibility and effectiveness with regard to interpreting and 
establishing legal rules that may result in investors being exploited—and thus being less willing 
to provide funds—can be overcome by banks that “can resolve conflicts and enforce contracts 
without court intervention” using their bargaining power.98 Such power can emerge from the 
establishment of close relationships with borrowers accompanied by lower costs of loans and 
higher loan availability that debtors are rarely willing to jeopardize.99 These patterns, which are 
prevalent in the German market, are also known as the German “Hausbank system.”100 On the 
other hand, the enhanced effectiveness and flexibility of the (UK) common law courts reduces the 
risk of investor exploitation and thus encourages capital market financing.101 The above-
described view on the close ties between financial systems and legal environments has received 
further empirical support, for instance from Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002).102  
                                                          
93 cf. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 770. 
94 cf. La Porta et al. (2000), p. 17; Shleifer and Vishny (1997), pp. 769–770. 
95 cf. on this and the following Allen and Gale (2000), pp. 4–5. 
96 cf. La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1137; La Porta et al. (2000), p. 17. 
97 cf. Ergungor (2004), pp. 2884–2885. 
98 Ergungor (2004), p. 2870. 
99 cf. Ergungor (2004), p. 2873. 
100 cf. Allen and Gale (2000), p. 4. 
101 cf. Ergungor (2004), p. 2873. 
102 cf. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), pp. 359–360. 
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Admittedly, both financial systems have several specific advantages and disadvantages, which 
are summarized in a study by Levine (2002).103 According to that research, an important 
characteristic of banks that have established (long-term) relationships to respective firms is the 
ability to directly acquire information about these companies (e.g., by looking at their books) or 
their management (e.g., through face-to-face interaction). In the scope of this practice, banks can 
perform a monitoring function that can help, for instance to alleviate managerial opportunism, 
and should reduce the need for firms’ public market disclosure.104 Similar arguments can also be 
related to large shareholders (such as families), which are typical in the German market.105 
However, banks (as well as other large stakeholders) may pursue their own goals, such as private 
benefits of control, to the detriment of (minority) shareholders—which could ultimately result in 
their expropriation.106 For instance, banks may collaborate with a firm’s management or extract 
informational rents instead of exercising efficient monitoring.107 Because banks typically do not 
immediately forward information obtained through their “Hausbank” relationship (if at all) to the 
public market and the legal shareholder protection related to disclosure provisions is less 
extensive in the civil law environment,108 other investors seem to suffer from a substantial 
information disadvantage. However, this disadvantage can be alleviated by more forthcoming and 
transparent (voluntary) disclosure in the scope of the IR function to enable investors to decide on 
their investments using the most recent and comprehensive information. In contrast, the UK’s 
market-based system, which is characterized by a large number of diversified stock market 
participants, tends to facilitate the acquisition, aggregation, and transmission of signals and 
information to investors.109 This allows to lower information costs and to overcome the 
aforementioned issues associated with the German bank-centered system. Furthermore, the equity 
market in the UK offers a good setting for the market of corporate control (as an important 
external CG instrument); in this setting, underperforming managers have to reckon with the risk 
of corporate takeover, which should reduce their incentives for managerial opportunism.110 In this 
context, Anderson and Gupta (2009) demonstrate that the overall level of CG tends to be higher 
in countries that have a combination of common law and market-based systems than in those 
                                                          
103 cf. on this and the following Levine (2002), pp. 399–400. 
104 cf. Anderson and Gupta (2009), pp. 64, 70. 
105 cf. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 754; Andres (2008), p. 433.  
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with a combination of civil law and bank-centered regimes.111 As Beekes and Brown (2006) 
indicate, higher CG quality seems in turn to be accompanied by more informative corporate 
disclosure,112 which positively contributes to the already high base level of information provision 
legally required in common law countries. In line with what was elaborated in the previous 
chapter, information asymmetry appears to be considerably lower in the UK market than in 
Germany, which results in less room for IR to contribute to a firm’s success through this channel. 
The aforementioned view is further supported by Bushman et al. (2004), whose results show that 
corporate transparency in relation to governance and financial items is generally higher in 
countries that exhibit characteristics usually attributed to common law system, market based-
system, or both.113 It is also supported by Brown and Hillegeist (2007), whose findings indicate 
that public disclosure is more important in settings that are characterized by higher firm-investor 
information asymmetry,114 which has been ascertained for the German market. Finally, because 
the capital market appears to constitute the major financing source for UK firms, IR in the UK 
may become particularly important for acquisition and supporting investors, as in the case of 
capital issues. Anderson and Gupta (2009) call for additional research concerning how firms in 
market-based/common law and bank-centered/civil law systems can improve their corporate 
governance practices in response to their specific environments.115 The present thesis contributes 
to this claim by investigating the relevance of the IR function for shareholder wealth within these 
system combinations in Germany and the UK. 
  
                                                          
111 cf. Anderson and Gupta (2009), pp. 71, 77. 
112 cf. Beekes and Brown (2006), p. 422. 
113 cf. Bushman et al. (2004), pp. 244–245. 
114 cf. Brown and Hillegeist (2007), pp. 445, 472–473. 
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3 Literature 
3.1 Literature review on IR studies  
As shown in chapter 2, some channels through which a firm’s IR activities can basically generate 
value for shareholders have been identified in the existing scientific literature on IR. Before the 
additional contribution to the existing results is provided in this thesis, the major findings of 
previous empirical studies are presented in this chapter. These results are further used to facilitate 
the development of hypotheses for the present sample of German and UK firms. 
The measures typically used by scientific researchers to capture either the effects of a reduction 
in information asymmetry levels or the impact of IR marketing activities on market awareness of 
a firm’s stock are briefly summarized here. The stock volatility and liquidity proxies are usually 
deployed in relevant studies to measure the impact of at least one of the two aforementioned IR 
practices that could ultimately affect a firm’s cost of capital and stock performance (as a final 
outcome). In addition, several measures related to analyst forecasts are frequently used to assess 
the quantitative and qualitative levels of information provision in the scope of the IR function. 
The set of deployed variables covers, inter alia, analyst dispersion regarding a firm’s future 
earnings and forecast accuracy. The number of analysts following a firm is also commonly used 
as a proxy for its visibility among market participants. In this context, previous studies dealing 
with the IR function ordinarily rely on datasets that deviate in relation to the size and local origin 
of the investigated firms as well as the time period covered. As such, these dataset characteristics 
are also discussed in this chapter to identify potential issues in previous research and to provide 
possibly suitable solutions at a later stage. 
 
Firm performance, visibility, and stock liquidity 
The study of Dennis (1973) is one of the first empirical investigations of IR activities and their 
outcomes.116 In this study, the author assesses the impact of independent IR firms, which were 
hired to conduct IR operations, on the stock prices of respective US client companies.117 Using 
data on stock price performance before and after the corresponding recruitments, the study fails 
to measure any significant effect of IR firms on clients’ market valuation. However, according to 
Dennis (1973) as well as to Farragher et al. (1994), due to the consideration of only IR activities 
                                                          
116 cf. Farragher et al. (1994), p. 404. 
117 cf. on this and the following Dennis (1973), pp. 373, 379. 
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performed by external agents, the results of this study are admittedly limited and difficult to 
project onto modern listed firms (which typically employ their own IR staff and may be only 
sometimes supported by external IR firms).118  
Bushee and Miller (2012) use the same identification strategy as Denis (1973), namely the 
recruitment of external service firms, to assess the value of IR in small, less visible companies.119  
In contrast to the study of Denis (1973), considering a US dataset that covers recruitments for 
210 firms between 1998 and 2004 this empirical investigation shows a significant market value 
increase for firms that initiate IR programs. The study also identifies the channels through which 
the ascertained value increase can be explained. The provided empirical evidence suggests that 
initiated IR programs increase the overall level of firms’ disclosure as well as the awareness of 
investors, media, and analysts about these companies—which makes possible to overcome the 
lack of market visibility and difficulties in forming appropriate shareholder base related to the 
investigated firms. However, with reference to Bushee and Miller (2012) as well as to Agarwal et 
al. (2015), the results obtained for small less visible companies cannot be simply generalized for 
larger listed firms, which usually already have well-developed IR strategies and departments.120  
Vlittis and Charitou (2012) exploit announcements of new IR officer appointments and external 
IR firm recruitments to measure the value effects of IR investments.121 Using 146 announcements 
made between 1999 and 2005 by US-listed firms and applying the event study methodology, 
Vlittis and Charitou (2012) find significantly positive value effects of IR investments around the 
announcements. Market participants thus seem to evaluate the extension of IR resources as a 
positive signal, which is corroborated by this study’s additional results on further market 
outcomes. The study also shows a significant increase in firms’ stock liquidity (interpreted as an 
information asymmetry reduction) and a systematical increase in firm visibility after IR 
investments. However, Agarwal et al. (2015) emphasize that the firms in the sample of Vlittis and 
Charitou (2012) are also relatively small, which means the generalizability of these results is 
limited (similar to the findings of Bushee and Miller, 2012).122 Furthermore, the identified value 
effects seem to not persist in the long run, as indicated by insignificant changes in the one-year 
post-announcement performance.123 
                                                          
118 cf. Farragher et al. (1994), p. 404; Dennis (1973), p. 373. 
119 cf. on this and the following Bushee and Miller (2012), pp. 875–877, 880–891. 
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123 cf. Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 964. 
Literature  25 
 
Kirk and Vincent (2014) primarily concentrate their research on more established firms that have 
implemented internal professional IR to draw conclusions about the value of these investments 
for shareholders.124 Applying a dataset that covers US firms from 1996 to 2009, their study finds 
that firms that practice professionalized IR significantly outperform their counterparts in relation 
to market valuation. The results also reveal a significant increase in firms’ disclosure activities 
concerning management earnings forecasts and press releases after the establishment of 
professional IR. In addition, the corresponding firms seem to experience an increase in liquidity 
and visibility relative to the control sample. By using a natural experiment setting that relies on 
the exogenous shock of the introduction of the Regulation Fair Disclosure in the US, the study 
can widely confirm the results obtained in the previous analysis. However, the authors admit that 
their definition of professionalized IR (which is based on NIRI membership) does not necessarily 
imply that non-member firms do not have well-established IR teams that actively communicate 
with market participants. In summary, the study of Kirk and Vincent (2014) extends the existing 
literature by considering the relevance of internal IR for well-developed firms, but the IR 
measure they deploy appears to be subject to some concerns. 
Agarwal et al. (2015) investigate a broad US sample that comprises all firms listed on the NYSE, 
Amex, or NASDAQ stock exchanges for a three-year period from 2000 to 2002.125 Using the 
“best overall IR” awards provided by analysts and investors as its IR measure, this study shows 
that better IR quality is accompanied by higher valuation multiples for all firms—hence for large 
as well as small, less visible companies. However, in contrast to Kirk and Vincent (2014), 
Agarwal et al. (2015) find a significantly positive relation between IR quality and firms’ stock 
liquidity/visibility for small firms only, which leaves the question on value driving channels for 
large firms open. Furthermore, the authors admit that the study covers only a short time period in 
the past due to the non-availability of IR data for recent years; as such, the results may not be 
fully applicable to the contemporary IR framework. 
Further empirical evidence concerning the causal effects of IR is provided by Chang et al. 
(2008).126 Their study uses data on the internet IR activities of 290 Australian firms in 2005 to 
establish a link between IR quality and information asymmetry levels, proxied by a stock 
liquidity measure (in particular, the weighted bid-ask spread). The analysis initially suggests that 
a significantly negative relation exists between the both above-mentioned variables, which 
                                                          
124 cf. on this and the following Kirk and Vincent (2014), pp. 1427, 1437–1438, 1441–1450, note 7.  
125 cf. on this and the following Agarwal et al. (2015), pp. 6, 8, 11–14, 16–17.  
126 cf. on this and the following Chang et al. (2008), pp. 382, 385–389. 
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indicates that IR has a positive information and liquidity effect; however, further investigation 
considering, inter alia, analyst following and institutional ownership uncovers new insights. The 
study reveals that these factors seem to strongly predict the quality of IR (e.g., because IR 
activities have to meet market demands); as such, they appear to be not solely its outcomes, as 
usually assumed. After the researchers instrumentalize IR quality through analyst and investor 
measures, their initially postulated negative effect of IR on information asymmetry disappears, 
hence uncovering a possible endogenous relation between the evaluated variables that casts doubt 
on the results of studies that do not control for this issue. Similar concerns are also stated by 
Hong and Huang (2005), who show in the scope of their theoretical model that the liquidity needs 
and size of equity stakes held by corporate insiders may also positively affect the extent of IR 
activities—which points to an additional agency conflict that may impede the identification of 
IR’s true value.127  
 
Analyst forecasts 
Chang et al. (2014) provide additional contribution to the IR literature by focusing on the relation 
between the properties of analyst forecasts and IR disclosure. Their study relies on qualitative and 
quantitative IR measures and explicitly considers time periods of uncertainty, when the need for 
disclosure is reasonably high.128 Using IR awards granted to 370 Australian firms by analysts and 
fund managers in 2005 and 2009 as the qualitative measure, the analysis reveals that better 
quality IR has a negative effect on the forecast error (i.e., the difference between actual and 
forecasted earnings), which emphasizes the importance of IR’s informational function. This result 
is in line with the findings of Lang and Lundholm (1996), who consider approximately 732 US 
firms during the period 1985–1989,129 and Hope (2003), who investigates a sample of 890 firms 
from 22 countries for the years 1991 and 1993.130 However, according to Chang et al. (2014), the 
ascertained effect is only valid for firms with low levels of disclosure, which is reminiscent of the 
evidence provided by Bushee and Miller (2012) and Vlittis and Charitou (2012).131 While Chang 
et al. (2014) as expected additionally find an increase in firms’ disclosure during the 2008–2009 
global financial crisis, they fail to establish any link between disclosure and the dispersion of 
                                                          
127 cf. Hong and Huang (2005), pp. 1, 25. 
128 cf. on this and the following Chang et al. (2014), pp. 372, 382–387. 
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analyst forecasts. However, the latter result contradicts the empirical evidence on the negative 
relation between these variables presented in previous literature, for instance by Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) and Farragher et al. (1994), who undertake a correlation analysis for 136 large 
US firms from 1982 to 1988.132 The divergences in the results of empirical studies dealing with 
the properties of analyst forecasts may be attributed, besides the differences in the sample 
periods, the size of the investigated firms, and the methodology applied, to the different country-
specific settings applicable to the sample companies as discussed by Aerts et al. (2007). 
In the aforementioned study, Aerts et al. (2007) show that firms from North America exhibit a 
higher involvement in web-based performance disclosure than their counterparts from continental 
Europe, which ultimately results in its stronger negative impact on the dispersion of analyst 
forecasts.133 Using a sample of 894 firms for the year 2002 and applying the simultaneous 
equations approach, this study also uncovers that the level of importance assigned to a firm’s 
disclosure in explaining the forecast deviation is influenced by the number of analysts following 
a company. In the scope of an investigation of the link between IR and forecast dispersion, it 
therefore appears to be reasonable to account for analyst coverage, which can be related to both 
variables of interest. However, the results of Aerts et al. (2007) have one major limitation, 
namely the fact that, in addition to web-based disclosure, firms can generally use other 
communication channels to provide the same information to the market. In this context, Aerts et 
al. (2007) mention, inter alia, press releases and telephone or face-to-face conferences with 
market participants, all of which can serve as substitutes for web activities. As such, internet-
based disclosure can be used as an indicator of IR quality but is admittedly only a part of this 
multifarious function.  
 
Cost of capital 
Another branch of scientific literature on IR deals with the direct link between IR activities and 
firms’ cost of capital. Botosan (1997) investigates this relation with a self-constructed annual 
reports’ disclosure index that is applied as a proxy for all firms’ disclosure activities.134 Using a 
sample that covers 122 US manufacturers in 1990, this study establishes a negative link between 
greater disclosure levels and costs of equity capital for less visible firms. However, according to 
the author, the finding about disclosure’s positive role in reducing capital costs (through reducing 
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information asymmetry, improving firm visibility, or both) is subject to several limitations that 
should be addressed in subsequent research. Botosan (1997) argues that the self-constructed 
measure may fail to capture a firm’s overall disclosure level and that results may not be 
generalizable given that they are only obtained for companies in a single industry for one year. 
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) address the above-mentioned concerns by investigating a broad 
sample of 668 US firms from 1986 through 1996.135 Again, the results of this study suggest that 
greater disclosure provided in annual reports is linked to a reduction in the cost of equity capital, 
which supports the findings of Botosan (1997). However, in explicitly considering the overall IR 
function, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) find no significant relation between the quality of IR and 
firms’ cost of capital. A potential explanation for this surprising result may be that expansive IR 
activities attract more transient institutional investors, who contribute to a higher volatility of the 
relevant stock that may fully offset the benefits concerning capital costs that are usually attributed 
to the IR function. Heflin et al. (2015), who use nearly the same dataset as Botosan and Plumlee 
(2002) while also controlling for earnings quality in their analysis, provide empirical evidence 
that even shows that IR has a significantly positive impact on the cost of equity capital.136  
Whereas all aforementioned studies rely on US data to assess the relation between firms’ cost of 
capital and IR (or disclosure) activities, Francis et al. (2005) investigate a sample drawn from 34 
countries excluding US firms to eliminate the impact of US legal and financial systems on 
disclosure effectiveness.137 Using 672 observations covering the years 1993 and 1995, the study 
establishes a negative and significant link between a firm’s higher voluntary disclosure level and 
cost of equity and debt capital, which confirms the study’s corresponding hypothesis.138 The 
findings of Francis et al. (2005) also suggest that the cost of equity capital is already lower in 
countries with higher investor protection.139 This is generally in line with the predictions noted in 
chapter 2.3 of the present thesis, the empirical investigation of which might help to clarify the 
mixed picture created by the above-described studies. 
 
Stock volatility 
The volatility of stock prices is a further subject of empirical investigations dealing with IR and 
corresponding disclosure activities. In this context, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) analyze a sample 
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from 1997 of 102 German firms that had committed themselves to an international reporting 
regime—and hence higher disclosure levels.140 While this study finds that the committed firms 
experience a decrease in the information asymmetry components of their cost of capital (namely, 
a decrease of bid-ask spreads and an increase in share turnover), it is unable to establish the same 
link for price volatility as an additional information asymmetry proxy. Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) argue that the absence of significant results concerning this measure may on the one hand 
be attributable to the sensitivity of stock deviation to factors entirely unrelated to information 
asymmetry and on the other hand be linked to differences in the types of institutional investors 
attracted by firms’ disclosure activities. In particular, improvements in IR (or disclosure) may be 
accompanied by an increase in the holdings of investors with a short-term investment horizon, 
who in turn have a positive impact on stock volatility as ascertained by Bushee and Noe (2000) 
for US firms between 1982 and 1996.141 
Further evidence on the link between stock price volatility and IR practices is provided by Rieks 
and Lobe (2009), who investigate 258 German firms that have been included in the DAX, 
MDAX, SDAX, and TecDAX indices from 2002 to 2007.142 Using rankings awarded by analysts 
to firms for their overall IR activities, this study establishes a positive link between IR quality 
and direct liquidity measures, which has also been shown for the US companies. In a next step, 
the study considers both the stock return volatility and share trading volume of investigated 
firms. The findings reveal a significantly negative relation between these measures and the level 
of IR quality, which contradicts the previous empirical evidence. According to Rieks and Lobe 
(2009), this result supports the view that IR practices can help to reduce the divergence of 
investors’ opinions by reducing information asymmetry between firms and investors as well as 
among investors themselves. In addition, the study is unable to find any evidence for the 
perception that higher IR quality predominantly attracts short-term oriented investors. The 
observed deviation in prior study results may also be attributed at this point to the differences in 
the investigated time periods or firms’ local origins. 
 
Further studies 
The framework of the IR function as well as its impact on corporate outcomes are investigated in 
a few other empirical studies, which are summarized here. Bollen et al. (2006), Hassink et al. 
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(2007), D’Amato and Cacia (2013), Feng and Wan (2013), Bagnoli et al. (2014), Koehler (2014), 
Trabelsi et al. (2014), and Gajewski and Li (2015) provide evidence on the contribution of 
Internet-based IR activities (particularly with regard to the contents of corporate websites) to the 
information environment and thus to the alleviation of information asymmetries. Some empirical 
insights are also provided into the drivers of different disclosure levels (Frankel et al., 1995; 
Gelb, 2000; Gelb and Strawser, 2001). Further studies investigate determinants of the existence 
of firms’ internal IR departments and officers (Marston, 1996; Rao and Sivakumar, 1999) or deal 
with events that enable IR staff and management to have individual interactions with market 
participants, such as analyst and investor days (Kirk and Markov, 2016) and investor conferences 
(Green et al., 2014). In contrast, Peasnell et al. (2011) reveal the limits of even the best IR 
departments during high-profile corporate scandals.143 Finally, van Geyt et al. (2014) find that 
high-quality disclosure reduces the profitability of insider trading. This supports the theoretical 
prediction of Baiman and Verrecchia (1996), who expect managers’ informational advantages to 
be reduced by enhanced information flows to investors.144  
One of the most recent and comprehensive studies on the economic effects of IR is provided by 
Karolyi and Liao (2017), who address a large number of questions raised in previous scientific 
literature. Several predictions and methodological procedures in the present thesis are derived 
from that study due to its well-developed framework. Karolyi and Liao (2017) use the results of 
BNY Mellon’s 2012 Investor Relations Survey, which includes 773 firms located in 59 countries, 
to develop an IR score for each firm based on its responses related to 25 attributes concerning its 
IR activities.145 As a first step, this study establishes a significantly positive link between total IR 
activities and a firm’s market performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. In the next step, Karolyi and 
Liao (2017) show that activities with global outreach (i.e., activities related to foreign markets) in 
particular are positively related to firm performance. Furthermore, by splitting the investigated 
sample into firms from countries with high (low) disclosure standards, regulations against self-
dealing among corporate insiders, and overall rule of law levels, they determine that the positive 
link between global IR activities and Tobin’s Q is stronger for firms with weaker disclosure 
provisions and lower investor protection. The IR effect is hence economically higher for these 
firms, whereas the subsample of companies from countries with higher disclosure and investor 
protection standards suffers from a lack of significant results. In addition, the absence of a 
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statistically significant IR effect for the subsample of firms that are cross-listed in the US (which 
typically accompanies a commitment to higher firm transparency) corroborates the above-
mentioned insights. As such, these findings basically support the prediction stated in chapter 2.3 
with regard to heterogeneity in the economic role of IR attributed to legal and market 
environments. However, in this context a question arises as to how cross-country differences may 
actually come about—and thus whether significant divergences exist with regard to IR’s 
relevance for several value-driving channels identified in the scientific literature (which may be 
more or less pronounced in a specific legal and market setting). The present thesis aims to shed 
light on this issue, thereby complementing the first evidence on cross-country IR differences 
provided by Karolyi and Liao (2017).  
Using their full sample of firms, Karolyi and Liao (2017) further show that higher global IR 
activities are positively related to firms’ foreign analyst following, institutional ownership, and 
global equity issuance.146 Karolyi and Liao (2017) also report a negative significant relation 
between the implied cost of capital and overall IR efforts. On the other hand, relying on several 
proxies, they are unable to establish a strong positive relation of IR activities to stock liquidity, 
which is frequently suggested in prior empirical research. In the scope of additional tests, Karolyi 
and Liao (2017) uncover that IR activities are not merely a proxy for overall firm-level CG. This 
result is important for interpreting IR as a separate value-creating function.  
In addition to deep investigation of the IR function, the analysis conducted by Karolyi and Liao 
(2017) is characterized by its comprehensive empirical framework. In particular, the study uses 
the fraction of IR budget allocated for external support, number of IR department members, and 
IR officers’ base salaries for instrumentalizing firms’ IR measure to address potential 
endogeneity concerns related to the link between IR and corporate outcomes.147 It also deploys 
the distances between firms and foreign investors as an additional instrumental variable based on 
the concepts of proximity to investors and cost of travel. Due to the convincing design of this 
analysis, the present thesis relies on similar instruments to alleviate endogeneity concerns and 
provide conclusive evidence. In this context, the problems related to the endogeneity of variables 
in empirical research as well as respective solutions are introduced in the next chapter.  
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3.2 Endogeneity concerns in empirical studies 
Endogeneity is a serious issue in the scope of accounting, finance, and corporate governance 
research that can distort empirical results and thus prevent causal inference.148 With regard to IR 
and disclosure research, Healy and Palepu (2001) and Core (2001) voice similar doubts 
concerning whether studies that do not appropriately account for this issue provide any valuable 
insights.149 In this context, Wintoki et al. (2012) emphasize that it is admittedly difficult to find 
(explanatory) factors that are fully exogenous and allow a clear link of interest to be 
established.150 Endogeneity problems particularly arise because the variables included in an 
empirical model are often subject to simultaneous determination and measurement errors; the 
model may also suffer from the omission of further important variables.151 From a statistical 
point of view, all of these issues can lead to a correlation between an explanatory variable and the 
error term of a regression model that in turn causes biased and inconsistent regression 
estimates.152 The statistical relevance of this problem is discussed in detail in the methodology 
section of the present thesis, while the reasons for endogeneity, particularly vis-à-vis IR analysis, 
are explained in this chapter. 
 
Simultaneity  
The simultaneity issue means that an explanatory measure’s expected impact on the outcome 
variable could also exist in the reverse direction.153 As such, either the outcome variable itself can 
be the driver of the link to the explanatory measure (which is known as reverse causality) or both 
variables can be simultaneously determined distorting the empirical model’s results.154 An 
example of a simultaneous relation frequently mentioned in the context of CG literature is 
provided by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). These researchers state that firms typically select a 
specific board composition to enhance their financial performance so that firm valuation can be 
affected by board structure, while performance itself can affect the choice of the respective 
directors.155 A similar argument can be made regarding the relation between firm performance 
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and IR quality, where IR is expected to drive this link. According to Healy and Palepu (2001), 
increased disclosure activities may also be encouraged by good company performance, for 
instance because firms are more willing to communicate with the capital market during good 
times.156 In this setting, the positive relation between firm value and IR assessed within the 
empirical analysis may result from the performance itself rather than from good IR. Similar 
simultaneity (or reverse causality) issues are also conceivable for other expected outcomes of 
enhanced IR, as suggested by Core (2001).157  
 
Measurement errors 
Endogeneity problem may also arise if the empirical model contains measurement errors in the 
proxies it uses for factors that are difficult to measure or even to observe.158 In the case of a 
measurement error in an explanatory variable (that is the difference between the value of the 
proxy and true value reflected in the error term), the explanatory variable’s estimated effect 
suffers from a so-called familiar attenuation bias that shrinks the coefficient of interest 
downwards toward zero. In addition, the coefficients of other explanatory variables may also be 
biased by a measurement error in the proxy, however in either direction depending on the 
correlation among covariates. Roberts and Whited (2012) emphasize that CG research in 
particular frequently has to rely on proxy measures, for instance to approximate diverse quality 
aspects. This problem seems to also be inherent in studies on IR and disclosure, which often rely 
on rankings to proxy IR quality, the extent of respective activities, or both.159 Some researchers 
use self-constructed IR indices, for example deploying survey data (e.g., Karolyi and Liao, 
2017);160 others use nominations for best IR (e.g., Agarwal et al., 2015)161 or IR rankings 
provided directly by analysts (e.g., Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Rieks and Lobe, 2009).162 
Further measures are based on factor such as memberships in IR associations, as used by Kirk 
and Vincent (2014).163 According to Core (2001), such IR proxies can also obviously be subject 
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to measurement concerns that in relation to IR indices and ratings particularly arise from the 
possibility of judgment errors.164     
 
Omitted variables 
An additional major source of endogeneity in the scope of empirical studies is the omission of 
important factors that affect the explanatory as well as the outcome variable.165 While 
investigating a research question, scholars are typically faced with the issue that the analyzed 
objects (such as firms) are heterogeneous regarding a wide range of different characteristics, 
some of which can admittedly be hard to quantify.166 If relevant factors correlated with both 
variables of interest are not included in the analysis as explanatory measures, they consequently 
occur in the model’s error term that in turn will be naturally correlated with the affected 
explanatory variable—which constitutes an endogeneity problem. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
provide an example of the omitted variable bias in the scope of CG research, once again relying 
on the relation between firm performance and board characteristics.167 They argue that both firm 
performance and board composition may be causally determined by a CEO’s previous 
performance (or more generally, a CEO’s ability); as such, omitting this factor, which is 
obviously not easy to measure, may yield spurious results that indicate an ostensible link between 
firm value and board characteristics. The same issue may arise in the context of IR analysis, 
where firm outcomes and IR quality could depend on a CEO’s skills. The research of Custódio 
and Metzger (2014) provides evidence for this by indicating that CEOs who are financial experts 
tend to communicate better with the financial market, while simultaneously affecting the firms’ 
financing and investment characteristics in another manner than their non-financial expert 
counterparts.168 According to Chang et al. (2008), more obvious factors also exist, the omission 
of which can lead to incorrect conclusions.169 For instance, previous research indicates that firm 
size positively affects a company’s disclosure activities as well as analysts’ forecast properties.170 
As such, the model estimates may be biased if the study does not appropriately account for the 
size of investigated firms.   
                                                          
164 cf. Core (2001), p. 452. 
165 cf. Wintoki et al. (2012), p. 586. 
166 cf. on this and the following Roberts and Whited (2013), p. 498.  
167 cf. on this and the following Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), p. 8. 
168 cf. Custódio and Metzger (2014), pp. 125, 133–135. 
169 cf. Chang et al. (2008), p. 377. 
170 cf. Lang and Lundholm (1993), p. 269. For further elaboration, see Chang et al. (2008), p. 377. 
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Methodological solutions 
Given that endogeneity is a recognized issue in various research areas, several techniques that 
should allow to at least alleviate the corresponding concerns have been introduced in previous 
empirical studies.171 The first approach considered in this thesis deals particularly with the 
problem of the omitted variable bias that results from the unobserved heterogeneity that is 
constant over time.172 This statistical method, which is known as FE estimation, makes it possible 
to eliminate the fixed component of unobserved differences (e.g., across firms), while requiring a 
panel structure of the sample data.173 The main characteristic of the panel data is that it 
additionally covers several time points (e.g., years) for the investigated cross-section.174 If such a 
data structure is available, the FE estimation is conducted by demeaning all variables in the 
model relying on the individual mean values obtained from the considered time period for each 
group of observations.175 Gormely and Matsa (2014) emphasize that in the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity, the FE approach provides consistent estimates and is well suited to 
address existing concerns, inter alia in finance research. However, this method also has some 
limitations; in particular, the FE approach does not make it possible to identify the effects 
attributed to explanatory variables that do not vary over time and cannot account for time-variant 
unobserved heterogeneity. The concerns attributed to the last issue can be at least partially 
addressed by including adequate control variables in the research model, as indicated in previous 
elaborations on firm size.176  
Another statistical method capable of dealing with the endogeneity of explanatory variables is the 
IV approach. According to Larcker and Rusticus (2010), IV estimation can help to address 
several causes of endogeneity; in addition to the omitted variables bias, it also addresses both 
measurement errors and simultaneity (or reverse causality) concerns.177 This is because in an IV 
setting, the endogenous explanatory variable has to be instrumentalized (or proxied) by an 
exogenous instrument (or a set of those instruments) that is not correlated with the error term. As 
such, instruments’ impacts on the explained variable have to come solely through their effect on 
the instrumentalized variable.178 This further implies that the instruments must be correlated with 
                                                          
171 cf. Gippel et al. (2015), pp. 143–144. 
172 cf. Wooldridge (2013), p. 444, 466. 
173 cf. Wintoki et al. (2012), pp. 586–587. 
174 cf. Wooldridge (2013), p. 10.  
175 cf. on this and the following Gormley and Matsa (2014), pp. 631, 650. 
176 cf. Wintoki et al. (2012), p. 588. 
177 cf. on this and the following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), pp. 186–187, note 3. 
178 cf. Reeb et al. (2012), p. 214. 
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the endogenous variable of interest after the impacts of other variables included in the model are 
netted out.179 Once such instruments have been identified, the most common approach in 
scientific research, namely two-stage least squares (2SLS) can be implemented. As a first step, 
the instruments and other exogenous variables (controls) in the model are used to predict the 
endogenous variable’s values. At the second stage, these predicted values are used to replace the 
endogenous measure and estimate the impact on the outcome variable. A few other estimation 
methods, such as three-stage least squares (3SLS) and the Heckman approach, also rely on 
instrumental variables.180 However, analogous to 2SLS estimation, they all have to deal with the 
issue of finding appropriate exogenous instruments in the context of the investigated research 
question.181 As recognized in the scientific literature, the study of Bennedsen et al. (2007) 
provides a good example of well-suited instruments.182 This study investigates the impact of 
family CEO succession on firm performance, assuming the succession variable to be 
endogenous.183 To alleviate the omitted variable bias and reverse causality concerns, Bennedsen 
et al. (2007) use the gender of the departing CEO’s firstborn child as their instrument for the 
succession decision. In this regard, it is difficult to imagine that the child’s gender affects firm 
outcomes, while the study empirically shows a higher probability for the appointment of a family 
CEO if the departing CEO’s firstborn child is male. This instrument thus seems to be truly 
exogenous as well as relevant in the case of CEO succession; as such, the negative effect of 
family succession on performance assessed in this study can be seen as causal.184 In the context 
of voluntary disclosure research, several studies (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Brown and 
Hillegeist, 2007; Chang et al., 2008) introduce different instruments that should help to establish 
causal inference. However, according to Larcker and Rusticus (2010), most of these instruments, 
which frequently comprise financial ratios or analyst and investor properties, are selected in an 
arbitrary way and may not meet the exogeneity assumption.185 By introducing IR resources (i.e., 
the budget for external help, the number of IR staff, and IR staff base salaries) as the instruments 
for IR activities, Karolyi and Liao (2017) attempt to avoid the aforementioned concerns.186 This 
set of instruments appears to be better suited to comply with the exogeneity requirement in the 
                                                          
179 cf. on this and the following Roberts and Whited (2013), pp. 512–513. 
180 cf. Larcker and Rusticus (2010), p. 187. 
181 cf. Agarwal et al. (2015), p. 14; Larcker and Rusticus (2010), p. 189. 
182 cf. Roberts and Whited (2013), p. 514; Wintoki et al. (2012), p. 586, note 2. 
183 cf. on this and the following Bennedsen et al. (2007), pp. 647, 688–689. 
184 cf. Roberts and Whited (2013), pp. 514–515. 
185 cf. Larcker and Rusticus 2010, pp. 187, 198–198. 
186 cf. on this and the following Karolyi and Liao (2017), pp. 16–17, 19 
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context of IR research, although Karolyi and Liao (2017) also voice some doubts. More 
specifically, they assert that the application of these instruments may be linked to the issue that 
IR resources are at a firm’s discretion and thus could be related to firm value. In consequence, 
following Karolyi and Liao (2017) the present thesis does not only rely on this set of instruments; 
it also deploys measures based on proximity to investors and ease of traveling for IR officers and 
management, as presented and motivated in the methodology section. The next chapter first 
develops hypotheses on the economic relevance of IR and describes the sample data. 
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4 Hypotheses, measures, and sample data 
4.1 IR quality and firm performance 
4.1.1 Hypotheses 
Fundamental expectations concerning whether IR activities generate value are highly dependent 
on whether the potential benefits of IR can outweigh the costs attributed to this function.187 As 
already indicated in previous chapters of this thesis, IR can contribute to shareholder wealth and 
consequently to a firm’s market performance through several channels. In short, IR can help to 
both reduce the level of information asymmetry through (voluntary) disclosure and increase a 
firm’s market visibility and recognition. The establishment and maintenance of (close) 
relationships to market participants and the formation of a stable shareholder base can also be 
seen as important outcomes of the IR function. In line with Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), all 
of this may ultimately result in lowering a firm’s cost of capital and increasing its market 
valuation.188 On the other hand, Hong and Huang (2005) point out that IR activities can be 
accompanied by substantial costs, which in the first instance include expenses related to 
information production and dissemination as well as to attracting and supporting investors and 
analysts.189 In addition, the time that top executives and other involved parties expend on IR 
activities generates opportunity costs. Furthermore, firm insiders may exploit IR to achieve 
personal goals (e.g., a higher liquidity of their stakes) that do not necessarily benefit other 
shareholders to the same extent, even though the corresponding costs are borne by all 
stockholders. In addition, Agarwal et al. (2015) state that not all of the outcomes of good IR 
necessarily create value for shareholders.190 For instance, higher firm visibility may also be 
value-destroying if it leads to market over-optimism accompanied by lower firms’ future returns. 
Lang and Lundholm (2000) further emphasize that stock marketing activities do not necessarily 
contribute to persistent value increase due to downward corrections by the market.191 Finally, IR 
investments may represent sunk costs for already renowned firms that are intensively followed by 
analysts and exhibit only a low information asymmetry level.192  
                                                          
187 cf. Agarwal et al. (2015), pp. 4–5. 
188 cf. Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), pp. 30, 37. 
189 cf. on this and the following Hong and Huang (2005), pp. 1–2. 
190 cf. on this and the following Agarwal et al. (2015), p. 5. 
191 cf. Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 623. 
192 cf. Agarwal et al. (2015), p. 5. 
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Indeed, some of the empirical studies presented in chapter 3.1 (e.g., Dennis, 1973; Rieks and 
Lobe, 2009) are unable to establish a positive link between IR and firm value, whereby none of 
these studies report a systematically negative relation. On the other hand, most of the recent 
empirical results—such as those of Vlittis and Charitou (2012), Kirk and Vincent (2014), and 
Agarwal et al. (2015)—suggest that better IR does significantly enhance market performance for 
both small and well-developed companies, which indicates that IR’s benefits seem to outweigh 
its costs and consequently enhance shareholder wealth. The present thesis provides additional 
contribution to existing studies on the performance relevance of IR by considering a recent time 
period of 10 years for a broad panel dataset that comprises German and UK firms and thereby 
extending the empirical results mainly reported for the US market with evidence concerning 
European firms. Motivated by the question of whether IR as a potentially costly function is 
worthwhile, the expectation in this thesis is formulated in line with the majority of previous IR 
studies:   
H1.1: Better IR quality is associated with higher firm performance in Germany and the UK 
Furthermore, as previously elaborated in chapter 2.3 and indicated in the study of Karolyi and 
Liao (2017), the extent of IR’s value contribution may deviate among countries due to 
divergences in their legal and market environments. In line with the implications provided by the 
studies of La Porta et al. (1998, 2000), Ball et al. (2000), and Djankov et al. (2008), the level of 
(residual) information asymmetry seems to be higher in the case of German firms (which act in a 
civil law and bank-based environment) compared to UK companies (which are subject to 
common law traditions and a market-based financial system). One could consequently expect that 
IR activities that deal with information provision are more relevant for German companies and 
therefore provide a higher contribution to firms’ market valuation. On the other hand, in line with 
Lev (2012) and Bushee and Miller (2012), IR activities that aim to raise firm visibility among 
market participants and ultimately to attract investors may have a similar performance impact in 
both countries—or have even higher relevance in the UK due to firms being more reliant on 
market financing. Nevertheless, because the information aspect of IR in particular appears to be 
tangential to a variety of value-generating channels (as indicated in the literature review), this 
thesis expects a higher value impact of IR for German firms in comparison to UK companies: 
H1.2: The positive link between IR quality and firm performance is stronger for German firms in 
comparison to UK firms 
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The empirical investigation of this prediction contributes to the existing literature by providing 
evidence on the differences in the relevance of IR quality for companies based in two developed 
countries characterized by divergent financial market systems and law environments.  
 
4.1.2 Measure of IR quality and its practical relevance 
The present thesis uses IR firm rankings obtained from the Extel WeConvene (formerly Thomson 
Reuters) survey, which is the world’s largest study of this kind,193 to measure the quality of the 
IR activities of German and UK listed firms. According to the interviews undertaken with IR 
professionals, the results of the Extel survey are highly regarded by practitioners and constitute 
an appropriate external measure of firms’ IR performance. The practical relevance of the Extel 
rankings becomes further apparent through a review of the IR web portals of several German and 
UK companies (e.g., BASF AG, Deutsche Telekom AG, or Daily Mail, and General Trust plc), 
all of which prominently present the results achieved in this survey to highlight the firm’s IR 
performance.194 The validity of the rankings is further encouraged by the survey approach, which 
in contrast to Karolyi and Liao (2017) does not rely on information that firms provide on their 
own IR activities and instead uses the perceptions of individuals from buy-and sellside firms 
(who are the direct addressees of IR practices and can provide independent and sound opinions 
on the quality of companies’ IR). This is particularly true seeing as the surveyed individuals from 
sellside firms are typically analysts who work for brokerage or research firms and cover the 
evaluated companies, whereas the respondent buyside firms ordinarily represent institutional 
investors (who usually constitute the primary target group of IR departments). A similar IR 
measure is also used in the empirical studies of Heflin et al. (2015), Rieks and Lobe (2009), 
Brown and Hillegeist (2007), and Botosan and Plumlee (2002).  
In particular, participants in the Extel survey are asked to vote on the overall IR quality of 
evaluated companies using a scale from 1 to 5, while considering major IR aspects such as the 
quality of service, website/webcasting, one-on-one meetings, non-deal roadshows, formal 
                                                          
193 cf. Thomson Reuters (06/17/2014): http://thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2014/thomson-reuters-
announces-2014-extel-survey-results.html.  
194 cf. BASF (n.d.): https://www.basf.com/en/company/investor-relations/awards.html,  
     Deutsche Telekom (n.d.): https://www.telekom.com/en/investor-relations/service/awards, 
     Daily Mail and General Trust (11/26/08): http://www.dmgt.com/news-and-media/news-articles/2008/26-11-2008.  
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disclosure, the proactivity of senior executives, and business knowledge/insights.195 Given that 
respondents may come from the same buy- or sellside firm, the votes of individuals from the 
same institution are combined to obtain an average vote for that firm. After the votes of all 
participating buy- and sellside firms are calculated, they are weighted using the European assets 
under management in the case of buyside firms and by applying previous years’ Extel brokerage 
rankings for votes submitted by sellside companies. This weighting scheme should help to 
account for the market presence of respective participants. Finally, companies are ranked relative 
to their counterparts on the basis of the aggregated scores for each evaluated firm. The stock 
indices that have included the respective companies in the given year are used for the 
classification. For the German market, firms are compared within the DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and 
TecDAX indices.196 For UK firms, the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE Small Cap indices are 
applied.197 Due to the indices’ requirements concerning factors such as the constituents’ (free 
float) market capitalization and share turnover, this approach ensures that a firm is ranked against 
companies that exhibit, inter alia, a comparable size. This addresses the issue of the variation in 
IR quality simply being an outcome of the investigated firms’ different development levels. In 
the end, the aforementioned approach yields each firm’s position in the given year, with a value 
of 1 being assigned to the firm in the first place (indicating the best IR quality) and, for instance 
in the case of DAX-listed firms, the company with the worst IR performance receiving a value of 
30. 
The results of the Extel survey, which is conducted both online and in paper form, are obtained 
for the time period from 2006 to 2014. The final dataset used in this thesis covers rankings for 
199 German firms and 338 UK companies for which the required data is available. Overall, the 
German sample covers 1143 firm-year observations and the UK sample contains 1651. 
Furthermore, the rankings are matched to firms’ outcomes potentially affected by IR activities 
                                                          
195 cf. on this and the following Extel (n.d.) https://www.extelsurveys.com//IRBenchmarks/IRBenchmarksHome.aspx, 
DIRK (06/13/2013): https://www.dirk.org/dirk_webseite/static/uploads/130613_final_DIRK_Extel_2013_English.pdf, 
DIRK (05/10/11): https://www.dirk.org/dirk_webseite/static/uploads/100511_-_extel_ir_2010_report_deutsch_ 
final.pdf.  
196 The DAX index contains the 30 largest stocks listed on the Prime Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The 
MDAX index comprises the following 50 companies and the SDAX the next 50 firms sorted by size. The 
TecDAX index includes the 30 largest technology companies after the firms already covered by the DAX index. 
See Deutsche Börse (n.d.) http://www.deutsche-boerse-cash-market.com/dbcm-en/primary-market/being-
public/indices.   
197 The FTSE 100 index contains the 100 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange that have the highest market 
capitalization. The FTSE 250 index comprises the next 250 firms and FTSE Small Cap index nearly 280 
subsequent companies sorted by their market capitalization. See FTSE Russell (n.d.): http://www.ftse.com/ 
products/indices/uk.  
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(e.g., market performance), as well as to other corporate characteristics that are introduced later 
in this thesis. In this context, it should be noted that the Extel survey is typically conducted 
during a period between February and early May.198 Consequently, the IR rankings are matched 
to the firm characteristics of the fiscal year ending before, during, or directly after the evaluation 
period. For instance, if a firm’s fiscal year ends in December 2007, the IR ranking obtained for 
this firm within the 2008 Extel study is used to approximate its IR performance in 2007. 
Furthermore, the results of the same study are matched to the firm’s characteristics from the 
fiscal year ending, e.g., in April 2008, because the corresponding votes of the buy- and sellside 
firms obviously refer to IR activities performed during that fiscal year, irrespective of its overlap 
with the evaluation period. This procedure ultimately makes it possible to create an appropriate 
panel structure for the present sample. 
 
Validity test 
As described earlier in this chapter, the Extel IR rankings appear to be an appropriate measure of 
IR performance. To further validate this proxy, the present thesis conducts an empirical analysis 
motivated by previous empirical studies on management turnover. As suggested by Coughlan et 
al. (1985), if managers’ activities do not positively contribute to shareholder wealth, a change in 
the management team’s composition could be expected.199 Using past abnormal stock 
performance (relative to a market index) as the measure of management performance, these 
researchers show that the probability of CEO dismissal declines with higher firm market 
performance. Warner et al. (1988) provide similar evidence.200 Following this basic idea and 
assuming that the Extel rankings adequately measure IR quality (or performance), one should 
expect that the probability of IR manager turnover is negatively linked to better Extel survey 
results. Furthermore, while a firm’s management team is typically led by the CEO, the head of IR 
is his or her counterpart in the IR department and bears primary responsibility for the company’s 
IR activities.201 In consequence, the following hypothesis is tested in the scope of the empirical 
analysis: 
H1.3: The probability of head of IR turnover is inversely related to IR quality 
                                                          
198 cf. DIRK (06/13/2013): https://www.dirk.org/dirk_webseite/static/uploads/130613_final_DIRK_Extel_2013_ 
English.pdf, DIRK (05/07/07): https://www.dirk.org/dirk_webseite/static/uploads/070520_-_extel_ir_study_2007.pdf.  
199 cf. for this and the following Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), pp. 46, 48, 60–63. 
200 cf. Warner et al. (1988), p. 461. 
201 cf. Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 945. 
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To assess the validity of this prediction, a unique sample containing information on IR officers is 
compiled for the full sample period from 2006 to 2014.202 The heads of IR for each given firm-
year are identified by scanning corporate websites (also using the “Wayback Machine”, which 
makes it possible to browse past versions of websites), annual reports, and the “Hoppenstedt 
Aktienfuehrer” database, as well as by consulting the information provided in the Extel IR 
surveys. Given that information on the exact or at least approximate date of head of IR turnover 
is not available for all cases, an advanced search for related announcements is conducted via the 
LexisNexis database (which can be used to browse news articles, publications, and other 
materials from a variety of origins, including wire services). Lastly, this hand-collected dataset is 
complemented by a Google search. Following prior studies, IR rankings applicable to the fiscal 
year before a head of IR change are used to evaluate the link between IR quality and turnover 
probability.  
 
4.1.3 Firm performance proxy 
In line with several empirical studies on the value relevance of CG characteristics (e.g., Morck et 
al., 1988; Yermack, 1996; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; La Porta et al., 2002; Gompers et al., 
2003; Bebchuk et al., 2009), Tobin’s Q is used as the market-based firm performance proxy in 
the present thesis. Tobin (1969), who first introduced this measure in the scope of his theoretical 
study, defines Q as “the value of capital relative to its replacement cost.”203 In the context of 
financial metrics, Tobin’s Q consequently indicates a firm’s relative price by putting its market 
value in relation to the replacement costs of its assets:204  
 	 =     +                                             (1) 
According to Morck et al. (1988), one of the main advantages of applying Tobin’s Q in the 
context of CG studies is that this ratio makes it possible to assess whether a firm “has valuable 
intangible assets in addition to physical capital, such as monopoly power (…), goodwill, a stock 
                                                          
202 As the analysis of IR turnovers is only conducted to support the validity of the IR measure, which is the same for 
both investigated countries, the verification test is limited to German companies for which the required data is 
available from the aforementioned sources. 
203 Tobin (1969), p. 21.     
204 cf. Yermack (1996), pp. 190, 192; Chung and Pruitt (1994), p. 70.  
Hypotheses, measures, and sample data  44 
 
of patents, or good managers.”205 If a firm owns such intangible resources, Tobin’s Q should 
theoretically exceed a value of 1, because the capital market would assign a higher value to the 
firm that would be accompanied by an increase in the numerator.206 The quality of a firm’s IR 
can also be considered as an intangible factor that may contribute to the part of the market 
valuation that goes beyond the firm’s measurable assets. For instance, Karolyi and Liao (2017) as 
well as Vlittis and Charitou (2012) rely on Tobin’s Q as a performance measure in the scope of 
their IR analyses.  
However, because some components of Tobin’s Q are admittedly hard to quantify, empirical 
studies usually deploy approximations of this ratio.207 Estimating the replacement costs of a 
firm’s assets poses a particular challenge, which is typically resolved by using the book values of 
company’s assets. The same applies to the market value of a firm’s debt, which is frequently 
assumed to be equal to its book value. Chung and Pruitt (1994) show that such approximation of 
Tobin’s Q has moderate requirements regarding the data and the calculation effort, while it 
almost completely explains the variability of this ratio obtained by more complex techniques. As 
such, the approximate Tobin’s Q is used in the present thesis:208 
 !  	 =  
    ℎ # + $   $                        (2) 
where the market value of shares is calculated by multiplying the firm’s stock price by the 
number of outstanding shares. For multiple equity securities, the value of each security is 
determined separately.209 In the next step, these values are cumulated to the full market value of 
the firm’s equity. For this thesis, all stock prices, numbers of shares, and book values referring to 
fiscal year-ends are extracted from the Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
According to Vlittis and Charitou (2012), Tobin’s Q is also used in scientific research as a proxy 
for the growth opportunities of a firm that are incorporated into its market value in accordance 
with investors’ expectations.210 Given that firms with more growth opportunities may profit more 
                                                          
205 Morck et al. (1988), p. 296. 
206 cf. Lindenberg and Ross (1981), p. 2. 
207 cf. on this and the following Kaplan and Zingales (1997), p. 177; Gompers et al. (2003), p. 126; Bebchuk et al. (2009), 
p. 800. 
208 cf. Chung and Pruitt (1994), p. 71. 
209 The value of outstanding preferred stocks is calculated as the liquidating value. Cf. Chung and Pruitt (1994),           
p. 71. 
210 cf. on this and the following Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 952. 
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from IR activities (e.g., through reduced financing costs) and may be consequently more engaged 
in IR, endogeneity issues may arise. As such, the present thesis appropriately accounts for the 
growth opportunities of the sample firms to alleviate the aforementioned concerns and establish a 
less noisy relation between IR and firm performance. Further control variables deployed in this 
analysis are introduced in the next chapters. 
 
4.2 IR quality and common value-generating channels 
4.2.1 Hypotheses 
The contribution of IR to firm value discussed in the previous section can be encouraged through 
several channels, as shown by the empirical studies presented in chapter 3.1. However, the results 
of these studies, which are primarily conducted in relation to the US market or a set of pooled 
countries, are mixed; as such, it is still not clear whether major omitted factors (e.g., country-
specific settings) drive the outcomes of that research and are responsible for the identified 
differences. The main contribution of this part of the present thesis concerns the disentanglement 
of IR effects on firms’ major financial metrics with regard to the base level of information and 
prevalent financial structures in a given country. Using the most recent panel data available for 
German and UK firms, this thesis is the first to perform such a broad and deep analysis in trying 
to identify the relevance of IR activities in different market environments. Corresponding 
hypotheses are derived below. 
 
Stock volatility 
The divergences in empirical results on the impact of IR on firms’ stock volatility are revealed 
through the significantly negative effect found by Rieks and Lobe (2009) for the German market 
and the mixed evidence presented by Bushee and Noe (2000) for US firms (which even indicates 
an increase of stock volatility in the case of IR improvements).211 In general, the main reason that 
good IR may negatively affect the volatility of firms’ stocks is the reduction of information 
asymmetries between firms and their shareholders as well as among investors themselves.212 
More forthcoming information provision should therefore align investors’ expectations and 
                                                          
211 cf. Rieks and Lobe (2009), p. 24; Bushee and Noe (2000), pp. 187, 200. 
212 cf. on this and the following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 99. 
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ensure a fair firm valuation, thereby reducing stock price fluctuations. On the other hand, as 
Bushee and Noe (2000) suggest, enhanced IR may attract more transient institutional investors 
with high turnover in their portfolios, who in turn positively contribute to stock volatility.213 
However, on the contrary Bushee and Miller (2012) show that IR activities tend to attract long-
term rather than short-term investors, which makes this relation appear more obscure.214 
Consideration of the aforementioned predictions and empirical evidence yields divergent 
expectations on the link between IR and stock volatility for German and UK firms. First, because 
German companies seem to suffer from greater information asymmetry issues, higher quality IR 
should contribute more to the reduction of their stock volatility than in comparison to their UK 
counterparts. Furthermore, the inconsistent empirical results on the formation of the shareholder 
base and this base’s role for the stock deviation may be related to the fact that high-quality IR is 
linked to an intensive shareholder base management—which aims to achieve an equilibrium 
between liquidity and the volatility of firm’s stock by selecting suitable investors in accordance 
with a firm’s current requirements.215 As a result, the ownership of short- and long-term investors 
should on average yield a zero-net effect on stock volatility, which is in line with elaborations of 
Bushee and Noe (2000).216 Here improving the information environment still seems to be the 
main channel through which IR quality may affect stock volatility, whereby the extensive 
relationship management conducted in the scope of good IR could, for instance additionally help 
to avoid conflicts between firms and their shareholders as suggested by Hoffmann et al. (2011)—
and thereby contribute to less volatile stock prices.217 In summary, one can also expect at least a 
non-positive relation between better IR and volatility for UK firms. These considerations lead to 
the following hypotheses: 
H2.1: Better IR quality is associated with lower stock volatility for German firms 
H2.2: Better IR quality is either not or negatively associated with stock volatility for UK firms 
H2.3: The (negative) link between IR quality and stock volatility is stronger for German firms in 
comparison to UK firms 
 
                                                          
213 cf. Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 187, 200. 
214 cf. Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 884. 
215 cf. Lev (2012), p. 52; Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), p. 1348. 
216 cf. Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 200. 
217 cf. Hoffmann et al. (2011), pp. 4, 6. 
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Analyst following, forecast dispersion, and forecast error 
As discussed in chapter 2.2, in addition to contributing to information provision, IR activities 
may also aim to enhance firm visibility and recognition among market participants, which can in 
turn help to improve the company’s ability to raise funds and form its desired shareholder base. 
Following the theoretical work of Merton (1987), which assumes that market participants invest 
only in stocks about which they are aware,218 several empirical studies additionally predict that 
market participants’ awareness of a company ultimately enables the firm to lower its financing 
costs.219 In this context, information intermediaries such as financial analysts serve as an 
important link between companies and financial markets (e.g., by providing reports and estimates 
on firm performance as well as specific investment recommendations).220 Firms may thus have an 
incentive to attract more analysts to cover their stocks and increase their recognition among 
potential investors.221 The extensive support of analysts, which may include activities such as 
calls and meetings with IR and management representatives, can positively contribute to the 
aforementioned goal.222 Furthermore, prior empirical studies have found that a higher number of 
analysts following a firm is linked to less dispersed and more accurate estimates concerning the 
company’s future earnings.223 Potential investors may ultimately anticipate the more consistent 
views of analysts on a firm’s prospects, which in turn may result in their more congruent beliefs 
about firm performance.224 In this context, a more informative company disclosure as an element 
of better IR practice can also help to expand the analyst coverage by reducing analysts’ efforts 
and costs linked to information searches.225 In addition, more sophisticated disclosure not only 
encourages the reduction of the information asymmetry level, which makes more accurate 
estimates possible; it also enhances the reliability of the disclosed information, which can result 
in higher analysts’ agreement being reflected in their forecasts. 
The results of previous empirical studies such as Agarwal et al. (2015), Kirk and Vincent (2014), 
and Lang and Lundholm (1996) widely support the prediction concerning the positive relation 
between IR and analyst following. In contrast, the empirical evidence on the link between IR and 
analyst dispersion is mixed and seems to depend on the study setting. For instance, Chang et al. 
                                                          
218 cf. Lehavy and Sloan (2008), p. 328. 
219 cf., amongst others, Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 870; Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1425. 
220 cf. Chang et al. (2014), p. 366. 
221 cf. Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1305. 
222 cf. Bollen et al. (2006), p. 275. 
223 cf. Hope (2003), p. 261; Aerts (2007), pp. 1316–1319. 
224 cf. Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 490. 
225 cf. on this and the following Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), p. 30. 
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(2014) argue that they may be unable to establish the expected relation due to the predominance 
of small firms with a limited analyst following in the scope of their sample.226 However, this 
issue does not appear to apply to the broad sample of companies analyzed in the present thesis. 
Aerts et al. (2007) also do not present significant results for their sample of continental European 
firms.227 This is presumably due to their application of a web-based disclosure measure that 
obviously captures only a part of IR functions and does not consider, for instance the quality of 
conference calls and meetings—and as such fully neglects individual communication with 
analysts. The rankings used in the present study, on the other hand, reflect the overall quality of 
IR and consequently allow this concern to be overcome. Furthermore, in contrast to Hope (2003), 
Farragher et al. (1994) are not able to establish a link between IR and accuracy of earnings 
forecasts in the scope of their correlation analysis.228 This could be attributable to the omission of 
important explanatory variables such as firm size and analyst coverage, which are consequently 
taken into account in the present analysis.  
In addition to the differences in the settings of the previous studies, the divergences among the 
empirical results may be further ascribed to the different information environments applicable to 
the investigated firms. In line with Aerts et al. (2007), the analysts covering German companies 
may face higher costs related to the gathering of information compared to UK firms, due to the 
less sophisticated base level of existing disclosure provisions.229 In turn, the higher information 
asymmetry level in Germany offers more scope for (voluntary) IR disclosure, which makes it 
possible to reduce information search costs and encourages more accurate forecasts; as a result, 
better IR should more severely affect analysts’ estimates and coverage in the case of German 
firms. In summary, while the potential goal of enhancing a firm’s market visibility can be equally 
attributed to the IR activities of German and UK companies, the information aspect seems to be 
more important for German firms. One can therefore expect a positive link between IR and 
analyst following for firms from both countries, whereas the negative relation between IR and 
forecast dispersion or forecast error should primarily appear for German companies. 
Consequently, the following hypotheses are tested in the present thesis: 
H3.1: Better IR quality is associated with higher analyst following for German firms 
                                                          
226 cf. Chang et al. (2014), p. 365. 
227 cf. on this and the following Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1320. 
228 cf. on this and the following Farragher et al. (1994), p. 410. 
229 cf. Aerts et al. (2007), pp. 1305–1307. 
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H3.2: Better IR quality is associated with higher analyst following for UK firms 
H3.3: Better IR quality is associated with lower analysts’ forecast dispersion for German firms 
H3.4: Better IR quality is either not or negatively associated with analysts’ forecast dispersion for 
UK firms 
H3.5: Better IR quality is associated with lower analysts’ forecast error for German firms 
H3.6: Better IR quality is either not or negatively associated with analysts’ forecast error for UK 
firms 
H3.7: The links between IR quality and analyst coverage, forecast dispersion, and forecast error 
are stronger for German firms in comparison to UK firms 
 
Stock liquidity 
Stock liquidity usually exhibits a close connection to the conditions on which companies can 
raise new capital.230 This is because less liquid firms must frequently offer discounts to their 
investors to compensate them for the higher risk attributed to the illiquidity of shares. As such, IR 
activities typically aim to address issues that result in low stock liquidity (e.g., information 
asymmetry and limited firm visibility) to improve a firm’s financing terms. As suggested in prior 
scientific literature, enhanced firm disclosure reduces the risk of investors and market makers 
facing a sell or buy order coming from market participants who have better or private 
information, which subsequently increases the firm’s stock attractiveness and decreases the 
respective bid-ask spread.231 Furthermore, investors should have higher incentives to invest in 
more prominent firms linked to lower information search costs and reduced expropriation risks, 
thereby increasing the overall trading activities in corresponding stocks.232  
Results of empirical studies undertaken by authors such as Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Vlittis 
and Charitou (2012), and Kirk and Vincent (2014) widely confirm the positive relation between 
IR activities and firms’ stock liquidity. In contrast, Karolyi and Liao (2017) present mixed 
evidence concerning this relation, which essentially indicates the absence of the expected link.233 
On the one hand, this finding may be attributed to the substantial differences between the sample 
                                                          
230 cf. on this and the following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 92. 
231 cf. Brown and Hillegeist (2007), p. 446; Chang et al. (2008), p. 382. 
232 cf. Agarwal et al. (2015), p. 1. 
233 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 26. 
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firms pooled from different countries; on the other hand, it may be related to the fact that the OLS 
regression conducted within the scope of the bid-ask spread analysis does not appropriately 
account for the endogeneity issues emphasized by Chang et al. (2008).234  
Following the predictions commonly made in the scientific literature and considering the fact that 
IR should positively contribute to firm visibility and the level of trading activities in a firm’s 
stock in different legal and market environments, a positive relation between IR quality and stock 
liquidity is expected for German as well as for UK firms. However, because investors in a bank-
based financial system and civil law environment may profit more from enhanced information 
provision that is accompanied by a lower probability of information-based trading by individual 
investors and hence lower divergences between the bid and ask prices,235 IR is expected to have a 
more pronounced impact for German firms. The following hypotheses are thus evaluated in this 
thesis: 
H4.1: Better IR quality is associated with higher stock liquidity for German firms 
H4.2: Better IR quality is associated with higher stock liquidity for UK firms 
H4.3: The positive link between IR quality and stock liquidity is stronger for German firms in 
comparison to UK firms 
 
Cost of capital 
In the scientific literature on IR (and disclosure), researchers usually expect a negative relation 
between this corporate function and the cost of (equity) capital;236 however, previous empirical 
results do not always support this prediction. As mentioned in the scope of developing 
hypotheses on other potential good IR outcomes, IR could also reduce a firm’s cost of capital for 
two main reasons. First, more informative firm disclosure should negatively affect the level of 
private information among investors and the extent of hidden information between investors and 
a firm’s management, thus simultaneously reducing the uncertainty factor and lowering the 
discount (or return) claimed by market participants with regard to an investment in the firm.237 
The second channel through which IR could affect capital costs is a firm’s better recognition by 
                                                          
234 cf. Chang et al. (2008), p. 386. 
235 cf. Beck and Levine (2002), p. 148; La Porta et al. (2002), p. 1165, note 12. 
236 cf., amongst others, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), p. 1325; Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), pp. 34–37. 
237 cf. Botosan (1997), p. 325; Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 92; Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), pp. 125–127. 
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investors and analysts, which as suggested by the model of Merton (1987) can ultimately increase 
the attractiveness of its stock to fund providers.238 
The empirical results of Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Francis et al. (2005) as 
well as Heflin et al. (2015) reveal that the different components of a firm’s communication with 
capital markets seem to have different effects on its equity costs. While all of the aforementioned 
studies establish a negative link between the quality of disclosure in annual reports and the cost 
of equity capital, the absence of such a link—or even a positive relation—between capital costs 
and explicit IR activities (e.g., individual communication) has also been reported. However, these 
results (particularly the latter) may be not applicable to more recent time periods, because they 
were obtained for the era before serious legal disclosure provisions (e.g., Regulation Fair 
Disclosure in the US) were introduced and individual communication with some market 
participants was possibly linked to a risk of information disadvantages for investors (and thus to 
potentially higher equity costs).239  
The model presented by Hong and Huang (2005) provides additional insights into the role of IR 
for firms’ capital costs by indicating that enhanced IR does not always necessarily lead to a 
decrease in these costs.240 As such, the improvements of other stock characteristics (e.g., 
visibility and liquidity) caused by IR activities may be not appropriately valued by a firm’s 
marginal investors; as a result, the effect would not be transmitted to capital costs to the same 
degree. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) further stress that the mixed results of previous studies on IR 
and the cost of equity capital may be attributed to the fact that the investigated US firms (which 
are comparable to UK companies) already operate in a rich information environment; in 
consequence, they expect to see an effect on the information asymmetry component of the cost of 
capital primarily for German companies.241 While Karolyi and Liao (2017) are able to establish a 
negative link between IR activities and the cost of equity capital for a broad sample of 59 
countries on average,242 as explained above the differences between the constituents may be 
significant. When these considerations and results are applied to the present data, particularly for 
UK companies, one could expect IR to have only a moderate—if any—effect on the cost of 
equity capital. As a result, the following hypotheses are tested in the scope of the present 
empirical analysis:  
                                                          
238 cf. Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 870. 
239 cf. Heflin et al. (2015), p. 23. 
240 cf. on this and the following Hong and Huang (2005), pp. 21, 22. 
241 cf. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 92. 
242 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 26. 
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 H5.1: Better IR quality is associated with lower cost of equity capital for German firms 
H5.2: Better IR quality is either not or negatively associated with the cost of equity capital for UK 
firms 
H5.3: The (negative) link between IR quality and the cost of equity capital is stronger for German 
firms in comparison to UK firms 
In addition to investigating the link between IR and the implied cost of capital by relying on 
yearly panel data, new insights may be obtained by directly considering the announcements of 
firms’ capital actions. This analysis is introduced in the further course of this thesis. First, in the 
next chapter, the variables used in the present study to proxy for the different IR value-generating 
channels are discussed. 
 
4.2.2 Relevant proxies 
Stock volatility 
Following the studies of Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Bushee and Noe (2000), in this thesis 
the standard deviation of daily stock returns calculated over a year’s time is applied to measure 
the stock price volatility of the investigated firms.243 To account for the price deviation attributed 
to capital actions such as stock splits as well as to dividend payments (due to the ex-dividend 
effect), a stock’s total return index is used to calculate respective returns. This index, which is 
obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream, reflects the stock performance adjusted by a 
factor for corporate actions and assuming the reinvestment of dividend payments in the stock 
(neither of which actually changes the financial situation of shareholders). An adjusted daily 
return is thus calculated as follows:244  
 & ' = ('(')* − 1                                                                                                                         (3) 
where ( is the (cumulative) total return index that, for instance, in case of a dividend payment 
can be defined as: 
                                                          
243 cf. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 105; Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 180. 
244 Definitions and formulas are obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream. In addition, cf. Campbell et al. (1997), 
p. 12. 
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(' = (')* ∗ .' + /'.')*                                                                                                                   (4) 
where .' is the stock price on the ex-dividend date, .')* is the price on the day before, and /' is 
the value of the corresponding dividend payment. 
The empirical standard deviation (volatility) of the adjusted daily returns for a firm  is then 
calculated for each given year & of the sample:245 
1 2,4 =  5∑ ( & 2,' −  7 899999999:';* )< − 1                                                                   (5) 
where  7 99999999 is the arithmetic mean of the firm’s adjusted returns in the respective year and  is 
the number of days for which returns in the year & are available. 
In addition, according to Bushee and Noe (2000), the time period to which the IR (or disclosure) 
rankings refer must be carefully taken into account when the volatility measure is being 
calculated.246 In line with the elaboration in chapter 4.1.2 of the present thesis, Bushee and Noe 
(2000) argue that if the rankings are awarded and released in the course of the year, they likely do 
not only refer to the preceding calendar year but also cover a part of the actual year. This is why 
they choose the middle of the year as a cut-off date for their sample, which they use to calculate 
the relevant measures (including stock volatility). Other researchers apply a similar technique, 
such as Botosan and Plumlee (2002).247 However, as completion of the survey and publication of 
the corresponding results used by Bushee and Noe (2000) occurred only in the second half of the 
year, this approach is not applicable to the current analysis (which relies on the Extel survey that 
is always conducted in the first half of each year). Because the majority of the firms in the present 
sample have a fiscal year that ends in December, April can be seen as an appropriate cut-off date. 
In most cases, this date makes it possible to consider the effects attributed to the disclosure of 
firms’ annual reports for the preceding year, as noted by Bushee and Noe (2000).248 Furthermore, 
because the Extel survey’s evaluation period typically ends sometime around April, the quality of 
IR activities—and thus their contributions to things such as the alleviation of information 
asymmetry as reflected in stock volatility—may be closely considered by voting parties until this 
                                                          
245 cf., for instance, Brown and Warner (1980), p. 250. 
246 cf. on this and the following Bushee and Noe (2000), pp. 179–180. 
247 cf. Botosan and Plumlee (2002), p. 27. 
248 cf. Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 179. 
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month. In light of the aforementioned arguments, the end of the time period used to calculate the 
yearly standard deviation of daily returns in this thesis is the end of March. This is also in line 
with the suggestions provided in the empirical literature on the calculation of other proxies used 
in the present analysis,249 which are introduced below.  
 
Analyst following, forecast dispersion, and forecast error 
To calculate the variables related to the characteristics of analysts and their forecasts, the present 
thesis uses data from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database, which has been frequently utilized 
in prior empirical research on IR.250 The information on the historical analyst earnings forecasts 
provided in the I/B/E/S database makes it possible to assess whether firms’ actual annual 
earnings met analysts’ expectations. Following studies of Lang and Lundholm (1996), Hope 
(2003), and Chang et al. (2014), the forecast error (or accuracy) is defined as the absolute 
difference between the actual earnings (or net income) per outstanding share (>.1) and the 
forecasted value (>(>.1)) for a firm  deflated by its stock price (.):251 
? 2,4 =  @>.12,4 − >(>.12,4)@.2,4                                                                                  (6) 
where & refers to the fiscal year for which the actual value and forecasts were provided.  
The closing stock price at the end of each fiscal year (as obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope database) is used as the deflator to enhance the results’ comparability among the 
investigated companies.252 The absolute value of the forecast error is also calculated, because a 
smaller variation of the measure in either direction generally indicates more consistent 
forecasts.253 In accordance with prior studies, the expected EPS is defined as the mean earnings 
forecast for the respective fiscal year.254  
The forecast dispersion among analysts in the given year is approximated for each firm using the 
standard deviation of EPS forecasts, which is calculated using the forecasted values and mean 
                                                          
249 cf., for instance, Claus and Thomas (2000), pp. 1637–1638. 
250 cf., for instance, Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 875; Chang et al. (2014), p. 372; Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1307. 
251 Chang et al. (2014), p. 376; cf. also Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 476; Hope (2003), p. 245.  
252 cf. Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 476. 
253 cf. Farragher et al. (1994), p. 406. 
254 cf. Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 477; Hope (2003), p. 245. 
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earnings forecast introduced above. In addition, as suggested in prior studies, the standard 
deviation is deflated by the fiscal year’s closing price analogous to the forecast error:255 
? 2,4 =  1   2,4.2,4                                      (7) 
In line with Chang et al. (2014), all observations based on fewer than two analyst forecasts are 
excluded from the analysis to avoid biased results.256 Furthermore, following Bushee and Noe 
(2000), the forecast dispersion is normalized using the natural logarithm.257 The corresponding 
firm’s analyst following is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who have 
provided an EPS forecast in the given year.258 Finally, this analyst coverage measure is also 
included in the analysis of the forecast error and dispersion, as suggested by Aerts et al. 
(2007).259  
 
Stock liquidity 
In the scope of IR and disclosure studies, a firm’s stock liquidity is frequently proxied by the 
respective bid-ask spread.260 It is commonly assumed that this spread in particular makes it 
possible to explicitly measure the adverse selection costs that result from asymmetric information 
allocation, as pointed out in chapter 2.1.261 The present thesis follows the prior literature and 
consequently relies on bid-ask spreads as a liquidity measure. However, according to Roll (1984), 
while information on quoted bid-ask spreads is typically available for a variety of firms, “the 
actual trading is done mostly within the quotes.”262 As such, he suggests to calculate the effective 
bid-ask spread using the market prices of respective securities.263 In the context of IR studies, 
researchers such as Karolyi and Liao (2017) follow this approach and use the bid-ask estimator 
proposed by Corwin and Schultz (2012), which is based on the investigated firms’ daily high and 
                                                          
255 Chang et al. (2014), p. 376; cf. also Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 476. 
256 cf. Chang et al. (2014), p. 376. 
257 cf. Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 180. 
258 cf. Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 476. 
259 cf. Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1321. 
260 cf., for instance, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 93; Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 952; Kirk and Vincent (2014), 
p. 1431; Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 13. 
261 cf. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 99. 
262 Roll (1984), p. 1127. 
263 cf. Roll (1984), p. 1127. 
Hypotheses, measures, and sample data  56 
 
low prices.264 Because this estimator outperforms other measures that are based on low-frequency 
data, it is calculated to proxy for firms’ liquidity in the present study.265   
The Corwin and Schultz estimator is based on an assumption that the high prices are generally 
initiated by buyers and the low prices are initiated by sellers; as a result, the daily high and low 
prices incorporate a stock’s bid-ask spread as well as its fundamental volatility.266 It is also 
assumed that in contrast to the incorporated spread, the volatility component rises proportionately 
with the trading time period. In this case, the high-low price ratio for a single period of two days 
and the high-low price ratios on the respective sequential single dates enable to solve for the 
spread component. 
In the first step, the factor C is calculated using the observed high (DE) and low (FE) prices for a 
single two-day period (t and t+1):267 
C =  G HD','I*EF','I*E JK
<                                                                                                                             (8) 
Next, the factor M is computed using the sum of the high-low ratios on both days: 
M = > NO P HD'IQEF'IQE J
<R*
Q;S
T                                                                                                               (9) 
The factor V is then estimated by relying on the differences between the aforementioned 
parameters: 
V =  W2M − M3 − 2√2 − 5 C3 − 2√2                                                                                                         (10) 
Finally, the spread estimate is given by the following term: 
1 =  2(Z − 1)1 + Z                                                                                                                      (11) 
where  is a mathematical constant. 
                                                          
264 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 13. 
265 cf. Corwin and Schultz (2012), p. 719. 
266 cf. on this and the following Corwin and Schultz (2012), pp. 719, 722. 
267 Corwin and Schultz (2012), pp. 723–725. 
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Corwin and Schultz (2012) assert that in contrast to the high-low ratios of two consecutive days, 
the high-low price ratio for a single period of two days incorporates the overnight return.268 This 
could inflate this ratio as well as its variance compared to the application of two one-day periods, 
thus the spread portion would be underestimated. An adjustment for the overnight stock price 
movements thus seems essential and is consequently conducted in the present thesis. The 
amendment is done by first determining whether the day t+1 low is higher than the closing price 
on day t for each bundle of sequential days. If it is, the difference between the day t+1 low and 
the closing price t is assumed to be the overnight change and subtracted from the low as well as 
the high on the day t+1. In turn, the overnight price fall is indicated by the negative difference 
between the day t+1 high and the day t close, which is then used to increase both the day t+1 
high and low. Corwin and Schultz (2012) suggest that this adjustment approach dominates 
alternative methods. Finally, in rare cases where the daily high and low are equal or the spreads 
are negative, the respective observations are dropped from the analysis. 
In the last step, the estimated daily spreads are averaged over a one-year period beginning in 
April and ending in March of the following year (in line with the calculation of the volatility 
measure) to obtain the final liquidity proxy.269 The data on the daily high, low, and closing prices 
required for calculating the spread estimator is obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
 
Cost of capital 
Prior empirical studies on the relation between IR and capital costs primarily use the expected 
internal rate of return of the investigated securities to proxy for firms’ cost of equity capital, 
which cannot directly be observed.270 Several approaches to estimating the implied cost of equity 
capital are introduced in the literature (e.g., by Claus and Thomas, 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2001; 
Easton, 2004), and all of these studies rely on analyst earnings forecasts to explain the respective 
security prices (.) in the scope of a valuation equation. The present thesis follows the study of 
Karolyi and Liao (2017) and estimates the cost of equity capital by applying the residual income 
valuation model developed by Claus and Thomas (2001).271 All of the data required for this 
approach is available in the Thomson Reuters Datastream (accounting, price, and yield data) and 
                                                          
268 cf. on this and the following Corwin and Schultz (2012), p. 726. 
269 The mean of daily bid-ask spreads is a common measure that is also used, e.g., by Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 956; 
Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 13. 
270 cf. on this and the following Francis et al. (2005), p. 1146.   
271 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 26. 
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the I/B/E/S database (analyst forecasts). The general equation used to derive the Claus and 
Thomas measure ([:) for the year & is given as follows:272  
.4 = 4 + O 4IQ(1 + \]^)Q
_
Q;*
+ 4I_(1 + #Z`)(\]^ − #Z`)(1 + \]^)_                                                           (12) 
where 4  is the book value of equity and #Z` is the constant rate within the terminal value 
beyond year & + 5, which indicates the growth of the abnormal earnings 4IQ. These abnormal 
earnings are in turn defined for each period as follows: 
4IQ = ?>.14IQ − \]^4IQ)*                                                                                                   (13) 
The abnormal earnings (or residual income) therefore constitute the difference between the 
consensus of analyst forecasts on a firm’s earnings per share (?>.1) and the charge for the cost 
of equity.  
The calculation is based on the “clean surplus” relation, which sets the requirement for all 
changes in book value that do not result from direct transactions between a company and its 
shareholders (such as dividend payments) to be incorporated into accounting earnings; as such, 
the expected book value of equity can be expressed as follows:273 
4IQ = 4IQ)* + ?>.14IQ − /4IQ                                                                                            (14) 
                    = 4IQ)* + ?>.14IQ(1 − /.4IQ) 
where /4IQ constitutes the dividends and /.4IQ is the corresponding payout (or market 
dividends to earnings) ratio. 
Admittedly, some transactions under the prevalent accounting rules in Europe may not satisfy the 
“clean surplus” assumption. However, Claus and Thomas (2001) assert that such discrepancies 
are typically not incorporated into the earnings forecasts made by analysts if they arise ex post. 
Furthermore, using an international sample that covers Germany, the UK, France, and the US, 
Isidro et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that general violations of the assumption do not 
                                                          
272 Claus and Thomas (2001), pp. 1635–1636. 
273 cf. on this and the following Claus and Thomas (2001), p. 1635. 
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notably bias the results of the residual income valuation models or cause substantive issues in 
inter-country analyses that rely on this valuation approach.274 
As proposed by Claus and Thomas (2001), to calculate the cost of capital measure, the analyst 
earnings estimates and stock prices are collected as of the cut-off date.275 This should ensure that 
most of the sample companies have already set up their balance sheets in which the equity book 
values (4) are provided. The last date in March seems to be a suitable date for this purpose; it is 
in line with the cut-off date chosen for the calculation of the volatility and liquidity measures and 
meets the suggestions of Claus and Thomas (2001). This residual income valuation model 
requires forecasts for the five forthcoming years, although explicit forecasts—particularly for the 
years & + 3 to & + 5—are frequently not available. Following Claus and Thomas (2001), the 
missing forecasts are calculated using the earnings growth forecast for the next five years (#_) 
obtained as of the aforementioned cut-off date:276 
?>.14IQ = ?>.14IQ)*(1 + #_)                                                                                                   (15) 
whereas negative earnings forecasts are not deployed to generate estimates for the following 
years.  
Furthermore, Hou et al. (2012) propose using the dividend payout ratio in the year & to estimate 
the future book values of equity (4IQ) instead of assuming a rigid value of 50% as suggested by 
Claus and Thomas (2001).277 Because applying the actual dividend payout ratio appears to be a 
more realistic and accurate approach, it is adopted in the present thesis. In addition, the 10-year 
risk-free rate attributed to the year & is applied to approximate the abnormal earnings growth 
(#Z`) following the year & + 5.278 In line with Claus and Thomas (2001), the risk-free rates equal 
the 10-year German or UK government bond yields, respectively. Finally, using the 
aforementioned inputs, the implied cost of equity capital ([:) is derived from the .4 equation by 
applying an iterative procedure that seeks for its best possible solution. 
 
                                                          
274 cf. Isidro et al. (2006), p. 341. 
275 cf. on this and the following Claus and Thomas (2001), pp. 1637–1638. 
276 Claus and Thomas (2001), p. 1638. 
277 cf. Hou et al. (2012), p. 524. 
278 cf. on this and the following Claus and Thomas (2001), pp. 1640–1641. 
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4.2.3 Essential control variables 
Given that this thesis’s outcome variables (e.g., capital costs) may be further related to factors 
other than IR quality (e.g., firm size), the major variables introduced in the empirical literature as 
additional predictors of the relevant dependent variables are considered in the present analysis. 
The advantage of using such control variables in the scope of an empirical study is the possibility 
to measure the effect of interest while holding the introduced controls constant.279 In addition, 
including further predictors that might be correlated with both explained and explanatory 
variables can help to alleviate endogeneity concerns that arise from the omitted variables bias, as 
described in chapter 3.1. The next step entails defining the considered control variables and 
hypothesizing their link to variables of interest.  
 
Firm size 
Almost all studies mentioned in the literature review of this thesis control for firm size effects in 
their empirical analyses. Following inter alia Bushee and Miller (2012) and Karolyi and Liao 
(2017), in the present study the size of the investigated companies is measured by the natural 
logarithm of firms’ total assets as reported on their balance sheets.280 The corresponding data is 
derived from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database. To make the measure comparable for 
German and UK companies, the total assets of UK firms are converted into euro.  
In the scope of an investigation of IR’s impact on firm performance that accounts for firm size, 
one could expect a negative relation between firm performance and the natural logarithm of total 
assets, because according to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) larger companies tend to have lower 
growth opportunities.281 Furthermore, firm size might be inversely associated to equity risk and 
thus to cost of equity capital, as suggested by Francis et al. (2005).282 Because large firms might 
have higher market recognition—and hence also higher media and analysts coverage283—they 
could exhibit higher stock liquidity and presumably lower volatility, as indicated by Bushee and 
Noe (2000) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000).284 The evidence provided by Hope (2003), who 
finds primarily a negative link between firm size and forecast accuracy, and Lang and Lundholm 
(1996), who report an inverse relation, makes the link between forecast characteristics and firm 
                                                          
279 cf. Wooldridge (2013), pp. 12, 72. 
280 cf. Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 877; Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 14. 
281 cf. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), p. 385. 
282 cf. Francis et al. (2005), p. 1147. 
283 cf. Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 954. 
284 cf. Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 193; Leuz and Verreccia (2000), pp. 107–108. 
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size appear less clear.285 In this context, Hope (2003) emphasizes that firm size may proxy for a 
variety of other factors for which expectations cannot be easily derived.286 Nevertheless, most 
prior studies predict a positive relation between IR activities or quality and firm size.287 Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) provide several explanations for this expectation.288 First, because IR (or 
disclosure) costs may have a fixed component, the respective costs per unit of size diminish with 
firm size. In addition, large firms might have better opportunities (and lower expenditures) to 
reach market participants inter alia through information intermediaries, who are more aware of 
larger companies. Furthermore, larger firms might have higher incentives to resolve information 
asymmetries, because they are subject to both more information-based trading and higher 
litigation costs.289 Numerous researchers—including Chang et al. (2014) and Karolyi and Liao 
(2017), to mention just a few—substantiate the aforementioned prediction with empirical 
evidence.290 
 
Finance structure 
To proxy for the finance structure of the sample firms that could substantially influence the 
outcome variables, the present analysis uses the firm leverage obtained from the Thomson 
Reuters Worldscope database and calculated for a firm  and year & by applying the following 
formula:291  
F#2,4 = (F#˗ /2,4 + 1ℎ˗ /2,4)  1ℎℎ >2,4                                            (16) 
The link between leverage and Tobin’s Q is difficult to predict in the scope of an empirical study. 
This is because on the one hand, leverage may have a disciplinary effect on managers, thereby 
reducing agency problems and enhancing firm performance; on the other hand, it may be linked 
to higher (equity) risk and bankruptcy concerns, which negatively affect a firm’s market value.292 
The expectation for the positive value effect of debt is based on the free cash flow (FCF) 
                                                          
285 cf. Hope (2003), p. 259; Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 487. 
286 cf. Hope (2003), pp. 250. 
287 cf., for instance, Chang et al. (2014), p. 379; Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1430. 
288 cf. on this and the following Lang and Lundholm (1993), pp. 250–251. 
289 See for more details King et al. (1990) and Skinner (1994).  
290 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 17; Chang et al. (2014), p. 379. 
291 Numerous empirical studies on IR control for the firm’s financial structure using this leverage measure, e.g., Kirk 
and Vincent (2014), p. 1431; Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1310. 
292 cf. Jong (2002), pp. 35–37; Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 967.  
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hypothesis introduced by Jensen (1986), who argues that fixed debt payments reduce the cash 
flow that could be inefficiently spent by managers (e.g., on unfavorable projects).293 Previous 
empirical results concerning the debt-performance relation are also inconsistent.294 With regard to 
the cost of equity capital, it appears to be more likely that equity costs increase with higher 
leverage due to increased risk for shareholders as residual income recipients.295 Gebhardt et al. 
(2001) support this argument with empirical evidence.296 According to Aerts et al. (2007), 
because higher-leveraged firms are less involved in equity financing, they may be less visible for 
analysts, media, and investors and suffer from higher information asymmetry linked to adverse 
selection issue, as indicated by Bharath et al. (2009).297 As such, one could expect greater 
leverage to have a negative relation with analyst following, stock liquidity, and forecast accuracy 
and a positive correlation with forecast dispersion and stock volatility. These predictions are 
mostly confirmed in empirical studies on IR.298 Ultimately, when the aforementioned arguments 
are considered, a positive link between firms’ leverage and IR quality can be expected in this 
thesis’s empirical study. This is because the higher risk for investors implied through extensive 
leverage, a higher information asymmetry, and lower firm visibility may increase the need for a 
firm to enhance its IR activities. Moreover, the potential disciplining of a firm’s management 
through more leverage should not outweigh these effects. 
 
Profitability 
Following Hope (2003), the return on equity (ROE) is included in the present analysis as a 
measure of a firm’s profitability. It is extracted from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database 
and defined as follows:299 
b>2,4 = c 2,412 ∑ 1ℎℎ′ >2,4S4;)*                                                                             (17) 
It can naturally be expected that a firm’s profitability is positively related to its market 
performance (Tobin’s Q).300 Furthermore, Francis et al. (2005) argue that good financial 
                                                          
293 cf. Jensen (1986), p. 324. 
294 cf., for instance, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), p. 392; Jong (2002), p. 52. 
295 cf. Tirole (2001), p. 4. 
296 cf. Gebhardt et al. (2001), p. 151. 
297 cf. Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1311; Bharath et al. (2009), pp. 3238–3239.  
298 cf., for instance, Karolyi and Liao (2017), pp. 43, 51–52; Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 193. 
299 cf. Hope (2003), p. 247. 
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performance should be accompanied by a lower cost of capital, because the default risk 
decreases.301 They substantiate this prediction by providing strong empirical evidence of a 
negative relation between the cost of equity capital and the profitability ratio. In this context, it 
seems plausible that more profitable firms (which are linked to rosier future prospects) become 
more visible to analysts and investors, as also shown by Kirk and Vincent (2014);302 as such, 
ROE could be positively linked to analyst following and stock liquidity. Bushee and Noe (2000) 
also indicate that more profitable firms tend to have lower stock volatility, whereas Chang et al. 
(2014) show that negative earnings are linked to higher dispersion and less accurate analyst 
forecasts.303 However, the relation between ROE and IR appears to be less unambiguous. On the 
one hand, management and IR team members may be more communicative during periods of 
higher earnings; on the other hand, the demand for higher IR quality and more extensive 
activities may arise during periods of weak results.304 As such, no direct prediction is made for 
this thesis. 
 
Opportunities and uncertainty  
In line with prior empirical studies on IR, the present analysis also considers variables that 
capture different aspects of firms’ future opportunities as well as uncertainty about their 
prospects.305 In particular, this study controls for the following variables, the components and 
descriptions for which are all obtained from the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database: 
e>! 2,4 =  e !2,4   2,4                                                                   (18) 
where the capital expenditures (CapEx) particularly cover funds spent for fixed assets, such as for 
“property, plant and equipment, investments in machinery and equipment” that are not related to 
acquisitions. 
&/ 2,4 =  ℎ & / !2,4 2,4                                    (19) 
                                                          
300 cf. Anderson and Reeb (2003), p. 1313. 
301 cf. on this and the following Francis et al. (2005), pp. 1147, 1157. 
302 cf. Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1448. 
303 cf. Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 193; Chang et al. (2014), p. 383. 
304 cf. Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1431. 
305 cf., for instance, Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 14; Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1431; Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1312. 
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where the research and development (R&D) expenses constitute funds used to improve or 
develop products/technologies and hence cover all costs for both basic and applied research and 
subsequent development processes. However, Koh and Reeb (2015) note that a well-known 
phenomenon exists in the empirical research, namely that some firms do not report any 
information on their R&D expenses in their financial statements.306 The common way to interpret 
this missing data, which is applied in leading scientific journals such as The Journal of Finance 
and The Accounting Review, is to assume that missing R&D information indicates that the firm in 
question lacks R&D activities or only marginally engages in them. This technique typically 
entails setting the missing values to 0 while including a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
a missing value has been replaced and 0 otherwise. As information on R&D expenses is missing 
for some firms in the present sample, this approach is applied in this thesis to avoid losing certain 
observations and thus obtaining potentially biased results related to the main link of interest.  
The further control variables are as follows:  
(  2,4 =  (# 2,4 2,4                                                                                    (20) 
where intangible assets (IA) constitute non-physical assets, such as goodwill (i.e., the cost above 
the value of assets acquired), patents, and trademarks. 
 #  #gℎ2,4 =  13 O G 1  2,4IQ 1  2,4IQ)* − 1K
S
Q ;)<
                           (21) 
where following Karolyi and Liao (2017), the average sales growth is calculated for the last three 
fiscal years.307 
As suggested in prior literature, the above-listed measures can be seen as indicators of the 
presence of valuable projects, investment opportunities, or products that are beneficial for 
shareholders but typically linked to uncertainty and possibly subject to substantial information 
asymmetries between firms and their investors.308 This is particularly the case because most 
intangible assets as well as R&D and CapEx expenses are frequently not recognized in detail in 
                                                          
306 cf. on this and the following Koh and Reeb (2015), pp. 74, 92. 
307 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 12. 
308 cf. Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 967; Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1422. 
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corresponding financial reports.309 With regard to a firm’s market performance, one could expect 
a positive relation to the aforementioned variables, because they all can be related to a firm’s 
positive growth prospects. However, prior research also shows that the valuation of future 
opportunities can naturally highly depend on investors’ perceptions concerning the quality of 
products, projects, or investments and may differ between industries.310 In summary, no direct 
prediction is made for the relation between Tobin’s Q and R&D, CapEx, or IA intensities for the 
present analysis. The same applies to the link to capital costs. In contrast, positive sales growth 
may constitute a more obvious indicator for market participants; as such, it could be expected to 
have a positive relation to a firm’s market performance and a negative one to its cost of equity 
capital, in line with the findings of Karolyi and Liao (2017).311 With regard to analyst coverage, 
Barth et al. (2001) suggest that financial analysts could have higher incentives to cover firms with 
less transparent assets, because such companies could allow to provide more profitable advice to 
investors accompanied by higher rewards to analysts.312 On the other hand, analysts might be 
faced with higher information search costs if they follow these firms. Nevertheless, it appears to 
be plausible that the information asymmetry aspect incorporated into the aforementioned 
measures should lead to higher discrepancies in the perceptions that analysts and investors have 
of a firm’s perspectives, which would increase stock volatility. As Kirk and Vincent (2014) 
demonstrate, IR seems consequently to become more important for firms that are linked to higher 
uncertainty and greater growth opportunities; as such, a positive relation between the 
corresponding variables and IR quality can be expected for the present study.313  
 
Firm age  
A further firm characteristic that empirical studies identify as a relevant factor for a company’s 
outcomes is firm age.314 Following Rieks and Lobe (2009), firm age is defined as the number of 
years since the company’s initial public offering (IPO).315 For the German companies considered 
in the present study, IPO date information is extracted from the “Hoppenstedt Aktienfuehrer” 
                                                          
309 cf. Barth et al. (2001), p. 2. 
310 cf. Chung et al. (1998), pp. 41–42. 
311 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), pp. 40, 52. 
312 cf. on this and the following Barth et al. (2001), pp. 1–2. 
313 cf. Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1422. 
314 cf., for instance, Pástor and Veronesi (2003), p. 1751; Adams et al. (2005), p. 1412.  
315 cf. Rieks and Lobe (2009), p. 10. 
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database; for UK firms, it is taken directly from the London Stock Exchange’s website. The data 
is complemented by information from corporate websites. 
One could expect that younger, less developed firms have higher stock volatility, lower stock 
liquidity, higher disagreement among analysts, less accurate forecasts, and potentially a higher 
cost of capital;316 however, the relation to firm performance and IR quality is less clear. Similar 
to uncertainty measures, the market performance of young firms may be a function of risk and the 
quality of future perspectives as assessed by market participants; as such, no general expectation 
can be stated. This also applies to IR quality. On the one hand, mature firms may have over time 
established well-developed IR departments that are characterized by extensive activities and a 
higher quality than what exists in young firms; on the other hand, as the demand for a more 
informative IR function may especially arise in younger firms and thus encourage them to 
improve their IR activities, the link is difficult to predict.  
 
Strategic holdings 
To account for the fact that firms may relate to complex corporate networks in which one 
company can have a substantial stake in another and thus be able to exert an influence on its 
strategies, corporate cross-holdings are considered in the present analysis.317 In the case that a 
company can influence the activities of another firm (particularly in the scope of a parent-
subsidiary relation), one could expect its impact on corporate outcomes and potentially on the IR 
strategy of the owned firm. Following Elshandidy et al. (2013), strategic holdings are defined as 
the percentage of total issued shares (of at least 5%) held by one firm in another.318 Related data 
is obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream. As discussed by Adams and Ferreira (2008), 
cross-ownerships may create value for shareholders of both firms; however, the owned firm may 
also be potentially subject to exploitation by opportunistic controlling shareholder to the 
detriment of other investors.319 Because the empirical evidence on this issue is mixed, this thesis 
does not formulate an explicit prediction on the matter.  
 
 
                                                          
316 cf. Pástor and Veronesi (2003), p. 1776; Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1431. 
317 cf. on this and the following Gordon (1938), pp. 385–386; La Porta et al. (2000), p. 14. 
318 cf. Elshandidy et al. (2013), p. 325. 
319 cf. on this and the following Adams and Ferreira (2008), pp. 69, 83. 
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US cross-listings 
Several empirical studies on IR suggest that cross-listings on foreign stock exchanges, 
particularly on major US stock exchanges (namely the NYSE and NASDAQ), may significantly 
affect a firm’s IR activities, financial outcomes, and other corporate characteristics.320 To account 
for this effect, the present analysis considers the cross-listings on NYSE and NASDAQ collected 
for German firms from the “Hoppenstedt Aktienfuehrer” database and for UK firms from annual 
reports and the Thomson Reuters Eikon database. 
Lang et al. (2003) summarize the consequences attributed to cross-listing on US stock exchanges. 
First, the respective firms become subject to extended disclosure and litigation environment that 
is oriented toward shareholder demands (see also the discussion in chapter 2.3) and to higher 
enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission.321 Furthermore, such companies are 
typically confronted with more scrutiny and pressure from analysts, investors, and auditors than 
in their domestic market. This could ultimately have a positive impact on several value-
generating channels and thus increase a firm’s market performance. In this context, Lang et al. 
(2003) provide empirical evidence that cross-listed firms have a higher analyst following and 
greater forecast accuracy and market valuation. In summary, with regard to the results of the 
present thesis, it can be expected that US cross-listings facilitate the quality and consistency of 
analyst forecasts, increase firms’ visibility and liquidity, reduce the cost of capital, and ultimately 
enhance firm performance.  
 
Fixed effects 
The panel structure of the present data (which covers time-series data for the investigated firms) 
makes it possible to additionally control for year-specific effects, such as the impacts of political 
and economic risks or investor sentiment on the explained measures.322 As such, dummy 
variables for each year of the present sample (omitting a reference year) that take a value of 1 in 
the respective year and 0 otherwise are included in the analysis to account for the average effects 
of different time periods.323  
                                                          
320 cf., for instance, Karolyi and Liao (2017), pp. 1, 20–21; Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1433; Aerts (2007), pp. 1309, 
1311. 
321 cf. on this and the following Lang et al. (2003), pp. 317–319. 
322 cf. Chang et al. (2014), p. 377; Heflin et al. (2015), p. 22; Rieks and Lobe (2007), pp. 13, 37. 
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Furthermore, firms’ characteristics may be generally heterogeneous across industries. In this 
context, Aerts et al. (2007) suggest that companies can basically have a different appeal to 
investors and analysts depending on a firm’s industry affiliation.324 Industry-related differences 
could be also applicable to firms’ IR activities. For instance, Botosan (1997) argues that 
companies in the pharmaceutical industry typically provide more information about their R&D 
activities and intangible assets (thereby reducing the uncertainty component) than their 
counterparts in other sectors.325 Following Karolyi and Liao (2017), Kirk and Vincent (2014), 
and Aerts et al. (2007), the present analysis includes dummy variables that take a value of 1 if a 
firm refers to a specific industry and 0 otherwise (omitting a reference industry).326 The industry 
classifications of the sample firms are derived from the two-digit Industrial Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) codes, which cover broad industry areas such as chemicals, 
telecommunications, and technologies. The ICB codes are obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope database. 
Finally, in line with Bushee and Noe (2000), the present thesis controls for specific index-related 
fixed effects.327 To this end, a set of dummy variables that indicates whether a firm was a 
constituent of DAX, MDAX, TecDAX, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, or FTSE Small Cap indices is 
included in the regression analysis (omitting a reference index). Each respective variable takes a 
value of 1 if a firm was listed in the specific index within the given year and 0 otherwise. The 
information on index listings is extracted directly from the Extel surveys and complemented 
using the Thomson Reuters Datastream database. Several arguments exist for including index 
dummies in the empirical model. First, these dummies make it possible to control for the 
different listing criteria of each index as indicators of heterogeneity across firms. Moreover, 
Bushee and Noe (2000) argue that investors (and also presumably analysts) may have preferences 
for firms listed in specific indices, which would lead to heterogeneity induced by the index 
listings themselves.328 They substantiate this prediction with empirical evidence. 
 
Alternative explanations 
This section discusses the factors that could serve as substitutive explanations for the expected 
impact of IR quality on corporate characteristics and outcomes and introduces the respective 
                                                          
324 cf. Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1312. 
325 cf. Botosan (1997), p. 327. 
326 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 14; Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1432; Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1308. 
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controls. The appropriate consideration of these alternative effects in the present analysis should 
at least partially rule out concerns about observing a spurious correlation. This thesis accounts for 
two common concerns in the empirical literature, namely individual managerial characteristics 
and social ties. 
In this context, the empirical study of Betrand and Schoar (2003) establishes a link between the 
assorted management styles of CEOs, which are attributable to individuals’ characteristics, and 
differences in firm performance.329 This issue is further investigated by Custódio and Metzger 
(2014), who analyze whether a CEO’s financial background in particular has an impact on 
corporate strategies and thus contributes to corporate success. They demonstrate that CEOs who 
are financial experts are indeed more financially sophisticated and capable inter alia of raising 
cash and debt during difficult market conditions, which is ultimately beneficial for 
shareholders.330 Furthermore, Bamber et al. (2010) examine the relation between managers’ 
personal backgrounds and firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. They determine that managers 
promoted from accounting/finance provide more prudent and precise management earnings 
forecasts (which may range from general impression to point forecasts).331 To summarize, the 
financial backgrounds of top managers and related corporate strategies may help firms to meet 
investors’ disclosure demands and could positively affect different corporate characteristics and 
outcomes. It is hence conceivable that the results of the present thesis are driven not by IR quality 
per se—which should be attributable to several factors, in particular the activities of firms’ IR 
officers—but rather by the individual characteristics of top management. To address this serious 
concern (which if true would require a reinterpretation of the study results), the analysis includes 
a variable that indicates if a CEO is a financial expert; it takes a value of 1 if yes and 0 otherwise. 
Following Custódio and Metzger (2014), the CEO is identified as a financial expert if he or she 
was previously employed by a banking or investment company or a large auditing firm (such as 
KPMG or PricewaterhouseCoopers) or worked as an accountant, treasurer, vice president of 
finance, or even a company’s CFO.332 The necessary CEO data for the investigated firms 
(including previous work experience) is hand-collected from annual reports, the “Hoppenstedt 
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Aktienfuehrer” database, CVs from corporate websites, and other sources (e.g., the LexisNexis 
database).333  
Considering the findings of prior empirical literature reveals that social ties between analysts and 
IR senior executives could constitute an additional concern with regard to IR studies. Cohen et al. 
(2010) provide empirical evidence that school ties (i.e. attendance of the same institution) 
between senior corporate executives and analysts seem to enhance the direct management-analyst 
information flow, which gives the analysts in question an information advantage and allows them 
to outperform on their investment advice.334 Cohen et al. (2008) report similar results for social 
ties between members of corporate boards and mutual fund managers, who seem to make higher 
investments in the affiliated firms and consequently can achieve a higher performance compared 
to other investments.335 In this context, Laskin (2014) argues that in the past firms commonly 
hired IR officers who were previously employed as financial analysts.336 The situation in which 
analysts cover firms where their former colleagues are now IR executives seems to provide an 
ideal setting for the social ties issue described above. Consequently, one could argue that such 
relationships may give the connected analysts an information advantage that could result in more 
precise and less dispersed analyst forecasts, which might in turn attract more investors to trade on 
the stock and potentially contribute to the market valuation. Furthermore, because analysts are 
major addressees of the Extel IR survey and the connected analysts may have an incentive to 
provide higher IR quality ratings for their former colleagues, the expected positive effects of 
better IR may be simply an outcome of social networks. To control for this concern, the previous 
work experience of heads of IR departments—who are typically in close communication with 
analysts and have the best access to a firm’s management as well as to price-sensitive 
information—is obtained from official announcements of new head of IR appointments in 
LexisNexis as well as from CVs gathered from corporate websites and other sources. If a head of 
IR previously held an analyst position, the corresponding dummy variable considered in the 
present analysis takes a value of 1; otherwise it is 0.337  
 
                                                          
333 As the financial expert variable is only introduced to rule out the concern of the alternative explanation, it is only 
calculated for German companies. 
334 cf. Cohen et al. (2010), pp. 1434–1435. 
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4.2.4 Sample data and descriptive statistics 
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics related to the German and UK samples. These tables 
contain information on all of the outcome variables investigated in the first part of the present 
analysis as well as on the respective explanatory measures. The maximum number of 
observations available for the German sample is 1143; for the UK sample, it is 1651. First, the 
statistics indicate that UK firms exhibit higher market valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The 
mean (median) value of Tobin’s Q in the UK is 1.9196 (1.4612), whereas the corresponding 
value in Germany is 1.6151 (1.2848). The average cost of equity capital in the UK (9.24%) is 
slightly lower than in Germany (9.44%), but the opposite is suggested by the median values. 
Following the previous elaborations of the legal and financial systems as well as the level of 
information asymmetry prevalent in Germany and the UK, one should clearly expect higher stock 
return volatility and more dispersed and inaccurate analyst earnings forecasts for the German 
market. This expectation is confirmed by the respective descriptive statistics: the mean (median) 
value of stock volatility is 2.43% (2.21%) for German firms and 2.09% (1.82%) for UK 
companies. In addition, the analyst forecast error and forecast deviation (standardized by the 
stock price) are noticeably higher in German firms (4.04% and 1.57%) than in UK companies 
(1.76% and 0.94%) on average. The identified differences in the forecast properties are also 
supported by the corresponding medians. The respective mean values reveal that analyst coverage 
is slightly lower in the UK than in Germany (15.0731 vs. 16.8697), whereas the medians suggest 
comparable coverage in the two countries (15 vs. 15). Surprisingly, the mean (median) value of 
estimated bid-ask spreads is higher for UK companies than for German firms, namely 1.21% 
(1.05%) vs. 1.02% (0.90%). However, as Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) emphasize, a large number 
of spread determinants may go beyond the information asymmetry aspect;338 as such, 
investigating stock liquidity in the scope of a multiple regression analysis could clarify the 
differences in liquidity across firms. With regard to corporate fundamentals, the civil law and 
bank system characteristics of the German market become apparent by looking at items such as 
the mean value of firms’ leverage, which substantially exceeds the respective average for UK 
companies (1.2503 vs. 0.8102). Similar insights are also provided by the corresponding median 
values (0.6246 vs. 0.5255). On the other hand, it can be noted that UK firms are on average larger 
and have less concentrated strategic ownership, a higher US cross-listing rate, higher sales 
growth, and higher profitability (according to the ROE measure). The variables used as proxies 
                                                          
338 cf. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 108. 
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for a firm’s future opportunities (and corresponding uncertainty) such as R&D and CapEx 
intensities do not notably deviate across samples, although the intangible assets relative to firm 
size are on average approximately 5% higher in the UK. Firm ages in German and UK firms 
differ only slightly according to the mean and median values, which presumably indicates that 
firms of nearly the same development level are compared in the present analysis. It can also be 
stated that the aforementioned statistics are widely in line with the values presented by 
researchers such as Karolyi and Liao (2017) and Aerts et al. (2007),339 which may indicate that 
the data used in this thesis is of sufficient quality.  
With regard to the properties of IR, it is noteworthy that neither the budgets nor the number of IR 
team members substantially differ between Germany and the UK on average, although IR 
managers in the UK seem to enjoy slightly higher remuneration than their German counterparts. 
In summary, as no significant disparities in firms’ IR resources can be ascertained between the 
countries, the expected differences in the IR outcomes in Germany and the UK seem unlikely to 
be a simple consequence of resource divergences. While the distance variables are discussed in 
detail in chapter 5.2, the statistics on financial expert CEOs reveal that German companies have a 
CEO with significant prior financial experience in 31.28% of the all firm-year observations. This 
is nearly 10% lower than what Custodio and Metzger (2014) report for the sample of US firms, 
and the difference might be linked to the peculiarities of market- and bank-based financial 
systems.340 The portion of heads of IR who have gathered experience as analysts is 13.65% in the 
present sample. This statistic seems to reflect the trend in IR departments to rely more on the 
communication skills of IR officers rather than to focus only on financial background, as Laskin 
(2014) emphasizes.341 Finally, the head of IR turnover rate in German firms over the entire 
sample period is 11.83%, which is in line with the information provided in interviews by IR 
professionals that the fluctuation rate for heads of IR is considerably lower than for other IR 
department members. The second part of the present thesis’s empirical analysis is introduced 
next. 
  
                                                          
339 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 39; Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1315. 
340 cf. Custodio and Metzger (2014), p. 131. 
341 cf. Laskin (2014), p. 212. 
Hypotheses, measures, and sample data  73 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the German sample 
 N mean stand dev 25th percentile median 75th percentile 
       
Tobin's Q 1143 1.6151 1.0013 1.0437 1.2848 1.7265 
       
Implied cost of equity capital 1013 0.0944 0.0344 0.0752 0.0903 0.1086 
       
Bid-ask spread 1143 0.0102 0.0046 0.0069 0.0090 0.0124 
       
Stock volatility 1141 0.0243 0.0105 0.0170 0.0221 0.0287 
       
Analyst following (abs) 1136 16.8697 9.7309 9 15 24 
       
Forecast error 1111 0.0404 0.1104 0.0038 0.0112 0.0309 
       
Forecast dispersion (st) 1114 0.0157 0.0484 0.0039 0.0073 0.0138 
       
Firm size (in € million) 1143 42800 187000 798.448 2134.938 10500 
       
ROE 1143 0.1087 0.2208 0.0548 0.1247 0.1883 
       
Leverage 1143 1.2503 2.4218 0.2480 0.6246 1.2189 
       
R&D intensity 1143 0.0244 0.0410 0 0.0049 0.0365 
       
CapEx intensity 1143 0.0432 0.0403 0.0175 0.0345 0.0568 
       
IA intensity 1143 0.1841 0.1787 0.0391 0.1250 0.2979 
       
Sales growth 1143 0.1313 0.3608 0.0272 0.0764 0.1422 
       
US cross-listing 1143 0.0892 0.2852    
       
Firm age 1143 24.8994 24.1548 8 14 44 
       
Strategic holdings 1143 0.1171 0.2107 0 0 0.15 
       
IR budget 260 2.2192 1.2833 1 2 3 
       
IR remuneration 260 2.3731 1.2062 2 3 4 
       
IR employees (abs) 260 3.2077 1.9120 2 3 4 
       
Distance to airport (km) 1113 30.4584 25.0654 10.8669 22.9601 47.4035 
       
Distance to Frankfurt (km) 1113 204.5443 118.3671 128.2977 187.3188 301.3452 
       
Financial expert CEO 1135 0.3128 0.4638    
       
Head of IR analyst 901 0.1365 0.3435    
       
Turnover head of IR 1124 0.1183 0.3231    
 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of outstanding shares and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. Implied cost of equity 
capital is estimated applying the approach proposed by Claus and Thomas (2001). Bid-ask spread is calculated following Corwin and Schultz (2012). Stock volatility is 
the standard deviation of adjusted daily stock returns. Analyst following (abs) is the number of analysts who provide forecasts on the firm’s earnings. Forecast error is 
measured as the absolute difference between the actual earnings per share and the forecasted earnings per share divided by the stock price. Forecast dispersion (st) is 
the standard deviation of earnings forecasts deflated by the stock price. Firm size (in € million) is measured as the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. 
ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the 
shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as 
the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. 
Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by 
other firms. IR budget contains five categories, where the value of zero is assigned to the lowest budget category and the value of four to the highest one. IR 
remuneration covers seven categories of the IR managers’ salaries, where the value of zero is assigned to the lowest category and the value of six to the highest one. IR 
employees (abs) is the number of the firm’s IR managers. Distance to airport (km) measures the distance between the firm’s headquarter location and the next 
international airport. Distance to Frankfurt (km) measures the distance between the firm’s headquarter location and Frankfurt. Financial expert CEO is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s 
head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. Turnover head of IR is a dummy variable that equals one if a head of IR change occurred during the 
fiscal year and zero otherwise. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the UK sample 
 N mean stand dev 25th percentile median 75th percentile 
       
Tobin's Q 1651 1.9196 3.0369 1.0849 1.4612 2.0861 
       
Implied cost of equity capital 1335 0.0924 0.0436 0.0646 0.0979 0.1166 
       
Bid-ask spread 1645 0.0121 0.0052 0.0086 0.0105 0.0141 
       
Stock volatility 1625 0.0209 0.0099 0.0145 0.0182 0.0245 
       
Analyst following (abs) 1627 15.0731 7.1714 10 15 20 
       
Forecast error 1413 0.0176 0.0626 0.0032 0.0070 0.0146 
       
Forecast dispersion (st)  1378 0.0094 0.0206 0.0021 0.0041 0.0085 
       
Firm size (in € million) 1651 52200 251000 1020.369 2919.251 9147.856 
       
ROE 1651 0.2818 1.0417 0.0856 0.1636 0.2641 
       
Leverage 1651 0.8102 8.0499 0.2053 0.5255 1.0573 
       
R&D intensity 1651 0.0147 0.0464 0 0 0.0022 
       
CapEx intensity 1651 0.0413 0.0434 0.0097 0.0291 0.0567 
       
IA intensity 1651 0.2354 0.2221 0.0323 0.1746 0.4107 
       
Sales growth 1651 0.2582 2.9937 0.0281 0.0842 0.1617 
       
US cross-listing 1651 0.1333 0.3400    
       
Firm age 1651 23.0854 20.7692 7 16 38 
       
Strategic holdings 1651 0.0307 0.0947 0 0 0 
       
IR budget 155 2.1290 1.3373 1 2 3 
       
IR remuneration 155 2.7871 1.5708 2 2 4 
       
IR employees (abs) 155 3.1032 1.8939 2 3 4 
 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of outstanding shares and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets. Implied cost of equity 
capital is estimated applying the approach proposed by Claus and Thomas (2001). Bid-ask spread is calculated following Corwin and Schultz (2012). Stock volatility is 
the standard deviation of adjusted daily stock returns. Analyst following (abs) is the number of analysts who provide forecasts on firm’s earnings. Forecast error is 
measured as the absolute difference between the actual earnings per share and the forecasted earnings per share divided by the stock price. Forecast dispersion (st) is 
the standard deviation of earnings forecasts deflated by the stock price. Firm size (in € million) is measured as the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. 
ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the 
shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as 
the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. 
Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by 
other firms. IR budget contains five categories, where the value of zero is assigned to the lowest budget category and the value of four to the highest one. IR 
remuneration covers seven categories of the IR managers’ salaries, where the value of zero is assigned to the lowest category and the value of six to the highest one. IR 
employees (abs) is the number of the firm’s IR managers. 
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4.3 IR quality and M&A performance 
4.3.1 Hypotheses 
Ahern and Sosyura (2014) as well as Bushee and Miller (2012) suggest that IR plays a 
particularly important role in major corporate events, which include a firm’s M&A activities.342 
This thesis is the first to investigate whether better IR is in fact associated with an improved 
M&A performance for acquiring firms. Furthermore, the present analysis assesses whether the 
potential IR impact on capital market reactions to M&A announcements varies across countries 
with different legal origins and financial systems. As a first step, the corresponding hypotheses 
are derived from existing literature on M&A performance and its determining factors. 
The main contribution of IR activities to an acquirer’s stock price reaction attributed to M&A 
announcements is the reduction of the information asymmetry between the bidder’s management 
and the investment community, which primarily exists with regard to the conditions of the deal 
and its expected future benefits for shareholders.343 This information is typically provided by IR 
officers and managers in the scope of official deal announcements and related conferences with 
investors and analysts. As indicated by the interviewed IR professionals, some IR departments 
additionally publish voluntary presentations that provide a comprehensive overview of a deal and 
enable information on the acquisition potentially provided by the target firm to be double-
checked. Such presentations become particularly important for less known targets, due to a higher 
divergence of opinion among market participants. However, it is not only the provision of 
information on a deal’s characteristics (e.g., its purpose or expected synergy gains) that can 
positively contribute to alleviating uncertainty among market participants; the credibility of the 
provided information also plays a role.344 In this context, the image of the management and IR 
team, which is built up before the actual transaction announcement through the implementation 
of appropriate IR strategies, may contribute to a higher probability that disclosed information will 
be seen as reliable.345 Investors’ concerns about the deal’s contribution to shareholder wealth 
could be primarily linked to the threat of overpayment for the target.346 According to Morck et al. 
(1990), managers may be willing to pay a price for a target firm that exceeds its value to 
shareholders if they expect private benefits from the transaction. A typical agency conflict may 
                                                          
342 cf. Ahern and Sosyura (2014), p. 248; Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 871. 
343 cf. Healey and Palepu (2001), pp. 420–421. 
344 cf. Dutordoir et al. (2014), p. 89. 
345 cf. Hoffmann and Fieseler (2012), p. 149. 
346 cf. on this and the following Morck et al. (1990), p. 31. 
Hypotheses, measures, and sample data  76 
 
thus arise when managers use an acquisition to pursue their own goals (e.g., entrenchment), as 
described by Shleifer and Vishny (1989).347 In this case, managers could make specific 
investments that, for instance, require their personal know-how and could result in better job 
security and higher compensation. In addition, in line with the prediction of Jensen (1986), 
managers of firms with large FCFs may engage in value-destroying M&As due to empire 
building motives that are potentially linked to factors such as higher prestige and remuneration.348 
Roll (1986) also suggests that managers may overpay for a target because they could be affected 
by hubris that results in the distorted perception of knowing a target firm’s true value and being 
able to reveal it.349   
A further information asymmetry aspect relates to the payment structures of M&A deals. 
According to Travlos (1987), managers of the acquiring firm prefer a company’s stock as the 
payment currency if they think that the respective shares are overvalued but pay with cash in the 
event of an undervaluation.350 As such, the choice of payment type in an M&A transaction could 
constitute a signal to the market about the managers’ beliefs regarding a company’s true value. 
Based on an assumption that managers are better informed about a firm’s actual value than 
shareholders, one would expect on average a negative acquirers’ stock price reaction to the 
announcements of M&As paid with equity and higher returns for the announcements of cash 
deals. However, as Martin (1996) demonstrates, other reasons may also drive the management’s 
decision to use stock instead of cash for payment purposes, such as profitable investment 
opportunities or risk sharing motives (including the goal to share any revaluation effects after the 
acquisition with the target).351 Furthermore, selecting the cash payment method may be simply 
related to the high amount of cash available in a firm, although the choice entails the above-
described risk of being involved in a value-destroying transaction. As such, clarifying the 
motives for a payment choice in the scope of an M&A announcement may help market 
participants to correctly assess the respective signal effects so that investors can positively value 
this additional information. 
In addition, IR may contribute to an acquirer’s M&A performance by raising its visibility among 
investors and analysts prior to the transaction. As Ahern and Sosyura (2014) suggest, a run-up in 
the acquirer’s stock price achieved through the active dissemination of information could make it 
                                                          
347 cf. on this and the following Shleifer und Vishny (1989), pp. 123–125. 
348 cf. Jensen (1986), p. 328; Shleifer and Vishny (1997), p. 756. 
349 cf. Roll (1986), pp. 199–200. 
350 cf. on this and the following Travlos (1987), pp. 944–945. 
351 cf. on this and the following Martin (1996), pp. 1229–1231, 1242. 
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possible to attain better condition terms in deals paid with stock, which should positively 
contribute to shareholder value.352 However, because such activities may be related to higher 
stock price reversals when the presumable purpose of the enhanced information exposure is 
revealed, IR could also serve as a counterbalance to this investor response through the application 
of an appropriate announcement strategy (e.g., by explicitly highlighting the beneficial condition 
terms achieved in the scope of the deal). Furthermore, irrespective of the deal’s payment type, 
M&A transactions may generally offer firms a good environment for attracting investors and 
analysts, because such major corporate events are often prominently reported in the media and 
intensively tracked by the investment community, as Draper and Paudyal (2008) argue.353 Firms 
with high-quality IR strategies may thus use the increased market attention resulting from M&A 
announcements to engage in stock marketing activities. If IR takes advantage of such an 
environment, it may reach more addressees by disseminating information about the firm (as in 
the absence of such event) and additionally decrease the level of information asymmetry.354 In 
summary, a larger number of investors facing fewer adverse selection concerns could become 
aware of a firm, which could ultimately result in a positive contribution to the acquirer’s market 
performance around the event. 
Furthermore, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) emphasize that M&A characteristics can differ 
depending on the legal and financial environments prevalent in the home countries of the firms 
involved in respective transactions.355 Based on the considerations of that study, one could expect 
that the higher degree of investor protection, more developed market for corporate control, 
greater transparency and disclosure requirements, and consequently lower information 
asymmetry level prevalent in the UK as compared to in continental Europe (particularly in 
Germany) could ultimately lead to disclosure activities having only a marginal effect on the 
announcement returns of UK acquirers. In addition, in line with the results of the aforementioned 
study, it could be expected that UK firms are engaged in more M&A transactions and subject to 
better performance than German companies. As discussed above, in addition to the information 
aspect, acquirer performance may also be positively affected by improvements in the acquirer’s 
market visibility that are encouraged by good IR and arise separately from the origins of the 
respective firms. To summarize, because increases in information level and investor awareness 
                                                          
352 cf. Ahern and Sosyura (2014), pp. 277–280. 
353 cf. Draper and Paudyal (2008), p. 377. 
354 cf. Draper and Paudyal (2008), p. 377. 
355 cf. on this and the following Goergen and Renneboog (2004), pp. 23–24, 38–39. 
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through better IR quality can be attributed to German companies and the information channel 
seems to be less applicable to UK firms, slightly different hypotheses with regard to the M&A 
performance of German and UK acquirers are evaluated in the scope of the present analysis:   
H6.1: Better IR quality is associated with higher M&A announcement returns for German 
acquirers 
H6.2: Better IR quality is either not or positively associated with M&A announcement returns for 
UK acquirers 
H6.3: The (positive) link between IR quality and M&A announcement returns is stronger for 
German acquirers in comparison to UK acquirers 
 
4.3.2 Sample construction and essential control variables 
The Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database is used in this thesis to obtain information on 
relevant M&A deals for German and UK acquirers in the period from 2006 to 2014. Following 
suggestions of Fuller et al. (2002) and Netter et al. (2011), only completed deals of non-financial 
firms with at least a $1 million356 deal value and transactions with a clear-cut change of control in 
which the acquirer purchased more than 50% of a firm’s shares are considered.357 In the next 
step, M&A deals are matched with the Extel IR rankings and control variables described in 
chapter 4.2.3. The IR rankings are allocated to M&A transactions by applying the same 
procedure as, for instance, for the volatility measure in this thesis. All transactions within a time 
period of 12 months ending in March are thus matched with IR rankings that were awarded 
shortly after the end of this period. Accounting data, such as the total assets of acquiring firms, 
refers to the fiscal year before the respective M&A transactions. This procedure ensures that the 
corresponding control variables reflect a firm’s financial characteristics before the M&A deal, the 
completion of which could have had a significant impact on the financial metrics. Finally, in line 
with previous empirical studies, the present analysis considers major deal characteristics as 
additional control variables. All deal properties are obtained from the Thomson Reuters SDC 
Platinum database and introduced in the further course of this chapter. Characteristics of the final 
sample are briefly summarized thereafter. 
 
                                                          
356 All dollar amounts presented in this thesis are in US dollars. 
357 cf. Netter et al. (2011), p. 2319; Fuller et al. (2002), p. 1770.  
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Deal size 
Following Asquith et al. (1983), Moeller et al. (2004), and Masulis et al. (2007), the deal value 
(excluding fees and expenses) relative to the acquirer’s market value of equity (as obtained from 
the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database)358 is used to measure transaction size.359 Employing 
the acquirer’s market value as the denominator seems to be reasonable, because the gains from 
the acquisition should be capitalized in accordance with acquirer size.360 While Travlos (1987) 
reports a negative empirical relation between relative deal size and the acquirer’s value effects, 
Asquith et al. (1983) and Moeller et al. (2004) find a significantly positive relation.361 Moeller et 
al. (2004) further show that larger firms seem to pay higher premiums for their targets as well as 
to be also involved in value-destroying acquisitions, which is consistent inter alia with the empire 
building hypothesis.362 Given that relative deal size is typically larger for small acquirers and 
value effects may be a function of deal volume, one could predict a positive relation for this 
measure and bidders’ announcement returns.   
 
Industry relation 
In line with the studies of Fuller et al. (2002) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004), the present 
analysis includes a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the acquirer and target firm operate 
in the same industry.363 On the one hand, transactions conducted in the same industry could be 
positively related to acquirer returns due to the possibility of higher synergy gains based on 
economies of scale, the target’s easier integration into the acquiring firm, and the experience of 
the acquirer’s management team in the respective business area.364 On the other hand, the 
diversification effect of cross-industry deals might also be generally seen as beneficial for the 
acquirer’s shareholders due to the potential operating risk reduction and development of new 
revenue sources. However, this effect may be strongly related to the firm’s pre-existing degree of 
diversification. Furthermore, Morck et al. (1990) suggest that self-interested managers may be 
inclined to overpay in cross-industry deals if the transactions allow them to improve their job 
security, for example by developing new business opportunities that might not otherwise yield 
                                                          
358 This study relies on the market value of equity 10 days prior to the announcement of a transaction. 
359 cf. Asquith et al. (1983), p. 122; Moeller et al. (2004), pp. 216–217; Masulis et al. (2007), p. 1856.   
360 cf. Asquith et al. (1983), p. 122. 
361 cf. Travlos (1987), p. 960; Asquith et al. (1983), p. 138; Moeller et al. (2004), p. 226. 
362 cf. on this and the following Moeller et al. (2004), pp. 208, 226. 
363 cf. Fuller et al. (2002), p. 1787; Goergen and Renneboog (2004), p. 35. 
364 cf. on this and the following Draper and Paudyal (2008), pp. 398–399. 
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any benefits to shareholders.365 In this context, the empirical evidence on the link between intra-
industry deals and acquirer returns is mixed: some studies report a positive relation and others the 
absence of such a link.366 In light of the findings and suggestions in the relevant scientific 
literature, no direct prediction on the link between acquirers’ M&A performance and the industry 
relation of the target and bidding firms is made in the present thesis. 
 
Cross-border deals 
Many researchers—including Fuller et al. (2002), Goergen and Renneboog (2004), and Rossi and 
Volpin (2004), to name only a few—suggest additionally accounting for the domicile of the 
acquirer and target firms in the scope of investigating M&A transactions.367 As such, a dummy 
variable coded with a value of 1 if the transaction can be classified as a cross-border deal and 0 
otherwise is included in the present analysis. According to Drapper and Paudyal (2008), an 
acquisition of a foreign target may be linked to a more complex transaction procedure as well as 
to greater challenges and higher risks related to managing a foreign business in comparison to a 
domestic deal.368 Following this argumentation, a negative average impact of cross-border deals 
on the acquirers’ announcement returns could be expected. On the other hand, foreign entity 
acquisitions may be linked to several benefits for domestic firms. Scholes and Wolfson (1990) 
and Kang (1993) suggest that the tax system, in particular the corporate tax rate, in the target 
firm’s domicile country can provide foreign acquirers with a valuable tax advantage if they come 
from a country with higher corporate taxation.369 Scholes and Wolfson (1990) also empirically 
demonstrate that the tax argument indeed can help to explain the higher level of M&A activities 
attributed to foreign investors in a country established a tax-favorable policy from the foreigners’ 
point of view. Furthermore, Danbolt (2004) argues that foreign acquisitions can help firms to 
overcome trade barriers and thus facilitate their access to new markets.370 Such transactions may 
be particularly valuable if the acquirer’s home currency is stronger than the currency of its target. 
In this context, the empirical results of previous studies are also mixed. For instance, Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) report a negative empirical link between domestic transactions and the 
                                                          
365 cf. Morck et al. (1990), pp. 32–33. 
366 cf. Draper and Paudyal (2008), pp. 398–399; Fuller et al. (2002), p. 1787; Goergen and Renneboog (2004), p. 36; 
Masulis et al. (2007), pp. 1868, 1875. 
367 cf. Fuller et al. (2002), p. 1786; Goergen and Renneboog (2004), p. 9; Rossi and Volpin (2004), p. 278. 
368 cf. on this and the following Draper and Paudyal (2008), p. 399. 
369 cf. on this and the following Scholes and Wolfson (1990), pp. 141–144, 157–158; Kang (1993), p. 348. 
370 cf. on this and the following Danbolt (2004), pp. 86–87. 
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announcement returns of European bidders, whereas the results of Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2005) suggest lower returns in the case of cross-border deals conducted by US acquirers.371 
Seeing as the data used by Goergen and Renneboog (2004) better fits the present sample and a 
number of reasonable arguments exist for predicting a positive link between acquirers’ M&A 
performance and foreign transactions, this relation is consequently expected for this thesis.   
 
Status of the target firm 
Fuller et al. (2002), Moeller et al. (2004), and Masulis et al. (2007) demonstrate that acquirers’ 
M&A returns additionally differ for public and private targets (or subsidiaries).372 They report a 
(more) negative relation for the target firm’s public status and bidder returns attributed to the 
acquisition announcement. According to Fuller et al. (2002), this link can be explained by the 
liquidity discount on private firms, which allows an acquirer to achieve a better price in the 
transaction and hence to raise the returns for its shareholders.373 The fact that private firms are 
more difficult to buy and sell and consequently less attractive could result in the acquirer having 
a bargaining advantage during the negotiation period and therefore in the aforementioned 
discount on the purchase price. In contrast, publicly traded firms could exhibit a higher number of 
interested bidders, which allows target firms to negotiate a higher price that potentially includes a 
liquidity premium. Furthermore, the link between the target’s private status and announcement 
returns can be more pronounced if the acquirer’s stock is used as the transaction currency. This is 
because a typical closely held private company paid for with the acquirer’s shares could have 
incentives to monitor the acquirer’s management after becoming a substantial shareholder, which 
creates additional shareholder value. Due to the clear findings of prior literature and widely 
unanimous empirical evidence, a negative link between the public status of target firms and 
acquirers’ announcement returns is expected for this thesis. To assess this relation, a dummy 
variable coded with a value of 1 if the target is a publicly traded firm and 0 otherwise is 
considered in the present analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
371 cf. Goergen and Renneboog (2004), pp. 36–38; Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), p. 533.  
372 cf. on this and the following Fuller et al. (2002), p. 1792; Moeller et al. (2004), pp. 212, 215; Masulis et al. (2007), 
p. 1858. 
373 cf. on this and the following Fuller et al. (2002), pp. 1765, 1784, 1792. 
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Payment type 
As discussed in chapter 4.3.1, the choice of payment method in the scope of an M&A transaction 
can constitute a signal to the market regarding how a firm’s management perceives the 
company’s actual value. A stock offer can thus be interpreted as an overvaluation signal, whereas 
a cash offer can indicate undervaluation.374 As such, one could expect acquirers’ announcement 
returns to be negatively related to the stock payment method and positively to cash payment 
option. However, as Martin (1996) suggests, a firm’s management may have other motives for 
using a specific payment method; the market reaction attributable to the payment choice may also 
depend on the target’s public or private status, as elaborated in the previous section.375 The 
empirical results concerning the link between M&A performance and payment type differ among 
scientific studies. While Draper and Paudyal (2008) find a more positive impact of cash offers on 
acquirer returns,376 Goergen and Renneboog (2004) report a negative relation between cash 
payment and bidders’ announcement performance.377 Furthermore, Travlos (1987) indicate a 
negative impact of stock payment on acquirer returns,378 whereas Fuller et al. (2002) show a 
negative effect of equity offers for deals that involve a public target and a positive effect for 
transactions that include private firms.379 In summary, while economic theory mainly suggests a 
positive (negative) relation between deals paid with cash (equity) and acquirers’ announcement 
returns, the results of previous studies indicate that this relation is still an empirical question. 
Two separate dummy variables are included in the present analysis to account for the differences 
in payment structures: the first takes a value of 1 for deals paid with cash and 0 otherwise; the 
second accounts for cases in which stock is used as deal currency. 
 
Further controls 
Researchers such as Martynova and Renneboog (2008) argue that the outcomes of M&A 
transactions may depend on whether the target becomes fully or partially acquired.380 This deal 
characteristic could be particularly important in cross-border deals, because a full acquisition 
implies a switch in the target’s nationality in accordance with international law. Such a switch 
                                                          
374 cf. Travlos (1987), pp. 944–945. 
375 cf. Martin (1996), pp. 1229–1231, 1242. 
376 cf. Draper and Paudyal (2008), p. 396. 
377 cf. Goergen and Renneboog (2004), p. 36. 
378 cf. Travlos (1987), p. 960. 
379 cf. Fuller et al. (2002), pp. 1764, 1787. 
380 cf. on this and the following Martynova and Renneboog (2008), pp. 200–201. 
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results in the de facto occurrence of spillover effects (e.g., with regard to CG standards related to 
the acquirer) and thereby potentially affects the extent of the synergy value. To appropriately 
control for this and other effects that depend on the size of the stake in the target firm held by the 
acquirer after a transaction, the present analysis includes a variable that contains information on 
this stake level. 
As suggested by Hite et al. (1987), Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), and Slovin et al. (2005), 
acquirers’ announcement returns may additionally depend on whether a share deal or asset deal 
(including the acquisition of entire assets or partial business units) is conducted.381 The 
preference for a specific deal form can be driven by specific conditions such as the extent of the 
expected synergy gains or the target’s current financial situation, which can ultimately be 
reflected in the market’s reaction to the deal announcement. To account for the basic deal forms, 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 in the case of an asset deal and 0 otherwise is added to 
the analysis. 
Furthermore, firm acquisitions can be roughly divided into hostile and friendly takeovers. These 
types of acquisitions are frequently considered in prior empirical studies because of their 
(presumable) value relevance for the involved firms, for instance due to the higher overpayment 
risk in hostile takeovers from the perspective of the bidder’s shareholders.382 However, as in the 
present sample none of the transactions for which the required data is available constitute hostile 
acquisitions, it is not necessary to account for this issue. The absence of hostile transactions in the 
sample is widely in line with the results of Moeller et al. (2007), who report only 2.5% hostile 
acquisitions in their broad sample of 4322 transactions.383 In the scope of the next section, 
descriptive statistics related to the present M&A sample are described in more detail.  
 
4.3.3 Sample data and descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics related to the M&A activities of German and UK firms are presented in 
tables 3 and 4. In line with the expectations derived from the study of Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004), UK firms appear to conduct significantly more transactions than their German 
                                                          
381 cf. on this and the following Hite et al. (1987), pp. 229–230, 251; Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), p. 2020; 
Slovin et al. (2005), p. 2385.  
382 cf., for instance, Moeller et al. (2004), p. 211; Martynova and Renneboog (2008), p. 211. 
383 cf. Moeller et al. (2007), p. 2054. 
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counterparts (553 vs. 148).384 However, the average value effects attributed to M&A 
announcements are more positive for German acquirers (1.1%) than for UK acquirers (0.66%).385 
This can be linked to the fact that the German sample covers larger transactions (as indicated by 
the absolute deal size) that are consequently related to more pronounced market reactions. 
However, the medians of the value effects reveal a much smaller difference between German and 
UK firms (0.49% vs. 0.34%). In this context, the mean (median) deal size for German companies 
is $1228.599 ($250.5805) million, whereas the respective value for UK firms amounts to             
$401.908 ($45.062) million. It can be additionally noted that cross-border deals, which could 
require a more detailed transaction explanation from the perspective of shareholders, dominate 
both the German and UK samples—although they are even more prevalent among German firms 
(77.03% vs. 62.93%). In contrast, deals that involves targets from the same industry occur 
slightly more frequently in the UK sample than in the German one (32.37% vs. 27.70%). 
Regarding the payment type in M&A transactions, the present data indicates that UK firms rely 
more on pure cash payment than their German counterparts (68.90% vs. 43.92%), whereas 
German companies rely slightly more on stock as the deal currency (4.73% vs. 1.45%). The 
finding of the predominance of pure cash financing is in line with the results of researchers such 
as Goergen and Renneboog (2004);386 however, the sample companies seem to have reduced 
their pure stock payments over time, presumably due to the negative signals they send to the 
market with regard to a firm’s stock overvaluation (as discussed in the previous chapter). In 
addition, German firms have greater involvement in transactions with publicly listed targets than 
UK companies (15.54% vs. 11.94%), whereas asset deals are more prevalent in the UK (62.93% 
vs. 44.59%). The high percentage of asset deals in the present sample is in accordance with the 
findings of researchers such as Netter et al. (2011), who report an asset deal percentage of even 
over 70% for the US market.387 Finally, full acquisition of the target seems to appear slightly 
more frequently in the UK sample than in the German one, as indicated by the statistics on the 
ultimate ownership. The descriptive statistics on the fundamental data of acquirers reveals that on 
average, M&A deals in the German sample tend to be conducted by larger firms than in the UK 
sample; this is in line with the higher deal values identified for German firms. In the following 
section, the third and final part of the present thesis’s empirical analysis is introduced. 
                                                          
384 cf. Goergen and Renneboog (2004), pp. 23–24. 
385 For detailed elaborations on the calculation of value effects, refer to chapter 5.3. 
386 cf. Goergen and Renneboog (2004), p. 14. 
387 cf. Netter et al. (2011), p. 2323. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for German M&As 
 N mean stand dev 25th percentile median 75th percentile 
       
CAR -1...1 (value effect) 148 0.0110 0.0401 -0.0088 0.0049 0.0269 
       
Deal size (in $ million) 148 1228.599 2835.72 42.25 250.5805 814.6675 
       
Cross-border deal 148 0.7703 0.4221    
       
Intra-industry deal 148 0.2770 0.4490    
       
Cash payment 148 0.4392 0.4980    
       
Stock payment 148 0.0473 0.2130    
       
Public target 148 0.1554 0.3635    
       
Final ownership 148 0.9631 0.1048    
       
Asset deal 148 0.4459 0.4988    
       
Firm size (in € million) 148 22700 40400 1100 5650 22000 
       
ROE 148 0.1239 0.2064 0.0695 0.1450 0.2030 
       
Leverage 148 0.6902 1.1872 0.2443 0.5207 0.8980 
       
R&D intensity 148 0.0323 0.0427 0.0007 0.0176 0.0451 
       
CapEx intensity 148 0.0447 0.0333 0.0218 0.0367 0.0546 
       
IA intensity 148 0.2685 0.1789 0.1230 0.2342 0.4317 
       
Sales growth 148 0.1315 0.2214 0.0483 0.0964 0.1637 
       
US cross-listing 148 0.2095 0.4083    
       
Firm age 148 29.7230 24.0424 11 17 59 
       
Strategic holdings 148 0.0620 0.1351 0 0 0.06 
       
IR budget 41 2.5610 1.3793 2 3 4 
       
IR remuneration 41 2.3415 1.0632 2 2 3 
       
IR employees (abs) 41 3.3415 1.7834 2 3 4 
       
Distance to airport (km) 147 29.7833 24.2343 12.5740 22.4691 32.4618 
       
Distance to Frankfurt (km) 147 202.6234 122.4448 91.3644 187.6617 304.0464 
       
Financial expert CEO 148 0.2230 0.4177    
       
Head of IR analyst 122 0.2377 0.4274    
 
CAR -1...1 (value effect) is the acquirer’s three-day cumulated abnormal stock return around the M&A announcement. Deal size (in $ million) is the total value of the 
transaction. Cross-border deal is a dummy variable that equals one in the case of the acquisition of a foreign target and zero otherwise. Intra-industry deal is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target firm operate in the same industry and zero otherwise. Cash payment is a dummy variable that equals one if cash is 
used as the deal currency and zero otherwise. Stock payment is a dummy variable that equals one if stock is used as the deal currency and zero otherwise. Public target 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the target firm is a publicly traded company and zero otherwise. Final ownership is measured as the equity stake in the target 
firm held by the acquirer after the transaction. Asset deal is a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is conducted via the acquisition of target’s assets and zero 
otherwise. All of the following corporate characteristics refer to the acquiring firm. In addition, all accounting variables refer to the fiscal year prior to the 
transaction. Firm size (in € million) is measured as the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average 
shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the 
research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total 
assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal 
years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years 
since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. IR budget contains five categories, where the value of 
zero is assigned to the lowest budget category and the value of four to the highest one. IR remuneration covers seven categories of the IR managers’ salaries, where the 
value of zero is assigned to the lowest category and the value of six to the highest one. IR employees (abs) is the number of the firm’s IR managers. Distance to airport 
(km) measures the distance between the firm’s headquarter location and the next international airport. Distance to Frankfurt (km) measures the distance between the 
firm’s headquarter location and Frankfurt. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and zero 
otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for UK M&As 
 N mean stand dev 25th percentile median 75th percentile 
       
CAR -1...1 (value effect) 553 0.0066 0.0342 -0.0128 0.0034 0.0228 
       
Deal size (in $ million) 553 401.908 1508.389 15 45.062 173 
       
Cross-border deal 553 0.6293 0.4834    
       
Intra-industry deal 553 0.3237 0.4683    
       
Cash payment 553 0.6890 0.4633    
       
Stock payment 553 0.0145 0.1195    
       
Public target 553 0.1194 0.3245    
       
Final ownership 553 0.9785 0.0869    
       
Asset deal 553 0.6293 0.4834    
       
Firm size (in € million) 553 9356.973 23000 776.071 2300 5800 
       
ROE 553 0.3221 0.6987 0.1374 0.2021 0.3557 
       
Leverage 553 0.3818 8.0424 0.2069 0.5248 0.8654 
       
R&D intensity 553 0.0259 0.0616 0 0.0008 0.0288 
       
CapEx intensity 553 0.0423 0.0446 0.0158 0.0302 0.0513 
       
IA intensity 553 0.3267 0.1986 0.1633 0.3125 0.4804 
       
Sales growth 553 0.1240 0.1167 0.0559 0.1052 0.1807 
       
US cross-listing 553 0.1646 0.3711    
       
Firm age 553 25.3996 19.6940 9 20 40 
       
Strategic holdings 553 0.0155 0.0531 0 0 0 
       
IR budget 64 2.2188 1.2783 1 3 3 
       
IR remuneration 64 2.5625 1.2956 2 2 3 
       
IR employees (abs) 64 2.9375 1.4351 2 2 4 
 
CAR -1...1 (value effect) is the acquirer’s three-day cumulated abnormal stock return around the M&A announcement. Deal size (in $ million) is the total value of the 
transaction. Cross-border deal is a dummy variable that equals one in the case of the acquisition of a foreign target and zero otherwise. Intra-industry deal is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target firm operate in the same industry and zero otherwise. Cash payment is a dummy variable that equals one if cash is 
used as the deal currency and zero otherwise. Stock payment is a dummy variable that equals one if stock is used as the deal currency and zero otherwise. Public target 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the target firm is a publicly traded company and zero otherwise. Final ownership is measured as the equity stake in the target 
firm held by the acquirer after the transaction. Asset deal is a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is conducted via the acquisition of target’s assets and zero 
otherwise. All of the following corporate characteristics refer to the acquiring firm. In addition, all accounting variables refer to the fiscal year prior to the 
transaction. Firm size (in € million) is measured as the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average 
shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the 
research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total 
assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal 
years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years 
since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. IR budget contains five categories, where the value of 
zero is assigned to the lowest budget category and the value of four to the highest one. IR remuneration covers seven categories of the IR managers’ salaries, where the 
value of zero is assigned to the lowest category and the value of six to the highest one. IR employees (abs) is the number of the firm’s IR managers. 
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4.4 IR quality and SEO performance 
4.4.1 Hypotheses 
As discussed previously (e.g., in chapter 2.2), IR may further become particularly valuable in the 
scope of firms’ equity offerings, where the quality of communication with existing and new 
investors could be reflected in the market’s reaction to announcements of such corporate actions. 
The present thesis is the first to analyze the relation between firms’ SEO performance and IR 
activities and disentangle the related value effects (if any) for firms that come from different legal 
and financial systems. In this section, the expectations on the aforementioned links are 
elaborated. 
According to Lang and Lundholm (2000), two major aspects of IR, namely the alleviation of 
information asymmetry between firms and investors and the application of appropriate strategies 
to raise investors’ awareness, could also be potential value drivers in the scope of SEO 
announcements.388 As Walker and Yost (2008) suggest, information asymmetry related to SEOs 
may exist in relation to a company’s true value and the value of utilizing realized proceeds.389 
The first concern regarding a firm’s actual value can be primarily ascribed to Myers and Majluf 
(1984), who argue that if a company’s management possesses superior information that indicates 
that the firm’s stock is overvalued, managers tend to raise new capital by relying on equity 
offerings.390 Because SEOs could consequently signal to the market that a firm is overvalued, one 
should expect on average a negative stock price reaction to SEO announcements assuming 
investor rationality. Among others, Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Kalay and Shimrat (1987) 
empirically substantiate this prediction by providing evidence of negative announcement returns 
for issuing firms.391 They also show that such market reaction indeed seems to be related to 
information asymmetry and the negative signal attributed to these capital actions.392 In this 
context, Lang and Lundholm (2000) suggest that better firm disclosure practices before equity 
offerings could lessen residual information asymmetry and hence alleviate negative value effects 
at the time of SEO announcements.393 In addition, as in M&A transactions, a firm’s management 
and IR team could communicate with investors and analysts directly in the scope of SEO 
                                                          
388 cf. Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 630. 
389 cf. Walker and Yost (2008), pp. 376–377. 
390 cf. on this and the following Myers and Majluf (1984), pp. 188, 220. 
391 cf. on this and the following Masulis and Korwar (1986), pp. 116–117; Kalay and Shimrat (1987), p. 125.  
392 For further conceivable issues that may be linked to raising new equity (in addition to stock overvaluation), see 
Kalay and Shimrat (1987), pp. 111–112. 
393 cf. Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 631. 
Hypotheses, measures, and sample data  88 
 
announcements to resolve market participants’ different concerns (e.g., on stock overvaluation), 
for instance by providing plausible arguments as to why additional capital should be raised by 
issuing new equity instead of debt and by generally elaborating a capital action’s purpose. In this 
sense, Walker and Yost (2008) suggest that if from the investors’ perspective a firm does not 
seem to have an appropriate purpose for raising equity capital, a (more) negative market reaction 
to the corresponding announcement could be expected.394 This is particularly the case because in 
line with the agency theory, managers may use the SEO proceeds to enhance their own wealth to 
the detriment of shareholders. For instance, Berger et al. (1997) provide evidence that entrenched 
managers try to avoid higher levels of leverage and consequently prefer equity over debt, for 
example to avert higher firm risk and consequently reduce performance pressure and enhance 
their own job security.395 Furthermore, investors may face a risk that managers use proceeds to 
engage in empire-building activities, as suggested by Jensen (1986), or enjoy perks at the expense 
of shareholders.396 The empirical study of Walker and Yost (2008) shows that provision of 
specific information on the usage of collected funds in the scope of SEO disclosure differs across 
firms.397 Whereas some companies provide detailed plans for the utilization of new capital, others 
disclose only little or no information. These researchers’ study also provides evidence that 
companies that are specific about their investment intentions for the collected funds experience 
value increases when equity offers are announced, while firms with hazy disclosure are subject to 
value losses. The extent of both effects is linked to the size of the intended programs. These 
empirical results highlight the importance of disclosure quality in the scope of SEOs, particularly 
due to concerns related to agency issues. In addition, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) stress that good 
IR quality can help to decrease adverse selection concerns and thereby contribute to higher stock 
liquidity in the run-up to capital actions, which should in turn allow firms to reduce the discount 
on the new equity they frequently offer to create incentives for market participants to invest in 
less liquid stock.398 As such, firms with more sophisticated IR may collect more funds and 
exhibit higher SEO performance.  
The stock marketing activities of IR can further contribute to firms’ SEO performance by 
boosting market participants’ awareness of the corresponding firms.399 In line with Merton 
                                                          
394 cf. on this and the following Walker and Yost (2008), pp. 376–377. 
395 cf. Berger et al. (1997), pp. 1414, 1436. 
396 cf. Jensen (1986), p. 328; Tirole (2001), p. 1. 
397 cf. on this and the following Walker and Yost (2008), pp. 376, 384–386. 
398 cf. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 92. 
399 cf. Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 630. 
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(1987), an increase in the amount of information disclosed, a higher frequency of more 
forthcoming communication with investors and analysts (e.g., during conferences and meetings), 
as well as a higher presence in the media can increase overall firm visibility in the run-up to a 
capital action and result in a higher stock price.400 This can in turn make it possible to raise funds 
on better conditions and enhance SEO performance. However, Lang and Lundholm (2000) 
emphasize that when information about an equity offering becomes public, investors may assume 
that enhanced IR activities served an opportunistic purpose and consequently revalue a firm’s 
stock—which might be reflected in a larger price drop being attributed to the SEO 
announcement.401 While Lang and Lundholm (2000) provide evidence of these patterns, Clinton 
et al. (2014) find that greater disclosure (e.g., via forward-looking statements) prior to SEOs 
typically enriches the information environment and is associated with higher stock returns in the 
run-up to SEOs, which subsequently do not suffer from reversals.402 Furthermore, as already 
highlighted in the scope of developing hypotheses on M&A performance, an appropriate IR 
strategy during SEO announcements can counterbalance investors’ potentially negative 
assessments of prior stock marketing activities; as a result, market participants may attribute a 
firm’s higher visibility to a sustainable increase in its market value and at least a less negative 
stock price reaction may occur. In this context, the credibility of management and the IR team 
built up before the capital action could play an important role for investors’ perception.403  
In line with previous elaborations concerning the importance of IR quality in different countries, 
the IR contribution to SEO performance may also deviate depending on country-specific settings. 
With regard to divergences in the financing structures of firms that are subject to different law 
origins and financial systems, Aktas et al. (2016) point out that whereas firms in Germany (which 
has a banked-based system) tend to exhibit a higher concentration of ownership and higher 
reliance on banks for raising external funds, UK companies have more dispersed ownership 
structures and stronger ties to financial markets as a financing source.404 In this context, Foley 
and Greenwood (2010) provide evidence that firms from countries with higher investor 
protection (e.g., the UK), exhibit more dispersed ownership on average and seem to rely more on 
equity financing (thus, SEOs) when they face valuable growth opportunities; in contrast, 
                                                          
400 cf. on this and the following Merton (1987), p. 501; Lang and Lundholm (2000), pp. 627–628. 
401 cf. on this and the following Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 623. 
402 Clinton et al. 2014, p. 59. However, this study relies on the SEO issue date as the reference day (which is more 
relevant for shelf offerings). 
403 cf. Hoffmann and Fieseler (2012), p. 149. 
404 cf. Aktas et al. (2016), pp. 1–2. 
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companies from countries with lower investor protection (e.g., Germany) are more likely to seek 
debt financing.405 In conclusion, the encouragement of successful SEO implementation—through 
either sophisticated stock marketing techniques, more intensive and forthcoming communication 
with a larger number of (potential) equity investors, or a combination thereof—appears to be one 
of the major IR tasks in the UK and its extent should be higher than in Germany. As such, a 
higher contribution of better IR quality to SEO performance could be expected for UK firms than 
for German companies. However, due to the higher information asymmetry concerns applicable 
to German firms and the identified importance of IR activities in addressing them, a more 
conservative expectation concerning the differences between Germany and the UK is stated for 
the present analysis. The following hypotheses are thus tested in this thesis: 
H7.1: Better IR quality is associated with higher SEO announcement returns for German issuers 
H7.2: Better IR quality is associated with higher SEO announcement returns for UK issuers 
H7.3: The positive link between IR quality and SEO announcement returns for UK issuers does not 
substantially differ from that for German issuers or is even stronger 
 
4.4.2 Sample construction and essential control variables 
Following researchers such as Lee and Masulis (2009) and Kim and Purnanandam (2014), the 
present thesis uses the Thomson Reuters SDC database to obtain information on SEOs of German 
and UK firms within the time period of 2006 to 2014.406 In line with the aforementioned studies, 
only completed SEOs for which a filing date of the offer is available are included in the sample. 
Furthermore, as suggested by Kalay and Shimrat (1987) and Kim and Purnanandam (2014), all 
pure secondary offerings are excluded from the analysis given that they constitute stock sales by 
existing shareholders and thus do not entail the actual issuance of any primary shares.407 The 
matching procedure used in relation to the data on SEOs, Extel IR rankings, and corporate 
fundamentals corresponds to the process described in the scope of the introduction to the M&A 
analysis. The procedure entails matching SEOs filed from April to March in each year with IR 
rankings awarded subsequent to the end of this time span. Furthermore, the accounting data 
                                                          
405 cf. Foley and Greenwood (2010), pp. 1231, 1259. 
406 cf. Lee and Masulis (2009), p. 449; Kim and Purnanandam (2014), p. 1027. 
407 cf. Kalay and Shimrat (1987), p. 113; Kim and Purnanandam (2014), p. 1027. 
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obtained for the fiscal year before the actual equity offering is used to avoid a bias in 
fundamentals through the completion of the SEO. Prior empirical research additionally suggests 
controlling for some SEO characteristics that may have an impact on the corresponding value 
effects. The following sections introduce these features and discuss expectations related to their 
impacts. 
 
Offer size 
Prior empirical studies on SEOs (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Jegadeesh et al., 1993; Slovin 
et al., 2000) suggest controlling for the (relative) size of the investigated equity offerings as a 
value-relevant factor, defined as the amount of the SEO proceeds divided by the firm’s market 
value prior the filing date.408 Following this suggestion, the present analysis considers the relative 
size of equity offerings, as calculated using information on SEO proceeds from the Thomson 
Reuters SDC database and the market value of equity from the Worldscope database.409 Based on 
the signaling model of Myers and Majluf (1984), Krasker (1986) predicts that negative stock 
price reactions to SEO announcements should be stronger for equity offers that aim to collect 
more funds.410 In contrast, Slovin et al. (2000) argue that an equity offering’s larger size could be 
related to a stronger decrease in ownership concentration; in this case, a firm may become subject 
to higher external monitoring that could in turn create value for current shareholders.411 This 
argument should particularly apply to German companies, which tend to exhibit more 
concentrated ownership structure (as previously discussed). The empirical evidence regarding 
this relation is also heterogeneous. Whereas researchers such as Asquith and Mullins (1986) and 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) report a negative link between relative offer size and value effects 
attributed to SEO announcements,412 Jegadeesh et al. (1993) and Slovin et al. (2000) find a 
positive relation.413 In summary, because both of the aforementioned perspectives appear to be 
reasonable and the results may further depend on the origin of the investigated firms, no direct 
prediction on the link between relative offer size and SEO announcement returns is made in the 
present thesis.  
 
                                                          
408 cf. Asquith and Mullins (1986), p. 80; Jegadeesh et al. (1993), p. 171; Slovin et al. (2000), p. 176.  
409 Analogous to M&A analysis, the market value obtained 10 days prior the filing date is used in this thesis. 
410 cf. Krasker (1986), p. 102. 
411 cf. Slovin et al. (2000), p. 177. 
412 cf. Asquith and Mullins (1986), p. 80; Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), p. 274.  
413 cf. Jegadeesh et al. (1993), p. 171; Slovin et al. (2000), p. 177. 
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Use of proceeds 
Following Masulis and Korwar (1986), Slovin et al. (2000), and Walker and Yost (2008), several 
intended uses of proceeds announced in the scope of SEOs and specified in the Thomson Reuters 
SDC database are taken into account in the present analysis.414 The respective purposes are 
covered by separate dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the proceeds should be used for 
corporate acquisitions, debt reduction, or working capital strengthening and 0 otherwise. Each 
objective is introduced below.  
First, utilizing proceeds to strengthen working capital typically implies higher firm cash holdings, 
which may raise additional agency concerns assuming managers’ opportunistic behavior.415 In 
this regard, cash holdings may be used for private benefits that would ultimately harm 
shareholder value. However, Kalcheva and Lins (2007) provide evidence that more cash being 
available to a firm’s management is related to lower market value only if country-level investor 
protection is weak.416 In consequence, the aforementioned argument should primarily apply to 
German firms. On the other hand, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) demonstrate that firms that hold 
a persistent level of cash and thus follow a conservative financial policy exhibit higher growth 
and intensified investment activities.417 To summarize, while the relation between SEO 
announcement performance and working capital as an intended usage of proceeds is not easy to 
predict, the link should be more positive (or less negative) for UK firms due to their lower agency 
concerns in comparison to German companies. This is in line with Kalcheva and Lins (2007). 
With regard to the relation between the use of SEO proceeds for debt reduction and 
announcement returns, a negative link can be generally expected. In this context, Masulis (1983) 
as well as Masulis and Korwar (1986) suggest that decreased firm leverage constitutes a negative 
signal about managers’ expectations concerning future earnings.418 This is because when a firm 
has a weaker financial situation, its interest payments linked to outstanding debt may result in a 
threat of financial distress. To avoid this problem, a firm’s management can aim to replace debt 
with equity that should be anticipated by rational investors and consequently reflected in SEO 
performance. This argumentation is closely linked to the evidence provided by Berger et al. 
(1997), which suggests that self-interested and entrenched managers prefer lower levels of 
leverage due to the lower performance pressure attributed to debt payments and higher job 
                                                          
414 cf. Masulis and Korwar (1986), p. 97; Slovin et al. (2000), p. 176; Walker and Yost (2008), p. 376. 
415 cf. on this and the following Mikkelson and Partch (2003), p. 277. 
416 cf. Kalcheva and Lins (2007), p. 1087. 
417 cf. Mikkelson and Partch (2003), p. 275. 
418 cf. on this and the following Masulis (1983), pp. 115, 125; Masulis and Korwar (1986), p. 93. 
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security.419 The empirical results concerning the link between debt reduction as the intended use 
of proceeds and SEO announcement returns are also widely consistent. For instance, Slovin et al. 
(2000) and Walker and Yost (2008) report a negative relation—although their findings partially 
suffer from a lack of statistical significance.420  
The link between SEO announcement returns and the use of proceeds for M&A activities is less 
obvious. Walker and Yost (2008) suggest that investment activities as an intended use of 
proceeds are generally positively assessed by shareholders and hence positively linked to 
respective value effects.421 On the other hand, as discussed in section 4.3.1, an acquisition itself 
can be subject to substantial information asymmetry and managerial opportunism concerns that 
could justify an inverse relation. As such, no direct prediction is made for this analysis. In the 
next chapter, descriptive statistics related to SEOs of German and UK firms are introduced. 
 
4.4.3 Sample data and descriptive statistics 
Tables 5 and 6 provide descriptive statistics concerning SEOs of German and UK firms. The 
numbers of observations for the German and UK samples that cover all required information are 
130 and 120, respectively. In line with the predictions of Myers and Majluf (1984) as well as 
previous empirical evidence (e.g., Kim and Purnanandam, 2014),422 the average value effects 
attributed to SEO announcements are negative for issuing firms from both Germany and the UK 
(-1.18% vs. -1.31%), which indicates the negative signal effect of equity offerings.423 This 
evidence is supported by the corresponding median values of -1.25% for Germany and -1.44% 
for the UK. In addition, as predicted in chapter 4.4.1, the magnitude of UK SEOs (which were 
identified as a primary financing source in the market-based financial system) significantly 
exceeds the magnitude in Germany (which is characterized by a bank-based regime). The 
corresponding mean (median) offer size is $801.297 ($158.368) million in Germany and               
$1759.552 ($260.772) million in the UK. However, it should be noted that firms in the UK 
sample are on average larger than their German counterparts, which could at least partially 
                                                          
419 cf. Berger et al. (1997), pp. 1411, 1414, 1436. 
420 cf. Slovin et al. 2000, p. 174; Walker and Yost (2008), pp. 382–383. 
421 cf. Walker and Yost (2008), pp. 382–383. 
422 cf. Myers and Majluf (1984), p. 188; Kim and Purnanandam (2014), p. 1030. 
423 For detailed elaborations o the calculation of value effects, see chapter 5.3. 
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explain the divergences in offer size. These differences could also underlie the slightly higher 
negative average market reaction to the announcements of UK companies.   
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for German SEOs 
 N mean stand dev 25th percentile median 75th percentile 
       
CAR -1...1 (value effect) 130 -0.0118 0.0723 -0.0506 -0.0125 0.0143 
       
Offer size (in $ million) 130 801.297 2114.758 60.781 158.368 550.542 
       
Use: Debt 130 0.1077 0.3112    
       
Use: Working capital 130 0.0385 0.1931    
       
Use: Acquisition 130 0.2923 0.4566    
       
Firm size (in € million) 130 91400 333000 680.758 1698.384 6557.000 
       
ROE 130 -0.0168 0.3485 -0.0101 0.0732 0.1458 
       
Leverage 130 2.2185 3.5499 0.3993 1.0311 2.2852 
       
R&D intensity 130 0.0259 0.0700 0 0 0.0320 
       
CapEx intensity 130 0.0499 0.0636 0.0119 0.0358 0.0564 
       
IA intensity 130 0.1431 0.1842 0.0048 0.0758 0.1859 
       
Sales growth 130 0.2013 0.6490 0.0023 0.0944 0.1998 
       
US cross-listing 130 0.1385 0.3467    
       
Firm age 130 23.7154 24.7478 7 12 50 
       
Strategic holdings 130 0.0916 0.1670 0 0 0.1 
       
IR budget 27 2.6296 1.2449 2 3 4 
       
IR remuneration 27 2.2222 1.0500 2 2 3 
       
IR employees (abs) 27 2.8889 1.7614 2 2 3 
       
Distance to airport (km) 129 25.8228 22.8050 9.7390 17.0544 35.7253 
       
Distance to Frankfurt (km) 129 214.7283 136.8386 113.0383 221.3916 309.2442 
       
Financial expert CEO 130 0.4615 0.5005    
       
Head of IR analyst 105 0.1143 0.3197    
 
CAR -1...1 (value effect) is the issuer’s three-day cumulated abnormal stock return around the SEO announcement. Offer size (in $ million) is the amount of SEO 
proceeds. Use: Debt is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for the debt reduction and zero otherwise. Use: Working capital is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for the strengthening of working capital and zero otherwise. Use: Acquisition is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for M&A activities and zero otherwise. All accounting variables below refer to the fiscal year prior to the SEO. 
Firm size (in € million) is measured as the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average 
shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the 
research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total 
assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal 
years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years 
since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. IR budget contains five categories, where the value of 
zero is assigned to the lowest budget category and the value of four to the highest one. IR remuneration covers seven categories of the IR managers’ salaries, where the 
value of zero is assigned to the lowest category and the value of six to the highest one. IR employees (abs) is the number of the firm’s IR managers. Distance to airport 
(km) measures the distance between the firm’s headquarter location and the next international airport. Distance to Frankfurt (km) measures the distance between the 
firm’s headquarter location and Frankfurt. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and zero 
otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics for UK SEOs 
 N mean stand dev 25th percentile median 75th percentile 
       
CAR -1...1 (value effect) 120 -0.0131 0.1265 -0.0455 -0.0144 0.0382 
       
Offer size (in $ million) 120 1759.552 4413.763 92.507 260.772 849.217 
       
Use: Debt 120 0.1917 0.3953    
       
Use: Working capital 120 0.0833 0.2775    
       
Use: Acquisition 120 0.4333 0.4976    
       
Firm size (in € million) 120 211000 587000 979.784 2321.155 12900 
       
ROE 120 0.2789 1.3181 0.0363 0.1451 0.2091 
       
Leverage 120 0.3681 17.3836 0.4037 0.7359 2.3155 
       
R&D intensity 120 0.0150 0.0756 0 0 0.0004 
       
CapEx intensity 120 0.0439 0.0673 0.0038 0.0233 0.0506 
       
IA intensity 120 0.1997 0.2345 0.0056 0.0999 0.3578 
       
Sales growth 120 0.1528 0.4193 0.0123 0.0716 0.1833 
       
US cross-listing 120 0.1750 0.3816    
       
Firm age 120 26.6000 23.2229 7 19.5 46 
       
Strategic holdings 120 0.0198 0.0608    
       
IR budget 10 2.1000 1.1005 1 2 3 
       
IR remuneration 10 2.5000 1.6499 1 2 4 
       
IR employees (abs) 10 3.9000 2.3781 2 3 6 
 
CAR -1...1 (value effect) is the issuer’s three-day cumulated abnormal stock return around the SEO announcement. Offer size (in $ million) is the amount of SEO 
proceeds. Use: Debt is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for the debt reduction and zero otherwise. Use: Working capital is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for the strengthening of working capital and zero otherwise. Use: Acquisition is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for M&A activities and zero otherwise. All accounting variables below refer to the fiscal year prior to the SEO. 
Firm size (in € million) is measured as the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average 
shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the 
research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total 
assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal 
years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years 
since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. IR budget contains five categories, where the value of 
zero is assigned to the lowest budget category and the value of four to the highest one. IR remuneration covers seven categories of the IR managers’ salaries, where the 
value of zero is assigned to the lowest category and the value of six to the highest one. IR employees (abs) is the number of the firm’s IR managers. 
       
 
Furthermore, while the usage of new equity capital as a (potential) acquisition currency is more 
frequently stated in SEOs related to UK firms than to German companies (43.33% vs. 29.23%), 
the usage of proceeds to strength working capital occurs less frequently in both samples (8.33% 
and 3.85%). In addition, the deployment of proceeds to reduce a firm’s debt is more frequently 
stated in the SEOs of UK firms than in those of German companies (19.17% vs. 10.77%), which 
seems to be in line with UK firms’ higher reliance on equity financing. Finally, SEO as a 
financing source seems to be used particularly by higher leveraged (2.2185) German firms (in 
comparison to the overall sample in this thesis) that have a CEO with significant financial 
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experience. In this context, the high leverage characteristic of German issuers may indicate a 
necessity (rather than a preference) for equity financing due to the higher costs of raising 
additional debt. The methodology used to provide further insights on the investigated variables is 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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5 Methodology 
5.1 Regression analysis and fixed effects 
In the scope of the present thesis, the regression approach is applied to test the different 
hypotheses formulated. The aim of this method is to assess the change in the explained variable 
when the predictor variable increases by one unit.424 The simple linear regression model can be 
outlined as follows:425 
y = V + M! + ε                                                                                                                                 (22) 
where y constitutes the predicted (dependent) variable, ! is the explanatory (independent) 
variable, α represents the constant term (intercept parameter), ε is the error or disturbance term, 
and β is the slope parameter of interest. In other words, given the linear function of the model, β 
indicates the ceteris paribus link between y and !, while α provides information on the constant 
level of y. Furthermore, the error term captures all unobserved factors that besides ! affect y.  
 
Estimation of relevant parameters 
To estimate the regression parameters α and β, the OLS approach is typically applied.426 When 
the error term (ε) has an expected value of zero and is uncorrelated with the independent variable 
(exogeneity), hence >lεm = 0 and elε|xm = 0, the function’s slope parameter can be estimated 
by dividing the covariance between the predicted variable and explanatory variable by the 
variance of the independent variable:427 
Mp =  e (!, )q (!) =  ∑ (!2 − !̅)(2 − 9)
s2;*∑ (!2 − !̅)<s2;*                                                                                  (23) 
where !̅ and 9 constitute the sample means and !2 and 2  the respective observations within the 
dataset. The constant parameter is then estimated using the calculated Mp  value and the sample 
means: 
                                                          
424 cf. Wooldridge (2013), p. 29.  
425 cf. Wooldridge (2013), pp. 20–21, 25. 
426 cf. on this and the following Angrist and Pischke (2009), p. 35; Wooldridge (2013), p. 27.  
427 Wooldridge (2013), pp. 26–27. 
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t =  9 − Mp!̅                                                                                                                                       (24) 
The aim of an OLS estimation is to determine the most suitable approximation that makes it 
possible to minimize the sum of squared residuals, which are defined as the differences between 
the actual and the estimated values of :428 
O(2
s
2;*
− t2)< = O(2
s
2;*
− t − Mp!2)< →  !                                                                          (25) 
The squaring of the residuals is necessary because otherwise the errors with opposite signs would 
counteract each other. 
However, the assumptions regarding the properties of the error term (ε) made in the scope of the 
simple regression model typically do not hold;429 further important variables related to  that 
might additionally be correlated with the independent variable of interest usually exist. A 
multiple regression analysis that considers relevant covariates is frequently conducted to alleviate 
this concern. The general form of the multiple regression can be expressed as follows:430 
y = V + M*!* + M<!< + . . . + Mx!x + ε                                                                                       (26) 
where  indicates the number of explanatory variables included in the model. 
If further relevant regressors are taken into account, the estimated Mp  coefficient on the variable of 
interest can be interpreted as the change in  when the respective independent variable changes 
by one unit (or in the case of a dummy variable, takes a value of 1), while all other factors in the 
model are held constant (i.e., ceteris paribus).431 This constitutes the first step in addressing the 
omitted variables bias and endogeneity concerns.432 To facilitate the interpretation of estimated 
coefficients for German and UK firms in the present thesis, the IR rankings (higher values of 
which initially indicate lower rating of IR quality) are multiplied by -1; after this transformation, 
an increase in ranking (i.e., less negative value) indicates better IR quality.  
Furthermore, to disentangle the IR effect for firms from Germany and the UK, the regression 
analysis of the pooled sample includes in addition to a country dummy (that takes a value of 1 in 
                                                          
428 Wooldridge (2013), p. 28. 
429 cf. Wooldridge (2010), pp. 3–4, 10.  
430 Angrist and Pischke (2009), p. 36; Wooldridge (2013), p. 67. 
431 cf. Wooldridge (2010), p. 3; Wooldridge (2013), p. 219. 
432 cf. Roberts and Whited (2013), pp. 498–499. 
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the case of German companies) an interaction term between this dummy variable and IR 
rankings. In line with Francis et al. (2005), the coefficient on IR rankings multiplied by the 
country dummy should reflect country-specific differences (if any) in the association of IR 
quality with several dependent variables.433 The respective regression model can be outlined as 
follows, where M* is the parameter of primary interest:434  
y = V + M*((  ∗ ) + M<(  + My + . . . + Mx!x + ε              (27) 
Finally, following empirical studies by researchers such as Hope (2003), Jegadeesh and Livnat 
(2006), and Bushee and Miller (2012), each analysis in this thesis contains a regression 
specification that relies on a winsorized version of the dependent variable.435 The winsorization 
procedure is applied for robustness purposes and should help to control for potential outliers that 
may drive the results of the current study. While different levels of winsorization are common in 
empirical research (e.g., 1% and 99%, 2.5% and 97.5%, or 5% and 95%), this thesis relies on a 
moderate level of 2.5% and 97.5%. As a result, all values of the dependent variable above the 
97.5th percentile are transformed into the value of the 97.5th percentile and all values below the 
2.5th percentile are set to the value of the 2.5th percentile.436 Winsorization thus decreases the 
variation of the dependent variable attributed to the values at both tails of distribution and makes 
it possible to estimate regression coefficients that are less affected by extreme values of  y.     
 
Statistical significance 
In this thesis, the statistical significance of the obtained results (i.e., whether it can be assumed 
that the relationships between variables derived from the investigated samples are also applicable 
to the overall population) is assessed using the two-sided test that is common in empirical 
research, even if a straight prediction regarding the sign of the coefficient exists.437 While the null 
hypothesis (H0: M = 0) predicts the absence of any relation between the dependent variable and 
independent measure, the alternative hypothesis (H1: M ≠ 0) implies an effect that differs from 
zero. The rejection of the null hypothesis is assessed using the test statistic—or rather the 
                                                          
433 cf. Francis (2005), p. 1144. 
434 cf. Angrist and Pischke (2009), p. 50; Wooldridge (2013), pp. 190–191. 
435 cf. on this and the following Hope (2003), p. 246; Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006), p. 152; Bushee and Miller (2012), 
p. 897. 
436 cf. on this and the following Tukey (1962), p. 18; Kennedy et al. (1992), p. 173.  
437 cf. on this and the following Wooldridge (2013), pp. 114–115, 120–121. 
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corresponding -value—for each coefficient as well as the overall significance level specified for 
the present analysis. In line with the majority of the empirical studies on IR and disclosure 
described within this thesis, the significance level of 10% is chosen as the maximal probability 
for the false rejection of the null hypothesis in the present analysis. The value of the test statistic 
is defined as follows:438  
 =  Mp1>(Mp)                                                                                                                                        (28) 
where 1> constitutes the standard error of the slope parameter.439  
Seeing as this standard error is usually subject to heteroscedasticity, which means that the 
variance of the regression residuals incorporated in 1>(Mp) depends on the different levels of the 
explanatory variables, the OLS assumption of homoscedasticity is violated and the test statistic 
may be seriously biased.440 To address this issue, for instance, Angrist and Pischke (2015) 
suggest applying the robust standard errors, which permits the possibility that the variance of 
residuals is conditional on the regressors’ specific values.441 Consequently, all test statistics 
reported in the scope of the present thesis are based on the robust standard errors introduced by 
White (1980).  
Finally, to be able to directly assess the statistical significance of the results, a -value that 
indicates “the probability of observing a t statistic as extreme as we did if the null hypothesis is 
true” 442 is computed for each test statistic. As such, the H0 that states the absence of any relation 
is rejected if the -value is smaller than 10% and retained otherwise. In line with previous 
research, the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance are reported in this thesis. 
 
Fixed effects 
As emphasized in chapter 3.2, besides the observable covariates included in the multiple 
regression, other relevant factors that are omitted but correlated with both the independent and 
the dependent variables could exist, which would give rise to the endogeneity issue and biased 
                                                          
438 Wooldridge (2013), p. 114. 
439 Using an analogous procedure, the z-statistic that relies on the (standard) normal distribution is calculated, e.g., in 
the scope of the logistic or IV regressions. See, for instance, Wooldridge (2010), pp. 101–104. 
440 cf. Wooldridge (2013), pp. 258–260. 
441 cf. Angrist and Pischke (2015), p. 97. 
442 Wooldridge (2013), p. 126. 
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estimates in the regression analysis. A FE regression within the framework of a panel dataset 
makes it possible to control for such factors that are attributed to individual firms and do not vary 
over time.443 Because in a (unbalanced) panel multiple observations are available for (at least 
several) investigated firms, the error term ε2,' of the regression function for each firm  at 
timepoint  can be separated into two components, as shown below:444 
y2,' = M*!2,' + M<′2,' + ω2,' + |2                                                                                   (29) 
where ω2,' constitutes the time-variant (idiosyncratic) component and |2 the fixed constituent of 
the error term; 2,' is a vector of control variables. 
The FE transformation is conducted by computing the average of the aforementioned function 
over time for each individual firm and subtracting it from the initial equation:445 
y2,' −  y92 = M*(!2,' − !̅2) + M<′(2,' − 999999999992) + ω2,' − ω} 2 + |2 − |2             (30) 
As the constant unobserved heterogeneity term (|2 =  |̅2) becomes eliminated, an OLS estimation 
can subsequently be applied relying on the variation in the variables of interest within the 
individual firms and avoiding the potential endogeneity bias caused by time-invariant omitted 
factors. To the best of this author’s knowledge, this thesis is the first to appropriately control for 
firm FE in the scope of IR analysis. 
A similar idea applies to the consideration of other FE introduced in chapter 4.2.3, namely the 
time, index, and industry effects. The dummy variables approach is implemented in the present 
analysis to account for the facts that an outcome variable’s values may additionally be explained 
by characteristics of a specific industry or stock market index to which the respective firms relate 
or that the outcomes may simply follow a time trend that is applicable to the entire sample.446 
Obviously, all previously mentioned factors could also be correlated with the independent 
measures; as such, considering these superordinate FE makes it possible to further alleviate 
endogeneity concerns. In this context, each dummy variable accounting for a particular industry, 
index, or year takes a value of 1 if a specific characteristic applies to the respective firm-year 
observation and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, each set of dummies is assigned a reference category 
                                                          
443 cf. Angrist and Piscke (2009), p. 221. 
444 cf. Wooldridge (2013), p. 444. 
445 cf. Wooldridge (2013), pp. 466–467. 
446 cf. Angrist and Pischke (2015), pp. 194–195. 
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(e.g., the year 2006 for the time FE) that is consequently omitted from the regression, which 
avoids perfect collinearity in the data (which is also known as the dummy variable trap).447 The 
basic regression equitation with all three FE settings can be expressed as follows: 
y2,' = V + M*!2,' +  M<′2,' + ~′2 + ′!2,' + C′' + ε2,'             (31) 
where , ~, and C constitute the coefficients on the specific FE characteristics. 
Finally, the approach accounting for firm FE that was introduced at the beginning of this section 
can be combined with other FE controls to adequately account for different sources of 
heterogeneity.448 This is done in the present analysis. However, it should be noted that in the case 
of a joint application of FE, industry effects are not included in the regression model; this is 
because they would otherwise typically become omitted due to their time-invariant character. To 
provide robust inference in this thesis, the IV analysis described in the next chapter is also 
conducted for each outcome variable. Before this statistical method is introduced in detail, the 
logistic regression used in the scope of the head of IR turnover investigation is briefly outlined 
for the sake of completeness. 
 
Logistic regression 
As the head of IR turnover variable is binary and thus takes a value of 1 or 0, applying a simple 
OLS estimation would give rise to several issues.449 First, while the OLS coefficients could be 
interpreted as partial effects on the probability that the dependent variable takes a value of 1, the 
estimated probabilities in the model may exceed 100% or fall below 0%. Furthermore, since the 
error terms are also binary, the heteroscedasticity issue naturally arises. The OLS regression is 
still applicable when heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used, but a better-suited 
approach is frequently applied in the scientific research, namely logistic regression. 
In the scope of a logistic regression, the aforementioned issues are addressed by transforming the 
binary dependent variable to logits.450 In the first step, the probability for the dependent variable 
having a value of 1 (( =  1)), which is derived from the sample, is used to calculate the 
respective odds by dividing this probability by the converse probability (1 − ( =  1)). The 
                                                          
447 cf. Wooldridge (2013), p. 220. 
448 cf. Wooldridge (2013), p. 467. 
449 cf. on this and the following Wooldridge (2013), pp. 241–242. 
450 cf. Menard (2010), pp. 14–15.  
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application of the natural logarithm on the odds yields the logit, which can basically take any 
positive and negative values and hence offsets the disadvantages of the limited binary variable. 
The general logistic regression model can be expressed as follows:451 
ln G ( =  1)1 − ( =  1)K = V + M*!* + M<!< + . . . + Mx!x + ε                                                     (32) 
where the M coefficients indicate the (ceteris paribus) change in the logit conditional on the 
change of ! by one unit.452 The coefficients’ signs can be directly interpreted, which provides 
information of interest on the types of relations between independent variables and the 
probability that the outcome variable takes a value of 1. The further transformation of the results 
for detailed interpretation purposes is not discussed in the present thesis due to the lack of 
relevance to the investigated hypotheses.453 
 
5.2 Instrumental variables approach 
Chapter 3.2 has already provided initial insights into the idea of an IV regression that relies on 
exogenous instrument(s) to predict the values of the endogenous variable of interest, which 
should ultimately help to establish the link between the dependent variable and the predicted 
explanatory measure and avoid several sources of endogeneity concerns.454 The instruments 
naturally have to be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable of interest. Furthermore, 
the exclusion restriction applicable to this approach requires that the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term. If such instrumental variables have been found, the 2SLS approach can be 
applied by “substituting the first-stage equation (…) into the causal relation of interest.”455 As an 
initial step, the fitted values of the explanatory variable are thus obtained from the following first-
stage OLS estimation:456 
 
                                                          
451 Menard (2010), p. 14. 
452 cf. on this and the following Wooldridge (2013), p. 566. 
453 For more details on the transformation of the coefficients as well as on the special case of Pseudo R2, see 
Wooldridge (2013), pp. 566–571. 
454 cf. Angrist and Pischke (2009), pp. 115–116, 121. 
455 Angrist and Pischke (2009), p. 121. 
456 Angrist and Pischke (2009), p. 121; Angrist and Pischke (2015), p. 133. 
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 !t2,' = Vt + Mp*′ instruments2,' + Mp<′2,'                                                                        (33) 
where instruments is the vector of the exogenous variable(s) and !t constitutes the fitted value of 
the endogenous regressor. The second stage then relies on the predicted values (!t) to establish the 
link of interest:457  
y2,' = V + M< !t2,' + M<′2,' +  ε2,'                                                                             (34) 
In this context, the vector of control variables is the same in both stages. With regard to the 
assessment of the results’ statistical significance, the standard errors of the second stage are 
adjusted to the fact that the endogenous regressor (instead of the fitted values) has to be used to 
construct the respective residuals.458 In the case of good instruments, the second stage yields 
consistent estimates that are subject to at least fewer endogeneity concerns. However, the 
identification of such exogenous variables that are related to ! and fulfill the exclusion restriction 
appears to be the greatest challenge.459 This thesis relies on two sets of instruments, which are 
presented below. 
 
Instruments 
Following Karolyi and Liao (2017), the first set of instruments covers the investigated firms’ IR 
resources, namely the number of IR team members, their remuneration, and the IR budget.460 The 
data required to construct the instruments is obtained from the Extel IR surveys, which ask firms 
to provide information on these characteristics (which are typically not made public). While the 
number of IR team members who directly communicate with market participants is measured in 
absolute terms (normalized using the natural logarithm), the information on IR salaries and 
budgets is given in bands. In relation to the remuneration variable, this means that IR managers’ 
salaries are classified into seven categories: less than €50,000; €50,000–70,000; €71,000–
100,000; €101,000–120,000; €121,000–150,000; €151,000–200,000; and more than €200,000. 
To create a variable that can be used in the empirical analysis, the lowest category (€50,000) 
receives a value of 0 and the highest (more than €200,000) the value of 6. The remaining 
remuneration categories are coded accordingly within this range. Because budget data on external 
                                                          
457 Angrist and Pischke (2015), p. 133. 
458 cf. Angrist and Pischke (2009), p. 140; Angrist and Pischke (2015), pp. 133–134. 
459 cf. Roberts and Whited (2013), p. 515. 
460 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), pp. 16–17. 
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IR help is only available for two years within the scope of the full sample, the present thesis 
relies on information concerning firms’ overall IR budgets, which is typically provided together 
with the salary data. The IR budgets are categorized as follows: less than €250,000; €250,000–
500,000; €500,000–1,000,000; €1,000,000–2,000,000; and more than €2,000,000. The respective 
budget variable considered in the analysis is coded analogous to the salary variable: a value of 0 
is assigned to the lowest category (€250,000) and a value of 4 to the highest (over €2,000,000). 
Similar to Karolyi and Liao (2017), because not all of the firms covered by the survey provided 
answers to the relevant questions and some queries were not included every year, the number of 
observations in the overall sample for which the information on all three variables is available 
drops to 415 firm-years.461 With regard to the relevance of these instruments, following Karolyi 
and Liao (2017) it can be expected that larger and better remunerated IR teams with a higher 
budget have more overall capabilities to provide more and better IR services. Compliance with 
the exclusion restriction is based on the assumption that no omitted factors that are correlated 
with both the IR resources and the dependent variable (e.g., firm performance) exist. As one 
could argue that this assumption is strong, an additional set of instruments is deployed in the 
present thesis. 
The second set of instruments relying on geographical proximity, which is in line with the further 
instrumental variable used in the analysis of Karolyi and Liao (2017), namely the weighted 
average distance between the capital city of a firm’s country and the headquarter city of foreign 
investors,462 is primarily motivated by the studies of Card (1995) and Giroud (2013). Card (1995) 
uses the proximity to a college as an instrument for the level of education to establish a causal 
link between completed schooling and the wages subsequently earned by individuals.463 The idea 
behind this instrument is that students living far from college are subject to a higher cost of 
education, which in turn reduces their engagement in schooling. Giroud (2013) investigates the 
impact of changes in the traveling time between firms’ headquarters and their plants on shifts in 
investments and productivity at the plant level.464 The decrease in traveling time between 
headquarter locations and plants is derived from the introduction of new flight routes. According 
to Giroud (2013), the main idea behind investigating this relation is that proximity—or rather an 
ability to reach a firm’s plant more quickly—should facilitate its monitoring and retrieving 
                                                          
461 cf. on this and the following Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 17. 
462 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), p. 19. 
463 cf. on this and the following Card (1995), pp. 201–202. 
464 cf. on this and the following Giroud (2013), pp. 861–863. 
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information about its current conditions. In brief, monitoring and information acquisition become 
less costly. Considering the frameworks of the aforementioned empirical studies and following 
their arguments, the present thesis uses the distances from firms’ headquarters to the closest 
international airports as an exogenous instrument. With regard to this measure, it could be 
expected that a firm is able to provide more and better services and information to related 
investors and analysts (irrespective of whether they are domestic or international) if its 
headquarter location allows top managers and IR team members to swiftly reach an airport that 
offers a flight to various market participants around the world. In this context, Bushee et al. 
(2015) provide empirical evidence that flights undertaken by firms’ officers indeed seem to 
enhance the information flow to investors.465 Furthermore, proximity to an airport could also 
naturally make firms themselves more attractive for investor and analyst visits related to public or 
private meetings. As such, the information acquisition costs may decrease for market participants 
and the direct interactions between firms and market participants may be enhanced. In summary, 
firms’ airport proximity should positively contribute to the assessment of firm’s IR and thus be 
related to higher IR rankings on average. The second instrumental variable based on geographical 
proximity relies on the distance between headquarter locations and a country’s financial center 
(i.e., Frankfurt in the case of Germany). This instrument is based on the idea that most large 
institutional investors and analysts are typically based in such cities. In this regard, Bushee et al. 
(2011) provide empirical evidence that IR presentations and conferences held in financial centers 
yield more information content due to the presence of more sophisticated audiences.466 
Furthermore, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Malloy (2005) demonstrate that information 
flows seem to be stronger if a firm and related investors or analysts are located nearby.467 
Following this empirical evidence and analogous to the elaborations on distances to airports, one 
could expect that direct proximity to the location of a large number of investors and analysts 
allows for more comprehensive IR services, activities, and information provision, which should 
be positively assessed in the scope of rankings on IR quality. Distances between firms and 
financial centers are similarly used as an instrumental variable in empirical research undertaken 
by authors such as Ebeke and Lu (2015).468 The joint consideration of distances to the next 
airport and a country’s financial center in the scope of IV regression analysis should make it 
                                                          
465 cf. Bushee et al. (2015), p. 2. 
466 cf. Bushee et al. (2011), p. 1165. 
467 cf. Coval and Moskowitz (1999), p. 2045; Malloy (2005), p. 719. 
468 cf. Ebeke and Lu (2015), p. 209, note 8. 
Methodology  107 
 
possible to account for the reachability of most domestic as well as foreign investors and 
analysts; as such, the measures are used together as a vector of instrumental variables. While the 
relevance of these instruments for IR quality measure appears to be given according to previous 
elaborations (the statistical validation is introduced later in this thesis), it additionally seems 
plausible that the distance variables are subject to fewer concerns related to violations of the 
exclusion restriction, as also suggested by Ebeke and Lu (2015).469 Because distance calculations 
require information on firms’ headquarter locations over the whole sample period (starting from 
2006), they are only done for German companies for which this data is directly available in the 
“Hoppenstedt Aktienfuehrer” database. Simply projecting the current headquarter locations of 
UK companies onto preceding years appears to not be appropriate, because as apparent from the 
German sample some firms could have shifted their headquarters during this time period. Using 
the exact addresses of German firms’ headquarters, the information on corresponding longitudes 
and latitudes required for the distance calculations is obtained from Google Maps. The same 
information is also obtained for all international airports in Germany and the bank district in 
Frankfurt. By applying the great-circle distance formula (Haversine equation), the distances 
between two points (1 and 2) are calculated as follows:470  
∆# = #< − #*                                                                                (35) 
∆ = < − *                                                                                           (36) 
V = sin<(∆2 ) + cos(*) ∗ cos(<) ∗ sin<(∆#2 )             (37) 
 = 2 ∗ 2(√V, √1 − V)                                                                                                          (38) 
/   =  ∗                                                                                                                 (39) 
where  is the mean radius of the earth, or 6,371 kilometers.  
Using a matching algorithm, distances to the nearest airport and Frankfurt (both normalized by 
the natural logarithm) are assigned to each sample firm. This set of instruments is used for the 
analysis of the relation between IR and major firm outcomes (e.g., Tobin’s Q and cost of capital) 
as well as the announcement returns attributed to M&As and SEOs. Due to the panel structure of 
                                                          
469 cf. Ebeke and Lu (2015), p. 209, note 8. 
470 Kifana and Abdurohman (2012), pp. 656–657. 
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the thesis’s main sample as well as the sufficient number of observations available, a further 
methodological procedure is applied to further satisfy the exclusion restriction. This procedure is 
explained below.  
 
Fixed effects 2SLS estimator 
As Wooldridge (2010) notes, within the framework of the IV approach, the instruments are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the time-variant as well as constant error terms.471 However, 
even if the first aspect of this assumption is likely to be satisfied, one could argue that any fixed 
unobserved factors (e.g., historical components) that are correlated with both the instruments and 
the explained variable may exist. To address this concern with regard to the distance measures, 
the within transformation is conducted within the scope of the IV 2SLS estimator. Analogous to 
the FE approach described in chapter 5.1, all variables—including instruments—become 
demeaned before the actual 2SLS procedure is applied. This transformation eliminates the 
model’s fixed error component attributed to individual heterogeneity across firms and makes it 
possible to consider only the within variation in distances that naturally comes from headquarter 
location changes. Nearly 13% of the unique firms in the final sample are subject to such 
headquarter changes within the investigated period. In contrast to the consideration of actual 
distances (which also contain the constant component), it could be expected that firms that move 
further away from airports and Frankfurt have to enhance inter alia their disclosure activities and 
conference calls to compensate for their increased distance to investors and analysts, which on 
average could even yield (at least temporary) improvements in the assessment of overall IR 
quality. Before the respective results can be closely analyzed, it is necessary to ensure that the 
preferred instruments are appropriate in a statistical sense. To this end, common tests that should 
ascertain the validity of the instruments used in the present thesis are briefly introduced in the 
next section. 
 
Instrument validity tests 
Angrist and Pischke (2009) emphasize that weak instruments and the overidentifying restrictions 
can cause the most bias to 2SLS estimators.472 The first concern is related to the assumption of 
instrument relevance and deals with the issue that only a weak relation exists between the 
                                                          
471 cf. on this and the following Wooldridge (2010), pp. 353–354. 
472 cf. on this and the following Angrist and Pischke (2009), pp. 205, 213. 
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endogenous explanatory variable of interest and the preferred instruments. To assess whether a 
sufficient correlation exists, Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest considering the instruments’ 
joint significance at the first stage using the corresponding F-statistic. It should therefore be 
tested whether the included set of instruments has a significant impact on the endogenous 
variable while controlling for other factors in the model.473 The respective H0 hypothesis 
consequently posits that all M parameters attributed to the instrumental variables equal zero, 
whereas H1 predicts the opposite. Because the single -statistics are not appropriate for assessing 
the validity of H0, the F-statistic is calculated using the sum of squared residuals (11) from the 
full model () as well as from the specification excluding the respective instruments ():474 
? =  
(11` − 11)(` − )11
                                                                                                                      (40) 
where  ( −  − 1) provides the degrees of freedom for each model with  estimated 
parameters and  observations. 
Consequently, the value of the F-statistic indicates the relative growth in 11 in the case of 
switching from the full to the restricted model, which almost always occurs when explanatory 
variables are excluded from the regression.475 Whether this relative increase makes it possible to 
reject the H0 hypothesis at the chosen significance level (which would indicate the instruments’ 
relevance) can be assessed using the corresponding p-value, similar to the t-test. In the next step, 
the concern related to the overidentification issue should be appropriately addressed in the scope 
of the IV analysis. 
While a specific instrument’s exogeneity cannot be directly tested, applying several instruments 
in the IV analysis makes it possible to investigate whether there are more instruments than 
required to estimate consistent parameters and thus to assess whether at least some of the 
instruments seem to not satisfy the exogeneity requirement.476 In this context, the main idea is to 
test whether a correlation exists between the instruments and the residuals of the estimation 
(besides the sampling error). In line with Sargan (1958), the general testing procedure entails 
                                                          
473 cf. on this and the following Wooldridge (2013), pp. 135–137. 
474 Wooldridge (2013), p. 138. 
475 cf. on this and the following Wooldridge (2013), pp. 137–139. 
476 cf. on this and the following Wooldridge (2013), pp. 514–515. 
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obtaining 2SLS residuals and then regressing them on all exogenous variables in the model.477 
The respective R2 of this regression is used to derive the test statistic (nR2), which is compared 
with the values from the 2 distribution. The R2 of the regression constitutes the explained sum of 
squares (11>) relative to the overall sum of squares (11) and hence the portion of variation in 
the dependent variable that is explained by the model constituents (this value is reported in the 
scope of all regression models)478:479 
< =  11>11 = 1 − 1111                                                                                                                     (41) 
The test for overidentification within the framework of 2SLS indicates that at least some of 
instruments are endogenous if the H0 hypothesis, which states the absence of correlation between 
instruments and residuals, can be rejected using the nR2 statistic.480 As in the case of other tests, 
the corresponding p-value makes it possible to assess the retention or rejection of this hypothesis. 
However, the test does not indicate which instruments violate the exogeneity assumption. 
Furthermore, while the above-described test procedure is subject to the homoscedasticity 
assumption, Wooldridge (1995) and Hansen (1982) provide heteroscedasticity-robust versions of 
this test that are consequently primarily considered in the present analysis.481 In the next step, the 
methodology applied to assess firm performance in the scope of M&As and SEOs is presented. 
 
5.3 Event study analysis 
In general, the event study approach aims to measure the impact of a certain event on firm 
value.482 The underlying framework of this empirical method constitutes the theory of efficient 
capital markets proposed by Fama (1970),483 who defines a market as efficient if “security prices 
at any time “fully reflect” all available information.”484 Fama (1970) distinguishes three different 
                                                          
477 cf. on this and the following Wooldridge (2010), pp. 134–135. 
478 cf. Wooldridge (2013), pp. 36, 76. 
479 Wooldridge (2013), p. 36. 
480 cf. on this and the following Wooldridge (2010), pp. 135–136. 
481 For more details concerning these statistics, refer to the both papers.  
482 cf. Campbell et al. (1997), p. 149.  
483 cf. Shleifer (2000), pp. 6–7.  
484 Fama (1970), p. 383. 
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types of information efficiency: weak, semi-strong and strong form.485 Weak information 
efficiency means that the information on historical price movements is fully reflected in the 
actual security prices. The semi-strong form posits that in addition to historical trading data, all 
other publicly available information (e.g., announcements of corporate events) is also fully 
incorporated in the security prices. Finally, the strong type of information efficiency implies that 
the security prices also fully reflect private (i.e., insider) information in addition to the previously 
described information content. Following a majority of the empirical studies introduced in 
chapters 4.3.1 and 4.4.1, the present thesis relies on public announcements of M&As and SEOs to 
measure the value effects attributed to these corporate events. Seeing as the purpose of the 
present analysis is to investigate the relation between IR quality and individual value effects, the 
procedure for assessing the average announcement effects on the entire sample is not discussed.  
 
Basic setting 
In the scope of event study methodology, an event’s impact on the stock price of investigated 
firm  on day  is measured by calculating the so-called abnormal return ( )—or the difference 
between the actually realized security return () and its expected (or normal) return (>lm)486:487 
 2,' = 2,' − >2,'@'                                                                                                                (42) 
where ' constitutes the conditioning information that depends on the choice of the model for the 
estimation of normal returns.  
A common approach to calculating the expected returns is the market model, in the framework of 
which the conditioning information is typically the return of a market index.488 As such, the idea 
of using this model for   calculation is to eliminate the expected variation in the stock price 
attributed to its (assumed) linear relation to the stock market’s development to obtain a stock 
price change that can be solely ascribed to the event of interest. The relation between stock 
returns and market returns is assessed by applying a linear regression (see chapter 5.1) within an 
estimation window that represents the time period prior the actual event. The historical 
information on stock returns (as the dependent variable) and market returns (as the regressor) is 
                                                          
485 cf. on this and the following Fama (1970), p. 383.  
486 cf. MacKinlay (1997), p. 15. 
487 MacKinlay (1997), p. 15. 
488 cf. on this and the following MacKinlay (1997), pp. 15, 18. 
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thus used to estimate the OLS regression coefficients Vt and Mp , which are subsequently applied to 
the event period to predict the security’s expected return. In this context, the   for each firm  
on day  can be defined as follows:489  
 2,' = 2,' – Vt2  +  Mp2,'                                                                                                         (43) 
where ,' is the contemporaneous return of the market index. 
The announcement date of a specific event (i.e., the day on which the information becomes 
public) is typically used as the respective event date ( = 0).490 Naturally, the event date must be a 
trading day that exhibits stock and market prices;491 as a result, event dates attributed to non-
trading days (e.g., Saturday) are shifted to the next trading date (e.g., Monday). Furthermore, 
MacKinlay (1997) points out that information on a corporate event might reach market 
participants only after the close of trading on the event day.492 To account for this issue, the event 
window is usually expanded and the abnormal returns are calculated for day  = 0 as well as for 
the subsequent trading date  = 1. In addition, seeing as market participants may also obtain 
information on a corporate event prior to its official announcement (e.g., through media 
channels), it is also common to account for the stock returns on the day before the actual 
announcement  = -1. To measure the full announcement effect arising over an event window 
covering multiple days (here, three days), the cumulative abnormal return (e ) is thus 
calculated for each firm as follows:493 
e 2(−1 … 1) = O  2,' 
';*
';)*
                                                                                                         (44) 
Finally, the individual e  are used as the dependent variable in the scope of the regression 
analysis to investigate the sources of variation in the value effects.494 The individual settings of 
the event studies conducted in the present analysis are briefly introduced below. 
 
                                                          
489 Brown and Warner (1980), p. 253. 
490 cf. Campbell et al. (1997), p. 151. 
491 cf. Brown and Warner 1985, p. 6. 
492 cf. on this and the following MacKinlay (1997), pp. 14–15, 35. 
493 MacKinlay (1997), p. 21. 
494 cf. MacKinlay (1997), p. 33. 
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Present settings 
In line with previous elaborations in this thesis as well as empirical studies by researchers such as 
Jegadeesh et al. (1993) and Netter et al. (2011), the three-day event window (-1…1) is applied to 
measure the value effects of M&As and SEOs in the present study.495 Furthermore, following 
Moeller et al. (2004), an estimation window covering 200 trading days (-220…-21) is used in the 
scope of the market model to estimate the expected stock returns of the investigated securities.496 
Instead of using simple stock prices to calculate returns, this thesis relies on a total return index 
that makes it possible to account for splits and dividend payments (as discussed in chapter 4.2.2). 
In addition, as suggested by MacKinlay (1997), the total returns of broad stock indices are 
utilized to calculate the expected returns.497 In the case of the German firms, the CDAX index, 
which according to Deutsche Börse AG “measures the performance of the entire German stock 
market and is ideal for analysis purposes,”498 serves as the market portfolio. For the UK firms, 
the FTSE All-Share Index, which reflects “98-99% of UK market capitalization,”499 is used as the 
market proxy. Data on the time series of all total returns is obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
Datastream database. In the final step, the relation between IR quality and individual e  is 
investigated by applying the regression approach. In the next chapters, the empirical results 
related to this issue and other research questions investigated in this thesis are presented and 
discussed. 
  
                                                          
495 cf. Jegadeesh et al. (1993), p. 160; Netter et al. (2011), p. 2327. 
496 cf. Moeller et al. (2004), p. 205. 
497 cf. MacKinlay (1997), p. 18. 
498 Deutsche Börse (2015): http://www.dax-indices.com/EN/MediaLibrary/Document/Guide_Equity_Indices.pdf, p. 16.  
499 FTSE Russell (n.d.): http://www.ftse.com/products/indices/uk.  
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6 Results on firm performance and related channels 
6.1 Link between IR quality and firm performance 
Table 7 provides the regression results on the relation between the quality of IR in German 
companies and Tobin’s Q as the measure of firm performance. Columns 1–7 cover different 
models and specifications used in this thesis to assess the link of interest, whereas columns 8 and 
9 contain the results of the first stages of the IV analyses. As indicated by the simple pooled OLS 
regression (specification 1)—which includes all firm-level controls introduced in this thesis as 
well as the year, index, and industry FE—the IR measure is positively correlated with Tobin’s Q 
and this relation is highly statistically significant at the 1% level. The respective β-coefficient 
shows that a one rank better IR quality is accompanied (ceteris paribus) by a 0.0121 higher 
Tobin’s Q on average. Given that the difference of one rank constitutes only a small discrepancy 
in IR quality, this link’s economic relevance can be better assessed, for instance, when a more 
considerable difference of 10 ranks is assumed. In this case, the firm’s market performance is 
0.121 higher, which appears to be a reliable and economically significant effect if the 1.6151 
mean value of Tobin’s Q in the German sample is taken into account. The OLS analysis, which 
relies on a winsorized version of Tobin’s Q (specification 2) that should reduce the impact of 
outliers, reveals a slightly weaker coefficient of 0.0106; however, as this is still statistically (at 
the 1% level) and economically significant, it supports the previous result. Model 3, which covers 
the firm FE estimation, makes it possible to better address endogeneity concerns by controlling 
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and also indicates a positive IR relation to firm 
performance. In this context, it is notable that despite the elimination of all firm time-invariant 
factors, the regression still yields a considerable IR effect of 0.0057 that is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Specification 4 reports the results of the IV analysis, which uses firm-individual 
IR resources as instruments. The validity of the deployed instruments is indicated by the results 
(the first stage) provided in column 8 of the table. The test of the joint relevance of IR budget, 
remuneration, and number of employees (Prob>F) is highly significant at the 1% level (0.0022). 
This result is also supported by the pronounced effect of individual coefficients on IR 
remuneration and employees. In addition, the instruments pass the overidentification test 
(Prob>2) proposed by Wooldridge (1995), as the test statistic does not allow the H0 hypothesis 
(which assumes the exogeneity of all instruments) to be rejected. The corresponding second stage 
of the IV analysis reveals a statistically significant (at the 10% level) and positive impact of 
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better IR on Tobin’s Q (0.0523) that is even higher than the OLS and FE regression estimates.500 
The results of an additional IV analysis that relies on FE estimation as well as distances to 
airports and Frankfurt as instruments (which should further alleviate endogeneity concerns) are 
reported in column 5. The validity of these two instruments is substantiated by the significant 
result of the test for the joint relevance of instruments (0.0014) and the lack of significance of the 
overidentification test (0.4336), as reported in column 9. An additional interesting finding is the 
positive and significant coefficient on the distance to Frankfurt variable (5.1605) at the first stage, 
which indicates that firms that move away from Frankfurt seem to enhance their overall IR 
activities/quality, presumably to compensate for the higher distance to the majority of 
institutional investors based in this financial center. The evaluation of the primary link of interest, 
namely between IR and firm performance, reveals that the respective coefficient on IR quality in 
the IV FE estimation (0.0251) is still positive, economically relevant, and highly statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Specifications 6 and 7 ultimately account for alternative explanations 
attributed to the relation between IR and Tobin’s Q, relying on FE estimations. While recruiting a 
head of IR with analyst experience does not seem to be significantly related to Tobin’s Q, the 
employment of a financial expert CEO surprisingly has a statistically negative link to firm 
performance. This finding may be attributable to the fact that the benefits ascribed by Custódio et 
al. (2014) to such CEOs in the scope of the US common law and market-based market 
environment are less applicable to German firms and the presence of CEOs’ pronounced financial 
abilities comes at the expense of other skills that are important for German companies.501 
Nevertheless, IR’s positive impact on firm performance still holds even when these two 
explanatory variables are controlled for. In summary, the models that account for several 
explanatory factors and sources of endogeneity provide strong support for the first part of the H1.1 
hypothesis, which expects the positive contribution of IR to firm value in Germany. The benefits 
of better and more intensive communication with investors, higher transparency, and higher firm 
visibility seem to outweigh the corresponding costs and thus enhance shareholder wealth in 
German firms on average. Insights into the question of whether this link is also applicable to UK 
companies are provided in table 8. 
  
                                                          
500 The higher coefficient in the IV setting is in line with the more pronounced effect of IR in the IV analysis of 
Karolyi and Liao (2017), pp. 17–18. 
501 cf. Custodio et al. (2014), p. 149. 
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Table 7: Results on the link between IR quality and firm performance in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Tobin’s Q OLS OLS  
winsorized 
Firm  
FE 
IV  
IR 
resources 
IV 
Distances 
Firm FE 
Alternative 
1 
Firm FE 
Alternative 
2 
First stage 
IV IR 
resources 
First stage 
IV 
Distances 
          
IR ranking 0.0121*** 0.0106*** 0.0057** 0.0523* 0.0251*** 0.0055** 0.0077***   
 (4.513) (5.281) (2.375) (1.743) (2.688) (2.318) (3.374)   
          
Firm size -0.3834*** -0.3306*** -0.4145*** -0.5665*** -0.3685*** -0.4267*** -0.4114*** 1.0263 0.1877 
 (-9.320) (-10.431) (-4.429) (-3.135) (-4.540) (-4.719) (-4.243) (0.939) (0.145) 
ROE 0.8199*** 0.6555*** 0.2419 0.8372 0.0705 0.2128 0.1656 8.3382** 8.3580*** 
 (3.031) (2.928) (1.299) (1.044) (0.451) (1.210) (1.023) (1.998) (4.058) 
Leverage 0.0174 0.0128 0.0121 0.0273 -0.0011 0.0111 0.0106 -0.1515 0.4874* 
 (1.167) (0.996) (0.709) (0.647) (-0.066) (0.693) (0.712) (-0.263) (1.922) 
R&D intensity 4.6272*** 3.1401*** -2.2033 0.6915 -2.9447 -2.0995 -2.5211 3.6234 -6.2609 
 (4.003) (4.013) (-0.916) (0.292) (-1.542) (-0.873) (-0.901) (0.142) (-0.337) 
CapEx intensity -0.6373 -0.4293 0.4941 -2.2835 0.6378 0.3675 0.6885 12.0617 -9.0293 
 (-1.068) (-0.858) (0.734) (-0.761) (0.884) (0.550) (1.014) (0.453) (-0.690) 
IA intensity -0.5736*** -0.3810** -2.3908*** -0.3420 -1.9430*** -2.3892*** -2.2949*** 1.5136 -14.7371** 
 (-3.075) (-2.514) (-4.744) (-0.618) (-4.553) (-4.614) (-4.185) (0.308) (-2.515) 
Sales growth 0.1903** 0.1735** 0.1320* 0.6722 0.1130* 0.1291* 0.1319 5.1714 0.5442 
 (1.994) (1.994) (1.759) (1.081) (1.781) (1.780) (1.320) (0.835) (0.469) 
US cross-listing 0.3166*** 0.2889*** 0.0654 0.3620** 0.1233 0.0469 0.0547 0.2608 -2.6911 
 (3.628) (3.628) (0.926) (2.248) (1.369) (0.692) (0.594) (0.113) (-1.642) 
Firm age -0.0004 0.0002 0.0208** 0.0005 0.0142 0.0225** 0.0175* 0.0496 0.0852 
 (-0.423) (0.288) (2.093) (0.142) (1.479) (2.242) (1.966) (1.284) (0.483) 
Strategic holdings 0.1522 0.1379 0.0227 -0.3084 -0.0472 0.0336 0.0680 7.5242** 3.2114 
 (1.470) (1.584) (0.127) (-0.959) (-0.294) (0.187) (0.476) (2.204) (0.906) 
Financial expert 
CEO 
     -0.1483* 
(-1.798) 
   
          
Head of IR 
analyst 
      -0.1003 
(-1.224) 
  
          
IR employees        4.4571**  
        (2.200)  
IR budget        -0.6547  
        (-0.958)  
IR remuneration        1.4779***  
        (2.745)  
Distance to  
airport 
        -1.7093 
(-1.345) 
          
Distance to 
Frankfurt 
        5.1605*** 
(3.421) 
          
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Prob>F 
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes No No No 0.0022 0.0014 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Prob>2 
Firm FE No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 0.1225 0.4336 
Observations 1,143 1,143 1,143 260 1,097 1,135 901 260 1,097 
R-squared 0.405 0.470 0.257 0.213 0.145 0.269 0.280 0.411 0.141 
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as the sum of the market value of outstanding shares and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets (in (2) winsorized at the 2.5% and 
97.5% levels). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income 
and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as 
the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book 
value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last 
three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the 
number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s 
Head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. IR employees is the natural logarithm of the number of the firm’s IR managers. IR budget contains 
five categories, where the value of zero is assigned to the lowest budget category and the value of four to the highest one. IR remuneration covers seven categories of 
the IR managers’ salaries, where the value of zero is assigned to the lowest category and the value of six to the highest one. Distance to airport is the natural logarithm 
of the distance between the firm’s headquarter location and the next international airport. Distance to Frankfurt is the natural logarithm of the distance between the 
firm’s headquarter location and Frankfurt.  
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Table 8: Results on the link between IR quality and firm performance in the UK and on cross-country 
differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Tobin’s Q OLS OLS  
winsorized 
Firm  
FE 
IV  
IR 
resources 
First stage 
IV IR 
OLS 
interaction 
OLS 
interaction 
winsorized 
Firm FE 
interaction 
winsorized 
         
IR ranking 0.0105*** 0.0058*** 0.0034* 0.0205**  0.0067*** 0.0049*** 0.0009 
 (4.278) (6.952) (1.839) (2.239)  (3.407) (6.164) (1.001) 
         
Interaction (IR*Country)      0.0095*** 0.0088*** 0.0058*** 
      (2.696) (4.437) (2.848) 
         
Firm size -0.8318*** -0.4665*** -0.5867*** -0.3037*** 0.9462 -0.6374*** -0.4090*** -0.4112*** 
 (-6.230) (-22.215) (-3.260) (-6.078) (0.491) (-7.972) (-24.558) (-7.036) 
ROE 1.0816* 0.0917*** 0.5940 0.0304 -0.5875 1.1281** 0.1224*** 0.0297 
 (1.939) (3.553) (1.316) (0.420) (-0.370) (2.009) (3.792) (1.414) 
Leverage 0.0412 0.0055*** 0.0209 0.0051 -0.1257 0.0409* 0.0064*** 0.0024*** 
 (1.634) (3.666) (1.317) (0.969) (-1.202) (1.651) (3.529) (2.617) 
R&D intensity -0.3211 0.6914 0.4837 16.8707*** -326.0306** 1.5171 1.4492*** -1.5579 
 (-0.240) (1.318) (0.219) (2.768) (-2.075) (1.327) (3.136) (-1.233) 
CapEx intensity -2.8008* 0.5497 0.2456 2.0228* -59.3822 -1.7036* 0.3397 0.6327 
 (-1.732) (1.177) (0.227) (1.645) (-0.675) (-1.819) (1.000) (1.604) 
IA intensity -2.1679*** -0.0839 -2.1218* 0.0445 27.4040* -1.4947*** -0.0837 -1.3440*** 
 (-2.812) (-0.822) (-1.856) (0.091) (1.875) (-2.887) (-1.004) (-4.192) 
Sales growth -0.0056 -0.0051* 0.0843** 0.5543 -25.0127 -0.0010 -0.0026 0.0372*** 
 (-1.261) (-1.904) (2.470) (1.019) (-1.473) (-0.314) (-0.705) (4.874) 
US cross-listing 0.1290 0.4693*** -0.0316 -0.0925 12.3855* 0.2948** 0.4011*** 0.0947 
 (0.528) (7.339) (-0.110) (-0.509) (1.833) (2.406) (7.988) (1.575) 
Firm age -0.0061** -0.0010 0.0270 0.0031 -0.1098 -0.0030** -0.0003 -0.0422 
 (-2.566) (-1.337) (0.419) (1.359) (-1.212) (-2.308) (-0.594) (-1.593) 
Strategic holdings -1.2831 -0.1357 -5.1012 -0.0235 14.5065 0.1770 0.1781** -0.0978 
 (-1.465) (-0.821) (-1.242) (-0.047) (0.613) (0.981) (2.291) (-0.625) 
IR employees     9.3649*    
     (1.972)    
IR budget     0.0948    
     (0.050)    
IR remuneration     1.7858*    
     (1.705)    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Prob>F Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes 0.0740 Yes Yes No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Prob>2 Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes No 0.5029 No No Yes 
Country No No No No  Yes Yes No 
Observations 1,651 1,651 1,651 155 155 2,794 2,794 2,794 
R-squared 0.334 0.536 0.178 0.652 0.496 0.315 0.482 0.298 
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Interaction 
(IR*Country) is the product of the IR ranking and the country dummy that equals one for the German firms and zero for the UK companies. Tobin’s Q is calculated as 
the sum of the market value of outstanding shares and the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets (in (2), (7), and (8) winsorized at the 2.5% and 
97.5% levels). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income 
and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as 
the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book 
value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last 
three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the 
number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. IR employees is the natural logarithm 
of the number of the firm’s IR managers. IR budget contains five categories, where the value of zero is assigned to the lowest budget category and the value of four to 
the highest one. IR remuneration covers seven categories of the IR managers’ salaries, where the value of zero is assigned to the lowest category and the value of six to 
the highest one.  
 
Specification 1 in table 8, which contains the results of a OLS regression for UK companies that 
relies on the same setting of firm-level controls and FE as in the case of German firms, reveals a 
positive (0.0105) and statistically significant (at the 1% level) β-coefficient for the link between 
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IR quality and Tobin’s Q in the UK context. The positive contribution of better IR to firm value 
thus seems to also be applicable to UK firms, although the magnitude of the effect is smaller than 
in Germany (as consistently indicated by all specifications in table 8). Model 2, which uses the 
winsorized version of Tobin’s Q, supports the previous finding, while the regression coefficient 
shrinks to 0.0058 but remains significant at the 1% level. The firm FE estimation in specification 
3 substantiates the OLS results, indicating a slightly weaker relation (the β-coefficient is 0.0034 
and significant at the 10% level). With regard to the IV estimates reported in column 4, the 
corresponding first stage in column 5 reveals a similar link between IR resources and IR quality 
for UK firms compared to the results for German companies. The instruments pass the test for 
joint significance (Prob>F: 0.0740) as well as the overidentification test (Prob>2: 0.5029). 
However, the relation between IR rankings and corresponding instruments is weaker than in the 
German case. Finally, the second stage of the IV analysis shows a positive effect of better IR 
quality on Tobin’s Q (0.0205) that is statistically significant at the 5% level. Overall, the results 
for the UK support the second part of the H1.1 hypothesis, which can consequently be seen as 
entirely confirmed. While IR quality appears to matter for firm performance in both countries and 
has a considerable economic effect, the extent of the impact seems to differ across countries (as 
also predicted by the H1.2 hypothesis). To assess the potential differences between Germany and 
the UK, the interaction analysis is applied in this thesis; the results are reported in specifications 
6, 7, and 8 in table 8. 
In model 6, which relies on the pooled OLS regression, the interaction between IR rankings and 
the country dummy—which takes a value of 1 for German companies and 0 for UK firms— 
reveals a positive (0.0095) and statistically significant (at the 1% level) difference between the 
countries. As such, on average a one rank better IR quality is accompanied by a 0.0095 higher 
Tobin’s Q in Germany compared to the UK. In specification 2, which uses the winsorized version 
of Tobin’s Q to reduce the impact of the outliers, the interaction effect remains present (0.0088) 
at the highly considerable 1% significance level. Furthermore, to appropriately account for 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms in the scope of the interaction analysis, column 8 presents 
the results of the FE estimation. The coefficient on the interaction term in this specification is still 
positive (0.0058) and highly statistically significant (at the 1% level) even after the FE 
transformation. Hypothesis H1.2 thus receives strong empirical support, which emphasizes the 
higher importance of IR for firm performance in Germany. In line with the elaborations in 
chapter 4.1.1—which are derived from studies such as those by La Porta et al. (1998, 2000), 
Results on firm performance and related channels  119 
 
Djankov et al. (2008), and Karolyi and Liao (2017)—this result can be attributed to the lower 
level of investor protection and private enforcement mechanisms in Germany. This situation 
results in higher information asymmetry among firms and market participants, which in turn 
leads to higher contribution of IR activities to the alleviation of these issues and ultimately to the 
market value of German firms in comparison to UK companies. While hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2 
have been confirmed, the relations of further factors to Tobin’s Q and IR quality are briefly 
presented below for the sake of completeness. 
As predicted in chapter 4.2.3, firm size exhibits a strong negative and statistically significant link 
to Tobin’s Q in both the German and UK samples, which could be explained by the lower growth 
opportunities that investors attribute to larger firms.502 In line with this explanation, the sales 
growth variable is positively and widely significantly related to firm performance in the German 
sample as well as in the scope of the FE estimation for UK firms. The link between intangible 
assets and Tobin’s Q is almost significantly negative in both samples, which may be attributed to 
uncertainty about the actual value of such assets.503 Naturally, firms’ accounting performance 
(measured by ROE) and market performance are positively correlated in both countries, although 
this relation is not continuously significant. The positive—and in some cases significant—
coefficients on the US cross-listings in the German sample meet the previous expectation and 
may reflect the fact that being listed on the US market makes German firms subject to higher 
demands on investor protection, which in turn positively contribute to their market value.504 The 
effect of US cross-listings on UK firms is less clear, because the corresponding coefficients 
switch signs and are negative as well as statistically insignificant in both the FE and the IV 
regressions. However, this result is in line with the previous elaborations on the differences 
between legal origins and financial systems. Given that the regression coefficients on other 
control variables are mostly insignificant or inconsistent, they are not further discussed. 
According to the first stages of the IV analyses, ROE can be pointed out as a significant 
determinant of IR quality in the German sample. The positive effect of accounting performance 
on IR could arise because firms may communicate more with capital markets during good 
times.505 In the scope of the UK sample, R&D intensity in particular appears to significantly 
                                                          
502 cf. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), p. 385. 
503 cf. Barth et al. (2001), p. 2. 
504 cf. Lang et al. (2003), pp. 317–319. 
505 cf. Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1431. 
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affect IR quality. Since this chapter has identified the value relevance of IR quality for both 
German and UK firms, results concerning the potential value drivers are presented below.  
 
6.2 Link between IR quality and stock volatility 
The empirical results on the link between the volatility of stock returns and IR quality are 
presented in tables 9 and 10. To start, table 9 provides the respective insights on German 
companies. Specification 1, which covers the model with firm FE, indicates a negative relation 
between IR quality and the standard deviation of stock returns. The corresponding regression 
coefficient reveals that an improvement in IR ranking, for instance by 10 ranks, is accompanied 
(ceteris paribus) by a decrease of stock volatility of 0.06% on average, which appears to be a 
moderate economic effect. This result is statistically significant at the 5% level. Specification 2, 
which relies on the winsorized value of stock volatility, provides a slightly smaller regression 
coefficient on IR that is nonetheless still statistically significant at the same level. The results 
therefore do not seem to be driven by outliers. To further address endogeneity concerns, column 
3 contains the results of the IV analysis. For brevity, the first stage—which has already been 
shown and discussed in the scope of the results on Tobin’s Q—is not separately reported. In this 
context, the overidentification test indicates the validity of instruments also with regard to the 
stock volatility analysis (Prob>2: 0.7570). The corresponding effect of IR quality on stock 
return deviation in the IV specification, which is still negative and significant at the 10% level, is 
more pronounced. The inclusion of additional explanatory variables related to previous 
occupations of the CEO and head of IR in specifications 4 and 5 does not cause any substantial 
changes in the results, which substantiates the previous findings. In summary, the regression 
analysis provides strong support for hypothesis H2.1, which predicts a reduction in stock return 
volatility of German firms in the case of better IR quality, even though the effect is of a lesser 
magnitude. This result can be explained in particular by improvements in the information 
environment related to better IR and the subsequent decrease of uncertainty among investors.506 
Table 10 reports the findings for the UK sample. Specification 1, which relies on the FE 
estimation, reveals at the 5% level significant and negative coefficient on IR rankings that 
constitutes a lower effect than found in the German sample. The increase in IR quality by 10 
                                                          
506 cf. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 99; Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 172. 
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ranks corresponds (ceteris paribus) to a decrease in stock return deviation by 0.03% on average. 
In addition, when the winsorized version of return volatility is used in specification 2, the 
magnitude of the effect shrinks and the coefficient becomes insignificant. As such, the existence 
of extreme values of the dependent variable seems to partially drive the results of the first model. 
Furthermore, the IV analysis, which is still valid according to the overidentification test 
(Prob>2: 0.9970), reveals a negative but also insignificant coefficient that amounts to exactly 
half of the value ascertained for German firms in line with the FE results. In summary, while a 
negative relation between IR quality and stock volatility appears to be consistent with the theory, 
the basic differences in the information environments between Germany and the UK diminish the 
contribution of more forthcoming communication with investors for UK firms. This is reflected 
in the UK sample’s lower and partially insignificant regression coefficients, which are generally 
in accordance with the prediction of the H2.2 hypothesis. To provide further insights into the 
country differences, specifications 4, 5, and 6 present the results of the analyses relying on 
interaction terms. 
As expected in the scope of hypothesis H2.3, the effect of the interaction term on stock volatility 
reported in column 4, which covers the pooled OLS estimates, is negative and highly significant 
at the 1% level. This indicates that the contribution of better IR to less volatile stock returns is 
higher in Germany than in the UK on average. This finding is supported by the significant and 
identical coefficient in specification 5, which relies on winsorized dependent variable. 
Furthermore, column 6, which covers the results of the FE estimation that accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity, also suggests a more pronounced effect in the case of German firms 
(significant at the 10% level). In conclusion, similar to the findings attributed to Tobin’s Q, 
substantial differences in the IR relevance for German and UK companies have also been 
identified with regard to the stock price deviation. In the next step, the relevance of other 
explanatory variables is briefly discussed.  
In line with researchers such as Bushee and Noe (2000), firm size, ROE, and firm age are 
negatively associated with the stock return volatility of German firms (e.g., because larger, more 
mature, and more profitable firms are subject to less uncertainty about their prospects, which are 
typically reflected in the stock price).507 The relation concerning firms’ profitability is also 
partially applicable to UK firms. Furthermore, consistent with the aforementioned effects, 
German firms that exhibit higher growth, which is characteristic of younger and smaller 
                                                          
507 cf. Bushee and Noe (2000), p. 193. 
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companies, have higher stock return volatility. Finally, CapEx intensity in the German sample is 
negatively linked to stock return deviation, which provides evidence against the assumption that 
higher uncertainty is attributable to such expenditures. In the next section, results related to IR 
relevance for the properties of analyst forecasts are presented and discussed. 
 
Table 9: Results on the link between IR quality and stock volatility in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Stock volatility Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
Firm FE  
Alternative  
1 
Firm FE  
Alternative  
2 
      
IR ranking -0.00006** -0.00005** -0.00028* -0.00006** -0.00006* 
 (-2.032) (-1.999) (-1.867) (-2.189) (-1.785) 
      
Firm size -0.00159* -0.00190** 0.00050 -0.00177** -0.00152 
 (-1.708) (-2.410) (0.813) (-1.979) (-1.442) 
ROE -0.00639** -0.00385** -0.01017*** -0.00639** -0.00591** 
 (-2.363) (-2.482) (-3.481) (-2.427) (-2.010) 
Leverage -0.00003 0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00009 
 (-0.092) (0.145) (-0.112) (-0.178) (-0.287) 
R&D intensity -0.02744 -0.02211 -0.01235 -0.03009* -0.03904** 
 (-1.624) (-1.243) (-0.831) (-1.805) (-2.339) 
CapEx intensity -0.01758** -0.01298** 0.00529 -0.01431** -0.01975** 
 (-2.485) (-2.057) (0.344) (-2.180) (-2.469) 
IA intensity 0.00204 0.00214 -0.00810*** 0.00237 0.00438 
 (0.497) (0.571) (-2.716) (0.585) (0.983) 
Sales growth 0.00255*** 0.00228*** 0.00166 0.00250*** 0.00231*** 
 (5.742) (6.651) (0.507) (5.701) (3.124) 
US cross-listing -0.00149 -0.00144 -0.00056 -0.00148 -0.00302** 
 (-1.423) (-1.534) (-0.492) (-1.430) (-2.290) 
Firm age -0.00036*** -0.00033*** 0.00001 -0.00037*** -0.00035*** 
 (-3.756) (-3.693) (0.285) (-3.859) (-3.252) 
Strategic holdings 0.00002 0.00072 -0.00327 -0.00027 -0.00084 
 (0.013) (0.463) (-1.616) (-0.153) (-0.403) 
Financial expert CEO    0.00121  
    (1.454)  
Head of IR analyst     -0.00070 
     (-0.614) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes No No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,141 1,141 260 1,133 899 
R-squared 0.680 0.682 0.693 0.686 0.686 
Prob>F   0.0022   
Prob>2   0.7570   
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Stock volatility is the 
standard deviation of adjusted daily stock returns (in (2) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of 
assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and 
short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total 
assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets 
and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage 
of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and 
zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. 
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Table 10: Results on the link between IR quality and stock volatility in the UK and on cross-country 
differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Stock volatility Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
OLS  
interaction 
OLS  
interaction  
winsorized 
Firm FE 
interaction  
winsorized 
       
IR ranking -0.00003** -0.00001 -0.00014 -0.00003*** -0.00002*** -0.00001 
 (-2.244) (-1.242) (-1.234) (-3.697) (-3.020) (-1.341) 
       
Interaction (IR*Country)    -0.00006*** -0.00006*** -0.00004* 
    (-2.607) (-2.855) (-1.783) 
       
Firm size 0.00069 0.00002 0.00063 0.00037** 0.00018 -0.00076 
 (0.833) (0.033) (0.877) (2.207) (1.392) (-1.580) 
ROE -0.00039 -0.00028 -0.00215** -0.00072** -0.00057** -0.00035 
 (-1.512) (-1.481) (-2.549) (-2.249) (-2.333) (-1.518) 
Leverage 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00015** 0.00002 0.00001 -0.00000 
 (0.206) (-0.099) (-2.449) (0.817) (0.675) (-0.001) 
R&D intensity 0.00160 -0.00654 -0.07301 0.01676*** 0.01521*** -0.00899 
 (0.131) (-0.605) (-1.343) (3.630) (3.840) (-0.947) 
CapEx intensity 0.00849 -0.00259 -0.02116 0.01157** 0.00997*** -0.00522 
 (0.646) (-0.365) (-1.169) (2.315) (2.598) (-0.977) 
IA intensity -0.00381 -0.00282 0.00131 -0.00142 -0.00175** 0.00003 
 (-0.923) (-1.158) (0.250) (-1.637) (-2.343) (0.015) 
Sales growth 0.00036*** -0.00008** -0.00336 0.00016** 0.00010*** 0.00006 
 (5.656) (-2.458) (-0.627) (2.154) (3.217) (0.554) 
US cross-listing 0.00131 0.00114* -0.00016 -0.00083** -0.00073** -0.00015 
 (1.300) (1.686) (-0.056) (-2.064) (-2.010) (-0.227) 
Firm age 0.00038* 0.00026 -0.00007** -0.00003*** -0.00003*** 0.00023 
 (1.728) (1.533) (-2.328) (-5.386) (-4.983) (1.487) 
Strategic holdings -0.00442 0.00069 -0.00299 -0.00090 -0.00038 0.00128 
 (-1.516) (0.269) (-0.563) (-0.976) (-0.449) (0.885) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Country No No No Yes Yes No 
Observations 1,625 1,625 155 2,766 2,766 2,766 
R-squared 0.632 0.689 0.689 0.591 0.618 0.672 
Prob>F   0.0740    
Prob>2   0.9970    
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Interaction 
(IR*Country) is the product of the IR ranking and the country dummy that equals one for the German firms and zero for the UK companies. Stock volatility is the 
standard deviation of adjusted daily stock returns (in (2), (5), and (6) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum 
of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value 
of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the 
intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure 
the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. 
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6.3 Link between IR quality, analyst following, forecast dispersion, and forecast 
error 
Tables 11 and 12 report the results on the link between IR quality and analyst following for 
German and UK firms, respectively. Specification 1 in table 11, which relies on the FE 
estimation, shows a positive relation between better IR quality and the natural logarithm of the 
number of analysts following German firms. The respective regression coefficient (0.0041) is 
significant at the 5% level. The magnitude of this link only slightly decreases (to 0.0039) when 
the winsorization approach (which accounts for extreme values) is applied in model 2. 
Endogeneity concerns are further addressed in specification 3, which comprises the IV analysis 
(the overidentification test is passed with Prob>2: 0.4895). In the scope of this model, the link 
between IR quality and analyst following is still positive and significant at the 10% level. Finally, 
specifications 4 and 5 consider the alternative explanations based on the previous occupations of 
the CEO and head of IR. However, these variables do not significantly affect the results presented 
above. In summary, hypothesis H3.1, which expects a positive relation between better IR and 
analyst following in the case of German firms, can be seen as confirmed. The identified link to 
higher firm visibility can be attributed to attracting analysts by providing better support and 
reducing these individuals’ information search costs.508 
Table 12 presents insights on the aforementioned link for UK firms. It is directly apparent that 
the positive β-coefficient on IR rankings is substantially smaller in all specifications than in the 
German sample and even insignificant in model 1, which relies on the FE estimation. When 
extreme values are accounted for in specification 2, IR quality’s effect on the logarithm of analyst 
following becomes more pronounced (0.0008) and also statistically significant at the 10% level. 
The existences of this significantly positive but comparatively weak link for UK firms is also 
indicated by the IV analysis in specification 3. However, as the Prob>2 value of 0.0252 reveals 
that the instruments do not pass the overidentification test for this specific analysis, the 
corresponding result is not reliable. In summary, hypothesis H3.2, which expects that better IR is 
positively related to analyst coverage in UK firms, receives partial support. The differences 
between the German and UK samples are further investigated in the scope of the interaction 
analyses in specifications 4, 5, and 6. 
  
                                                          
508 cf. Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), p. 30. 
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Table 11: Results on the link between IR quality and analyst following in Germany 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Analyst following Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
Firm FE  
Alternative  
1 
Firm FE  
Alternative  
2 
      
IR ranking 0.0041** 0.0039** 0.0137* 0.0040** 0.0037* 
 (2.257) (2.337) (1.656) (2.146) (1.817) 
      
Firm size 0.3406*** 0.3368*** 0.1037*** 0.3413*** 0.3023*** 
 (4.618) (4.628) (2.810) (4.606) (3.846) 
ROE -0.0622 -0.0511 -0.7372*** -0.0586 -0.0884 
 (-0.824) (-0.717) (-3.547) (-0.774) (-1.084) 
Leverage -0.0187 -0.0137 -0.0525** -0.0184 -0.0235 
 (-1.032) (-0.940) (-2.047) (-1.014) (-1.055) 
R&D intensity 2.6856** 2.6980** -1.4281 2.6211** 2.2117 
 (2.209) (2.222) (-1.275) (2.169) (1.541) 
CapEx intensity 0.1864 0.1885 0.6730 0.2157 -0.2340 
 (0.227) (0.232) (0.654) (0.233) (-0.260) 
IA intensity 0.0726 0.0597 0.2603 0.0692 0.0350 
 (0.262) (0.219) (1.428) (0.246) (0.112) 
Sales growth -0.0482 -0.0546 0.2059 -0.0474 -0.0366 
 (-0.911) (-1.038) (0.962) (-0.892) (-0.922) 
US cross-listing 0.0413 0.0458 -0.1035 0.0466 0.0943 
 (0.513) (0.558) (-1.474) (0.586) (1.152) 
Firm age 0.0347*** 0.0340*** -0.0032** 0.0345*** 0.0366*** 
 (4.040) (4.195) (-2.524) (4.017) (3.991) 
Strategic holdings -0.1452 -0.1025 -0.5019*** -0.1439 -0.2932** 
 (-1.419) (-1.101) (-2.691) (-1.374) (-2.329) 
Financial expert CEO    0.0523  
    (1.184)  
Head of IR analyst     0.0055 
     (0.085) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes No No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,136 1,136 259 1,128 895 
R-squared 0.260 0.281 0.674 0.262 0.236 
Prob>F   0.0024   
Prob>2   0.4895   
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Analyst following 
is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who provide forecasts on the firm’s earnings (in (2) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Firm size is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. 
Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and 
development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA 
intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US 
cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the 
firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously 
employed as analyst and zero otherwise. 
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Table 12: Results on the link between IR quality and analyst following in the UK and on cross-country 
differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Analyst following Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
OLS  
interaction 
OLS  
interaction  
winsorized 
Firm FE 
interaction  
winsorized 
       
IR ranking 0.0007 0.0008* 0.0079* 0.0044*** 0.0044*** 0.0008* 
 (1.380) (1.814) (1.652) (9.561) (10.233) (1.692) 
       
Interaction (IR*Country)    0.0065*** 0.0059*** 0.0027* 
    (4.304) (4.650) (1.797) 
       
Firm size 0.1532*** 0.1410*** 0.0165 0.1136*** 0.1038*** 0.1967*** 
 (3.350) (3.239) (0.560) (13.179) (13.233) (5.458) 
ROE 0.0063 0.0060 -0.0263 0.0201** 0.0189** 0.0044 
 (0.592) (0.559) (-0.987) (1.966) (1.968) (0.411) 
Leverage -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 
 (-0.587) (-0.601) (-0.502) (0.100) (0.312) (-0.742) 
R&D intensity -0.1311 -0.0882 3.1912 0.6841*** 0.5653** 0.6885 
 (-0.142) (-0.096) (1.304) (2.808) (2.494) (0.791) 
CapEx intensity 0.9398** 0.7178* 0.2516 0.1852 0.2030 0.4443 
 (2.109) (1.826) (0.359) (0.704) (0.901) (1.061) 
IA intensity 0.1850 0.1082 -0.2127 0.0815 0.0623 0.0255 
 (1.113) (0.756) (-0.874) (1.555) (1.357) (0.191) 
Sales growth -0.0104*** 0.0037** 0.1928 -0.0140*** -0.0113*** 0.0005 
 (-5.196) (1.983) (0.628) (-2.752) (-4.594) (0.159) 
US cross-listing 0.0555 0.0442 0.0930 0.0137 0.0150 0.0419 
 (0.775) (0.640) (0.814) (0.578) (0.674) (0.854) 
Firm age -0.0100 -0.0117 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0149 
 (-0.561) (-0.671) (-0.127) (1.443) (1.630) (-0.835) 
Strategic holdings -0.2547 -0.2461 0.0132 -0.0931 -0.0524 -0.1515* 
 (-1.200) (-1.325) (0.029) (-1.146) (-0.788) (-1.873) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Country No No No Yes Yes No 
Observations 1,627 1,627 155 2,763 2,763 2,763 
R-squared 0.336 0.352 0.633 0.614 0.649 0.300 
Prob>F   0.0740    
Prob>2   0.0252    
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Interaction 
(IR*Country) is the product of the IR ranking and the country dummy that equals one for the German firms and zero for the UK companies. Analyst following is the 
natural logarithm of the number of analysts who provide forecasts on the firm’s earnings (in (2), (5), and (6) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s 
equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and 
development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA 
intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US 
cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the 
firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. 
 
The regression coefficient on the interaction term (0.0065) in the scope of model 4, which is 
based on OLS estimation, indicates that better IR quality contributes more to analyst coverage in 
Germany than in the UK on average. This result is highly significant at the 1% level. A similar 
value is obtained by deploying the winsorized version of the dependent variable in the scope of 
model 5; specification 6, which relies on the FE estimation, indicates a lower difference (0.0027) 
that is still significant at the 10% level. These empirical results are in line with the prediction of 
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the H3.7 hypothesis and can be attributed, for instance, to the fact that the higher information 
asymmetry level in Germany allows IR disclosure to contribute more to reducing analysts’ 
information search costs and consequently to attracting analysts to cover respective stocks. In the 
next step, insights into the corresponding analyst forecast dispersion are provided. 
Table 13 reports the results for German firms. The firm FE model in column 1 as well as 
specification 2 using winsorized dependent variable indicate a negative (-0.0072 and -0.0064) 
and significant (at the 5% level) link between IR quality and dispersion of earnings forecasts. As 
such, better IR quality appears to go along with more consistent estimates that can be ascribed to 
more comprehensive support of analysts and more informative disclosure resulting in more 
congruent beliefs among analysts.509 Specification 3, which relies on the IV analysis (the 
instruments pass the overidentification test with Prob>2: 0.9650), also indicates a decrease in 
forecast dispersion due to better IR, whereat this relation becomes statistically insignificant. The 
same applies to specification 5 accounting for the previous occupation of the head of IR as 
analyst that itself, however, does not significantly contribute to the explanation of forecast 
dispersion. Therefore, the lack of significance in both specifications may be simply attributed to 
the noticeable reduction in the number of observations. Model 4, which considers the financial 
expertise of CEOs, still indicates a negative and significant link of interest. Overall, the H3.3 
hypothesis, which expects a negative relation between better IR and forecast dispersion for 
German firms, receives at least partial support from this study’s empirical results. 
Table 14 provides the respective results for UK companies. Specification 1, which applies the 
firm FE regression, and model 2, which uses the winsorized dependent variable, both indicate a 
negative significant relation between IR rankings and forecast dispersion (-0.0033 and -0.0026) at 
the 5% significance level; nonetheless, in the scope of the IV analysis the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant and even positive (the overidentification test is passed with Prob>2: 
0.6079). However, the reliability of the IV results appears to be limited, as indicated by the test 
for the joint significance of instruments (Prob>F: 0.1996). This can be particularly attributed to 
the missing data for some forecasts for the investigated firms, which results in an additional loss 
of 30 observations compared, for instance, to the Tobin’s Q analysis and ultimately in a reduction 
of the instruments’ explanatory power. Analogous to the case of German firms, hypothesis H3.4 
appears to be rather supported in favor of a negative link between analyst dispersion and better IR 
quality in the UK, although this observation is subject to concerns mentioned above.  
                                                          
509 cf. Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 486. 
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Table 13: Results on the link between IR quality and forecast dispersion in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Forecast dispersion Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
Firm FE 
Alternative  
1 
Firm FE 
Alternative  
2 
      
IR ranking -0.0072** -0.0064** -0.0202 -0.0073** -0.0042 
 (-2.306) (-2.157) (-1.145) (-2.355) (-1.249) 
      
Analyst following 0.1381 0.1201 -0.1510 0.1292 0.1886* 
 (1.409) (1.315) (-1.075) (1.297) (1.708) 
Firm size 0.2449* 0.2724** 0.3135*** 0.2457* 0.1321 
 (1.891) (2.411) (3.990) (1.945) (0.994) 
ROE -1.0985*** -0.9764*** -1.7092*** -1.0736*** -1.0420*** 
 (-3.380) (-3.664) (-5.223) (-3.425) (-3.227) 
Leverage -0.0021 -0.0121 0.0152 -0.0052 -0.0077 
 (-0.045) (-0.317) (0.440) (-0.113) (-0.145) 
R&D intensity 3.2070 3.4288 3.6076** 2.9470 1.2359 
 (1.084) (1.173) (1.963) (1.001) (0.508) 
CapEx intensity -2.9504*** -2.4020** -0.3191 -2.2287** -3.5847*** 
 (-2.748) (-2.371) (-0.189) (-2.336) (-3.631) 
IA intensity 1.3004*** 1.2680*** -0.8019** 1.3375*** 1.3585*** 
 (2.813) (3.222) (-2.353) (2.997) (3.011) 
Sales growth 0.0279 0.0027 -0.2009 0.0184 -0.0118 
 (0.153) (0.021) (-0.481) (0.103) (-0.086) 
US cross-listing -0.0105 0.0360 -0.1066 -0.0033 0.0741 
 (-0.063) (0.282) (-0.761) (-0.021) (0.398) 
Firm age -0.0103 -0.0148 -0.0026 -0.0124 0.0021 
 (-0.584) (-0.912) (-1.182) (-0.696) (0.112) 
Strategic holdings 0.2982 0.3085 -0.2573 0.2499 0.3140 
 (0.974) (1.103) (-0.910) (0.827) (0.928) 
Head of IR analyst     0.1248 
     (0.985) 
Financial expert CEO    0.1923  
    (1.619)  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes No No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,114 1,114 256 1,106 874 
R-squared 0.398 0.399 0.546 0.390 0.421 
Prob>F   0.0035   
Prob>2   0.9650   
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Forecast 
dispersion is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of earnings forecasts deflated by the stock price (in (2) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Analyst 
following is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who provide forecasts on the firm’s earnings. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total 
value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of 
long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of 
total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible 
assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the 
percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial 
expertise and zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. 
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Table 14: Results on the link between IR quality and forecast dispersion in the UK and on cross-country 
differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Forecast dispersion Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
OLS 
interaction 
OLS 
interaction  
winsorized 
Firm FE 
interaction  
winsorized 
       
IR ranking -0.0033** -0.0026** 0.0097 -0.0024** -0.0020* -0.0022* 
 (-2.500) (-2.026) (0.440) (-2.065) (-1.837) (-1.721) 
       
Interaction (IR*Country)    -0.0088*** -0.0081*** -0.0069** 
    (-3.115) (-3.142) (-2.304) 
       
Analyst following 0.1120 0.0928 -0.8336*** 0.0696 0.0343 0.1120 
 (0.957) (0.829) (-2.576) (1.229) (0.678) (1.501) 
Firm size 0.2832*** 0.2646*** 0.0559 0.2385*** 0.2271*** 0.2629*** 
 (2.818) (2.891) (0.522) (11.885) (12.350) (3.870) 
ROE -0.0164 -0.0122 -0.2918*** -0.0680** -0.0583** -0.0372 
 (-0.851) (-0.712) (-2.938) (-2.079) (-2.044) (-1.522) 
Leverage 0.0026 0.0025 -0.0122** 0.0020 0.0020 0.0024 
 (1.279) (1.226) (-1.977) (0.681) (0.766) (1.071) 
R&D intensity -1.6388 -1.8344 3.7943 2.9037*** 2.7740*** 1.3713 
 (-0.765) (-0.890) (0.451) (5.028) (5.215) (0.716) 
CapEx intensity 2.0357* 2.2233** 2.0191 0.6205 0.7380 -0.7533 
 (1.842) (2.200) (0.592) (1.082) (1.355) (-0.849) 
IA intensity 0.3947 0.3862 -0.2072 0.0112 -0.0007 0.7962*** 
 (0.882) (0.890) (-0.246) (0.094) (-0.006) (2.692) 
Sales growth -0.0073 -0.0050 -0.0823 0.0058*** 0.0051*** -0.0104 
 (-0.982) (-0.715) (-0.103) (2.963) (3.051) (-1.088) 
US cross-listing 0.1943 0.1834 -0.0495 -0.0537 -0.0431 0.0553 
 (1.128) (1.097) (-0.099) (-0.856) (-0.725) (0.426) 
Firm age 0.0512 0.0502 -0.0037 -0.0035*** -0.0032*** 0.0626* 
 (1.513) (1.496) (-0.644) (-4.233) (-4.077) (1.915) 
Strategic holdings 0.1348 0.2408 -0.0293 -0.1479 -0.1256 0.3492 
 (0.294) (0.540) (-0.028) (-1.246) (-1.136) (1.363) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Country No No No Yes Yes No 
Observations 1,378 1,378 125 2,492 2,492 2,492 
R-squared 0.280 0.280 0.634 0.390 0.402 0.306 
Prob>F   0.1996    
Prob>2   0.6079    
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Interaction 
(IR*Country) is the product of the IR ranking and the country dummy that equals one for the German firms and zero for the UK companies. Forecast dispersion is the 
natural logarithm of the standard deviation of earnings forecasts deflated by the stock price (in (2), (5), and (6) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Analyst 
following is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who provide forecasts on the firm’s earnings. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total 
value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of 
long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of 
total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible 
assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the 
percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. 
 
On the other hand, specifications 4, 5, and 6 in table 14 provide strong evidence for hypothesis 
H3.7, which expects German firms to have a more pronounced negative link between better IR and 
forecast deviation than UK companies due to the higher information asymmetry issues attributed 
to a civil law and bank-based environment. The respective coefficients on the interaction term 
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between IR ranking and the country dummy are negative (-0.0088 and -0.0081) in both OLS 
specifications and statistically significant at the 1% level, which indicates a higher IR effect in 
the case of German firms on average. Similar insights are provided by model 5, which relies on 
the FE estimation and yields a slightly lower coefficient of -0.0069 that is significant at the 5% 
level. These results are also supported by the descriptive statistics for both samples discussed in 
chapter 4.2.4, which reveal that the average forecast standard deviation in the UK sample is 
noticeably lower than in the German case. This could be attributed to the fact that the more 
sophisticated initial information environment linked to higher investor protection standards in the 
UK already contributes to more consistent forecasts, which in turn leave less space for IR 
contribution (as indicated by the results on the interaction term). The findings on the forecast 
error reported in tables 15 and 16 are discussed below. 
Specification 1 in table 15, which considers the firm FE, suggests a negative relation between 
better IR quality and forecast error in the scope of earnings estimates concerning German firms. 
The respective coefficient (-0.0009) is statistically significant at the 5% level. Model 2, which 
relies on winsorized forecast errors, substantiates this result by indicating a slightly lower 
negative coefficient (-0.0006) that is significant at the 1% level. The IV regression in 
specification 3, which further diminishes endogeneity concerns, supports the previously 
ascertained effect. The coefficient in this analysis is still negative and significant at the 5% level 
and the application of the instruments appears to be valid according to the overidentification test 
(Prob>2: 0.5482). The significant negative link between better IR quality and the inaccuracy of 
analyst estimates is also present in models 4 and 5, which take account of alternative 
explanations. To summarize, hypothesis H3.5, which expects the identified relation, can 
consequently be seen as confirmed. In line with Lang and Lundholm (1996), firms’ ongoing and 
more informative communication with the markets reduces the level of information asymmetry 
and thus positively contributes to the predictability of their future earnings.510 An additional 
interesting result is the significantly positive relation between CEOs’ previous financial 
experience and the forecast error, as identified in model 4. Following Bamber et al. (2010), 
however, this finding may simply reflect the higher conservatism of disclosure that is typically 
                                                          
510 cf. Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 489. 
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attributed to financial experts,511 which can in turn lead to a higher absolute deviation of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts from the true value. 
Table 15: Results on the link between IR quality and forecast error in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Forecast error Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
Firm FE 
Alternative  
1 
Firm FE 
Alternative  
2 
      
IR ranking -0.0009** -0.0006*** -0.0031** -0.0009** -0.0009* 
 (-2.180) (-2.969) (-2.501) (-2.235) (-1.695) 
      
Analyst following 0.0034 0.0022 0.0260 0.0022 0.0037 
 (0.322) (0.349) (1.623) (0.211) (0.315) 
Firm size 0.0040 0.0159* 0.0083 0.0028 -0.0124 
 (0.185) (1.659) (1.481) (0.131) (-0.562) 
ROE -0.1353 -0.0745** -0.1052*** -0.1342 -0.1347 
 (-1.624) (-2.234) (-2.863) (-1.637) (-1.505) 
Leverage 0.0065 0.0000 0.0086 0.0062 0.0067 
 (0.699) (0.001) (1.142) (0.680) (0.649) 
R&D intensity -0.0196 0.0991 0.0715 -0.0678 0.0120 
 (-0.097) (0.692) (0.477) (-0.345) (0.056) 
CapEx intensity -0.2587 -0.1117 -0.1544 -0.2139 -0.3640 
 (-1.355) (-1.594) (-1.073) (-0.963) (-1.485) 
IA intensity 0.0414 0.0608** -0.0477** 0.0464 0.0452 
 (0.779) (1.981) (-2.104) (0.888) (0.838) 
Sales growth 0.0195 0.0043 0.0394 0.0189 0.0328 
 (0.697) (0.484) (1.142) (0.668) (1.574) 
US cross-listing 0.0054 0.0007 0.0149 0.0078 0.0127 
 (0.500) (0.081) (1.122) (0.697) (0.769) 
Firm age 0.0001 -0.0013 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0015 
 (0.032) (-1.077) (0.699) (-0.097) (0.674) 
Strategic holdings 0.0212 0.0157 0.0266 0.0168 0.0100 
 (0.696) (0.832) (0.906) (0.522) (0.312) 
Head of IR analyst     -0.0276 
     (-1.197) 
Financial expert CEO    0.0328**  
    (2.426)  
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes No No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,111 1,111 255 1,103 870 
R-squared 0.164 0.188 0.283 0.164 0.179 
Prob>F   0.0057   
Prob>2   0.5482   
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Forecast error is 
measured as the absolute difference between the actual earnings per share and the forecasted earnings per share divided by the stock price (in (2) winsorized at the 
2.5% and 97.5% levels). Analyst following is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who provide forecasts on the firm’s earnings. Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage 
is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development 
expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is 
calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. 
Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO 
has a significant financial expertise and zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously employed as 
analyst and zero otherwise. 
  
                                                          
511 cf. Bamber et al. (2010), p. 1156. 
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Table 16: Results on the link between IR quality and forecast error in the UK and on cross-country 
differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Forecast error Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
OLS  
interaction 
OLS 
interaction  
winsorized 
Firm FE 
interaction  
winsorized 
       
IR ranking -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001* 
 (-1.288) (-1.207) (0.339) (-1.194) (-1.845) (-1.726) 
       
Interaction (IR*Country)    -0.0004 -0.0004*** -0.0005*** 
    (-1.445) (-3.607) (-3.234) 
       
Analyst following 0.0078 -0.0019 -0.1349** 0.0108* 0.0021 0.0009 
 (1.153) (-0.744) (-2.156) (1.871) (1.101) (0.311) 
Firm size 0.0106 0.0017 0.0001 0.0035 0.0027*** 0.0059* 
 (0.748) (0.660) (0.004) (1.456) (3.443) (1.799) 
ROE -0.0054 -0.0004 -0.0977** -0.0089** -0.0027** -0.0023* 
 (-1.125) (-0.746) (-2.336) (-1.990) (-2.235) (-1.684) 
Leverage -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0055** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
 (-0.406) (0.988) (-2.131) (0.456) (0.965) (0.431) 
R&D intensity -0.1384 -0.0536 0.1093 0.0103 0.0427** 0.0290 
 (-0.905) (-0.958) (0.084) (0.333) (2.267) (0.411) 
CapEx intensity 0.0196 0.0117 0.0285 -0.0818 -0.0245 -0.0336 
 (0.483) (0.557) (0.067) (-1.501) (-1.182) (-1.132) 
IA intensity -0.0616 -0.0052 -0.0836 -0.0096 -0.0047 0.0120 
 (-1.103) (-0.424) (-0.602) (-0.971) (-1.152) (0.854) 
Sales growth 0.0001 0.0006*** 0.1257 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.375) (4.150) (0.798) (1.100) (1.479) (0.944) 
US cross-listing 0.0027 -0.0052 0.0213 0.0050 0.0025 -0.0003 
 (0.370) (-1.464) (0.285) (1.217) (1.067) (-0.050) 
Firm age 0.0019 0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0001** -0.0001** 0.0009 
 (0.681) (0.159) (-1.454) (-2.424) (-2.206) (0.522) 
Strategic holdings -0.0018 0.0003 0.1181 -0.0054 -0.0005 0.0156 
 (-0.121) (0.026) (0.885) (-0.495) (-0.102) (1.025) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Country No No No Yes Yes No 
Observations 1,413 1,413 128 2,524 2,524 2,524 
R-squared 0.049 0.088 0.351 0.111 0.192 0.101 
Prob>F   0.4081    
Prob>2   0.3232    
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Interaction 
(IR*Country) is the product of the IR ranking and the country dummy that equals one for the German firms and zero for the UK companies. Forecast error is measured 
as the absolute difference between the actual earnings per share and the forecasted earnings per share divided by the stock price (in (2), (5), and (6) winsorized at the 
2.5% and 97.5% levels). Analyst following is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts who provide forecasts on the firm’s earnings. Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage 
is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development 
expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is 
calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. 
Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. 
 
The results of the FE estimation reported in the first column of table 16 demonstrate a negative     
(-0.0002) but insignificant relation between better IR quality and forecast error for UK firms. The 
regression coefficient, which is generally lower compared to what is found for the German 
market, becomes even smaller and remains insignificant when the winsorized version of the 
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dependent variable is introduced in specification 2. The IV regression results in column 3 instead 
indicate a positive insignificant link between the aforementioned variables. However, this 
analysis suffers from the same issue as the IV analysis of the forecast dispersion, namely the lack 
of the instruments’ joint explanatory power as suggested by the Prob>F-value of 0.4081. In 
summary, the H3.6 hypothesis appears to be supported regarding the absence of a relation between 
IR quality and forecast error for UK firms. This finding also seems to be in line with the 
descriptive statistics for both samples, which suggest that the average forecast error for UK 
companies is already noticeably lower than it is for German firms—which might leave less space 
for sophisticated IR practices to further contribute to forecast quality in the UK.  
The differences between German and UK firms with regard to IR’s relation to forecast error are 
additionally evaluated in specifications 4, 5, and 6 in table 16, which rely on the interaction 
analysis. The OLS coefficient on the interaction term in specification 4 is negative (-0.0004), 
which indicates a more pronounced link between better IR quality and forecast error in Germany 
on average—which is in line with the aforementioned findings on the individual samples. 
However, this result suffers from a lack of significance. On the other hand, the stronger effect of 
IR quality in the case of German firms becomes more evident when outliers are accounted for in 
specification 5, as indicated by the interaction coefficient (which is significant at the 1% level). 
Model 6, which considers firm FE, supports the latter result by revealing an even larger 
significant difference (-0.0005). The previous findings on the stronger effect that better IR quality 
has on analyst coverage and forecast dispersion in German companies as compared to UK firms 
is thus complemented by the similar insight on forecast error, which ultimately makes it possible 
to confirm the H3.7 hypothesis. In summary, the higher base level of information asymmetry 
applicable to the German market, which allows for higher IR contribution inter alia to analysts 
having lower information search costs and more congruent and consistent expectations,512 
appears to be a plausible explanation for the cross-country differences identified with regard to 
the relevance of better IR quality for several forecast properties. Results concerning forecast 
characteristics’ relations to other independent variables are briefly discussed below. 
In line with the elaborations of Vlittis and Charitou (2012) and the prediction made in the present 
thesis, firm size is positively and significantly associated with analyst coverage in both the 
German and UK samples.513 This finding can be attributed to the fact that larger firms are 
typically more visible and consequently have more analysts following them. A similar 
                                                          
512 cf. Lang and Lundholm (1996), p. 489; Brennan and Tamarowski (2000), p. 30. 
513 cf. on this and the following Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 954. 
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explanation also appears to apply to the identified positive relation between firm age and analyst 
coverage in Germany, because more mature firms frequently constitute larger and more 
established entities.514 Furthermore, higher R&D intensity, which can be linked to more future 
opportunities but also to higher uncertainty, seems to attract more analysts in the case of German 
firms. This result is in line with Barth et at. (2001), who associate higher uncertainty with an 
opportunity for analysts to achieve higher rewards by providing advice on respective companies, 
which increases their incentives to cover such firms.515 This relations’ lack of significance in the 
UK sample could be interpreted as additional evidence of a lower base level of information 
asymmetry in the common law environment. With regard to forecast dispersion, this variable 
appears to be positively related to firm size in both the German and UK samples. One possible 
explanation of this finding is that the more complex earnings composition in a larger firm can 
induce more divergent opinions. In accordance with the expectation stated in chapter 4.2.3, firm 
profitability is negatively linked to forecast dispersion. This result is in line with the idea that 
analysts’ opinions are more congruent in relation to well-running companies. Furthermore, the 
higher intensity of intangible assets is positively linked to forecast dispersion in German firms, 
which seems plausible due to the higher uncertainty about the value of this type of asset.516 The 
divergent results on CapEx intensity may be attributed to the specific characteristics of the 
respective long-term assets, as elaborated by Chung et al. (1998).517 Finally, higher firm 
profitability is widely negatively linked to forecast error, which indicates that well-running firms’ 
earnings are easier to predict.518 Surprisingly, analyst following is almost not related to forecast 
properties in either country. This result might be attributable to the fact that while a firm’s higher 
visibility should improve the congruence and precision of analyst forecasts, the larger number of 
estimates might suffer from a higher probability of divergent opinions. After this extensive 
evaluation of the hypotheses on analyst following and forecast characteristics, the predictions 
concerning IR’s relevance to stock liquidity are assessed in the next step. 
 
                                                          
514 cf. Pástor and Veronesi (2003), p. 1767 
515 cf. Barth et al. (2001), p. 2. 
516 cf. Barth et al. (2001), p. 2. 
517 cf. Chung et al. (1998), pp. 41–42. 
518 cf. Aerts et al. (2007), p. 1308. 
Results on firm performance and related channels  135 
 
6.4 Link between IR quality and stock liquidity 
Table 17 provides the results for German firms concerning the relation between IR quality and 
stock liquidity, which is proxied by estimated bid-ask spreads as proposed by Corwin and Schultz 
(2012). Model 1, which considers firm FE, reveals a negative coefficient on IR rankings; this 
indicates a negative link between better IR quality and bid-ask spreads, which indicates that 
better IR quality appears to go along with higher stock liquidity. This relation is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The regression coefficient suggests that an increase in IR quality by 
10 ranks is accompanied (ceteris paribus) by a -0.02% decrease in spread on average, although 
this appears to constitute an effect of lesser economic magnitude. Specification 2, which accounts 
for extreme values of the dependent variable, still indicates a negative link between better IR and 
spreads but slightly misses the 10% significance level. In the scope of the IV analysis in 
specification 3 (overidentification test is passed with Prob>2: 0.9888) and model 4 (which 
considers the prior financial experience of CEOs), the negative and significant coefficient (at the 
5% and 10% levels) supports the existence of a positive IR effect on stock liquidity. In contrast 
the negative coefficient on IR quality is insignificant in specification 5, which controls for the 
analyst experience of heads of IR and relies on a reduced number of observations. To summarize, 
because the obtained evidence is not fully consistent, hypothesis H4.1, which expects a positive 
relation between better IR and stock liquidity to be reflected in lower bid-ask spreads for German 
companies, can be seen as at least partially supported concerning a moderate economic effect. 
The identified link is generally in line with the idea that better IR can help to increase overall 
firm visibility, reduce information asymmetry, and decrease the risk of trading based on private 
information, which encourages overall trading activities in the respective shares and decreases the 
bid-ask spreads.519 Furthermore, while Karolyi and Liao (2017) are unable to establish a link 
between IR and bid-ask spreads in the scope of cross-sectional data,520 the present panel 
analysis—which relies inter alia on FE estimations—uncovers that some effect seems to exist, 
although it might be hard to identify due to variety of other factors (e.g., omitted time-invariant 
variables) having an impact on spreads. 
Table 18 contains the results for IR’s relevance to the stock liquidity of UK firms. Specification 
1, which covers the FE estimation, indicates a significant negative relation (at the 10% level) 
between better IR quality and bid-ask spreads, although it is weaker than in the German sample. 
                                                          
519 cf. Agarwal et al. (2015), p. 1; Brown and Hillegeist (2007), p. 446; Chang et al. (2008), p. 382. 
520 cf. Karolyi and Liao (2017), pp. 26, 51. 
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The regression coefficient in both model 2, which relies on winsorized dependent variables, and 
specification 3, which covers the IV analysis (Prob>2: 0.5474), also suggests that better IR is 
negatively linked to spreads—but it suffers from a lack of significance in both cases. The absence 
of significance is less surprising due to the overall moderate relation between IR and spreads, 
which appears less pronounced when the dependent variable’s variance or the number of 
observations is reduced. In summary, hypothesis H4.2, which expects a positive link between 
better IR quality and stock liquidity in UK firms, receives only limited support concerning a very 
small effect. 
Table 17: Results on the link between IR quality and stock liquidity in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bid-ask spread Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
Firm FE 
Alternative  
1 
Firm FE 
Alternative  
2 
      
IR ranking -0.00002* -0.00002 -0.00015* -0.00002** -0.00002 
 (-1.828) (-1.601) (-1.799) (-2.017) (-1.373) 
      
Firm size -0.00077* -0.00075* 0.00069** -0.00086* -0.00101** 
 (-1.711) (-1.816) (2.092) (-1.922) (-2.014) 
ROE -0.00162** -0.00104 -0.00468*** -0.00165** -0.00141* 
 (-2.281) (-1.436) (-3.238) (-2.325) (-1.812) 
Leverage -0.00009 -0.00007 -0.00010 -0.00010 -0.00008 
 (-0.765) (-0.628) (-0.530) (-0.855) (-0.603) 
R&D intensity -0.01766** -0.01503* -0.00472 -0.01820** -0.02702*** 
 (-1.995) (-1.678) (-0.587) (-2.071) (-3.347) 
CapEx intensity -0.00438* -0.00333 -0.00216 -0.00329 -0.00596** 
 (-1.757) (-1.340) (-0.265) (-1.383) (-2.321) 
IA intensity -0.00169 -0.00122 -0.00657*** -0.00156 -0.00051 
 (-0.776) (-0.591) (-3.889) (-0.715) (-0.223) 
Sales growth 0.00116*** 0.00107*** 0.00277 0.00114*** 0.00155*** 
 (3.391) (3.604) (1.408) (3.310) (5.086) 
US cross-listing -0.00014 -0.00013 -0.00002 -0.00019 -0.00085 
 (-0.217) (-0.214) (-0.024) (-0.295) (-1.160) 
Firm age -0.00015*** -0.00015*** 0.00001 -0.00015*** -0.00012** 
 (-3.259) (-3.328) (0.694) (-3.282) (-2.434) 
Strategic holdings -0.00044 -0.00028 -0.00058 -0.00051 -0.00065 
 (-0.582) (-0.390) (-0.590) (-0.694) (-0.722) 
Financial expert CEO    0.00002  
    (0.078)  
Head of IR analyst     -0.00062 
     (-1.152) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes No No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 1,143 1,143 260 1,135 901 
R-squared 0.613 0.612 0.596 0.622 0.622 
Prob>F   0.0022   
Prob>2   0.9888   
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Bid-ask spread is 
calculated following Corwin and Schultz (2012) (in (2) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of 
assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and 
short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total 
assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets 
and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
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firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage 
of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and 
zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 18: Results on the link between IR quality and stock liquidity in the UK and on cross-country 
differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bid-ask spread Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
OLS  
interaction 
OLS  
interaction 
winsorized 
Firm FE 
interaction  
winsorized 
       
IR ranking -0.00001* -0.00001 -0.00005 -0.00001*** -0.00001*** -0.00000 
 (-1.833) (-1.371) (-0.857) (-3.400) (-3.846) (-0.364) 
       
Interaction (IR*Country)    -0.00002* -0.00002 -0.00002* 
    (-1.704) (-1.593) (-1.726) 
       
Firm size 0.00017 -0.00005 0.00031 0.00028*** 0.00020*** -0.00042* 
 (0.452) (-0.166) (0.974) (3.712) (3.102) (-1.807) 
ROE -0.00013 -0.00011 -0.00110*** -0.00035*** -0.00029*** -0.00010 
 (-1.424) (-1.322) (-4.518) (-2.723) (-2.760) (-1.138) 
Leverage -0.00001 -0.00001* -0.00008*** -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001** 
 (-0.991) (-1.863) (-4.434) (-0.422) (-0.699) (-2.328) 
R&D intensity 0.00453 0.00303 -0.03040 0.00575*** 0.00552*** -0.00465 
 (0.745) (0.515) (-1.161) (2.968) (3.238) (-0.844) 
CapEx intensity -0.00178 -0.00273 -0.00699 0.00287 0.00313* -0.00325 
 (-0.434) (-0.776) (-0.788) (1.389) (1.655) (-1.300) 
IA intensity -0.00076 -0.00057 -0.00049 -0.00159*** -0.00154*** -0.00004 
 (-0.470) (-0.423) (-0.201) (-3.539) (-3.979) (-0.031) 
Sales growth -0.00039*** -0.00032*** -0.00140 0.00003** 0.00003** -0.00021*** 
 (-15.151) (-13.925) (-0.627) (2.229) (2.002) (-3.290) 
US cross-listing 0.00066 0.00068 -0.00048 -0.00007 -0.00002 0.00010 
 (1.062) (1.153) (-0.329) (-0.342) (-0.120) (0.243) 
Firm age 0.00011 0.00010 -0.00003* -0.00001*** -0.00001*** 0.00010 
 (1.229) (1.238) (-1.865) (-3.849) (-3.467) (1.395) 
Strategic holdings -0.00215 -0.00071 -0.00170 -0.00008 0.00000 0.00027 
 (-1.518) (-0.578) (-0.620) (-0.173) (0.008) (0.391) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes No No No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Country No No No Yes Yes No 
Observations 1,645 1,645 155 2,788 2,788 2,788 
R-squared 0.722 0.749 0.781 0.586 0.596 0.676 
Prob>F   0.0740    
Prob>2   0.5474    
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Interaction 
(IR*Country) is the product of the IR ranking and the country dummy that equals one for the German firms and zero for the UK companies. Bid-ask spread is 
calculated following Corwin and Schultz (2012) (in (2), (5), and (6) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum 
of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value 
of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the 
intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure 
the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. 
 
As mentioned above, the estimated coefficients indicate a more pronounced relation between 
better IR and liquidity for German firms and thus support hypothesis H4.3; the results of the 
interaction analysis reported in columns 4, 5, and 6 of table 18 generally substantiate this finding. 
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The OLS coefficient on the interaction term in specification 4 reveals a stronger negative link 
between IR rankings and bid-ask spreads for German firms compared to UK companies on 
average. This cross-country difference is significant at the 10% level. Model 5, which uses the 
winsorized version of spreads, still shows a negative but insignificant coefficient, whereas the FE 
estimation in column 6 again yields a statistically significant difference (at the 10% level). The 
identified variation with regard to IR’s effect on stock liquidity in Germany and the UK can be 
particularly attributed to higher information asymmetry in the case of German firms; this is 
linked inter alia to a higher probability of information-based trading, which allows for a higher IR 
contribution. For the sake of completeness, the relation of stock liquidity to further variables 
introduced in the present analysis is briefly discussed below. 
As expected, more mature, larger, and more profitable firms, which as Kirk and Vincent (2014) 
and Vlittis and Charitou (2012) suggest should also be more visible to market participants,521 
exhibit higher stock liquidity (and hence lower bid-ask spreads) in the German sample and 
partially in the case of UK companies. The negative relation between all intensity variables (e.g., 
R&D) and spreads (which is significant in Germany) may simply reflect the fact that hidden 
opportunities induce more frequent trading in corresponding shares.522 Finally, sales growth, 
which is typically higher for younger and smaller companies, consistently exhibits a positive link 
to bid-ask spreads in Germany. On the other hand, the negative link identified in the UK may 
again reflect the difference in the information environment or specific trading preferences. In the 
next section, the results related to the cost of equity capital are presented. 
 
6.5 Link between IR quality and cost of equity capital 
Table 19 provides insights into the link between IR quality in German firms and the implied cost 
of equity capital, which are estimated following Claus and Thomas (2001). Specification 1, 
which considers firm FE, indicates a relation between these variables that is negative and highly 
statistically significant (at the 1% level). The coefficient on IR rankings equals -0.0003, which 
corresponds to an average decrease of 0.3% in the cost of equity capital when IR quality 
increases by 10 ranks (ceteris paribus). This effect appears to be reliable as well as economically 
significant. A slightly lower effect of 0.2% that is still significant at the 1% level is indicated by 
                                                          
521 cf. Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1448, Vlittis and Charitou (2012), p. 954. 
522 cf. Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1448. 
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the second specification, which accounts for outliers. However, in the scope of specification 3, 
which covers the IV analysis (instruments pass the overidentification test with Prob>2: 0.2337), 
the negative coefficient becomes insignificant. Because previous empirical studies suggest that 
IR is a significant determinant of the cost of capital, a substantial question arises as to whether 
these prior results suffer from endogeneity (as indicated by the insignificant coefficient in model 
3) or whether the finding in the present IV analysis is simply driven by a reduced number of 
observations. To address this issue, the firm FE IV regression, which relies on the distances to 
Frankfurt and the next airport as instruments and thus makes it possible to investigate a higher 
number of observations, is additionally conducted; the corresponding results are reported in 
column 4. The application of these instruments appears to be valid according to the 
overidentification test (Prob>2: 0.1622) as well as the test for their joint significance (Prob>F: 
0.0018). This additional IV analysis reveals a negative coefficient on IR quality that is significant 
at the 10% level. As such, this result ultimately alleviates the aforementioned endogeneity 
concerns and substantiates the negative link between better IR quality and the cost of equity 
capital. Specifications 4 and 5, which account for alternative explanations, yield similar insights 
by reporting negative and highly significant coefficients on IR ranking. With regard to the H5.1 
hypothesis, it can be stated in summary that better IR quality appears to diminish the cost of 
equity capital on average in Germany. On the one hand, this can be attributable to IR’s 
contribution to reducing information asymmetry and consequently the uncertainty factor faced by 
market participants, which allows firms to decrease the discount (or return) claimed in the scope 
of respective investments; on the other hand, it may stem from the increase in a firm’s visibility 
and attractiveness to investors.523 In conclusion, hypothesis H5.1 can be seen as confirmed. 
Furthermore, the present analysis surprisingly indicates a positive and significant relation 
between financially well-versed CEOs and the implied cost of equity capital. However, this result 
is in line with the negative effect of financial expert CEOs identified in the scope of the Tobin’s 
Q analysis and may reflect the fact that such CEOs skills are less beneficial in the German civil 
law and bank-based environment (e.g., due to specific firms’ financing characteristics). In the 
next step, the validity of the H5.2 hypothesis concerning the UK market is evaluated using the 
results provided in table 20. 
  
                                                          
523 cf. Botosan (1997), p. 325; Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 92; Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), pp. 125–127; 
Bushee and Miller (2012), p. 870. 
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Table 19: Results on the link between IR quality and the cost of equity capital in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Implied cost of  
equity capital 
Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
IV  
Distances 
Firm FE 
Alternative  
1 
Firm FE 
Alternative  
2 
       
IR ranking -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0010 -0.0019* -0.0003*** -0.0004*** 
 (-2.786) (-2.888) (-1.331) (-1.760) (-2.802) (-3.094) 
       
Firm size 0.0156*** 0.0131*** 0.0078*** 0.0153*** 0.0156*** 0.0144*** 
 (4.740) (4.889) (2.942) (3.782) (4.730) (3.938) 
ROE -0.0003 -0.0028 0.0133 0.0129 0.0000 -0.0021 
 (-0.038) (-0.498) (1.199) (1.177) (0.002) (-0.278) 
Leverage -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0035** 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0001 
 (-0.310) (-1.041) (2.130) (0.565) (-0.315) (-0.069) 
R&D intensity 0.1343 0.0320 -0.0671 0.1338 0.1301 0.1941 
 (1.280) (0.483) (-0.834) (1.389) (1.245) (1.402) 
CapEx intensity 0.0001 0.0178 0.0254 -0.0170 0.0022 -0.0236 
 (0.002) (0.724) (0.400) (-0.420) (0.057) (-0.626) 
IA intensity -0.0084 -0.0087 0.0220 -0.0288 -0.0081 -0.0090 
 (-0.562) (-0.637) (1.412) (-1.176) (-0.551) (-0.539) 
Sales growth 0.0200*** 0.0133*** -0.0137 0.0207*** 0.0200*** 0.0253*** 
 (4.577) (5.942) (-0.980) (3.594) (4.549) (7.184) 
US cross-listing 0.0030 0.0031 0.0041 -0.0015 0.0033 0.0064 
 (0.619) (0.848) (0.896) (-0.274) (0.669) (0.988) 
Firm age -0.0024*** -0.0023*** -0.0002** -0.0020*** -0.0025*** -0.0022*** 
 (-5.030) (-5.276) (-2.196) (-3.122) (-5.099) (-3.967) 
Strategic holdings 0.0014 0.0025 -0.0284** 0.0051 0.0009 -0.0003 
 (0.147) (0.297) (-2.398) (0.467) (0.095) (-0.025) 
Financial expert CEO     0.0043*  
     (1.909)  
Head of IR analyst       -0.0038 
      (-0.622) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes No No No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,013 1,013 246 966 1,006 811 
R-squared 0.388 0.423 0.479 0.165 0.388 0.382 
Prob>F   0.0010 0.0018   
Prob>2   0.2337 0.1622   
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Implied cost of 
equity capital is estimated applying the approach proposed by Claus and Thomas (2001) (in (2) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Firm size is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage 
is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development 
expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is 
calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. 
Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO 
has a significant financial expertise and zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously employed as 
analyst and zero otherwise. 
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Table 20: Results on the link between IR quality and the cost of equity capital in the UK and on cross-
country differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Implied cost of  
equity capital 
Firm  
FE 
Firm  
FE  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
OLS  
interaction 
OLS  
interaction  
winsorized 
Firm FE  
interaction  
winsorized 
       
IR ranking -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0000 
 (-0.619) (-0.368) (-1.642) (-2.382) (-2.140) (-0.543) 
       
Interaction (IR*Country)    -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002** 
    (-1.306) (-0.952) (-2.426) 
       
Firm size 0.0078*** 0.0055*** 0.0036 0.0059*** 0.0052*** 0.0086*** 
 (3.220) (2.728) (1.062) (7.640) (7.957) (4.909) 
ROE -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0007 0.0010 -0.0002 
 (-1.525) (-1.227) (0.034) (0.817) (1.448) (-0.521) 
Leverage 0.0001 0.0001* -0.0003 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0001* 
 (1.436) (1.734) (-1.074) (2.714) (2.893) (1.915) 
R&D intensity 0.0042 0.0010 -0.2041 -0.0620*** -0.0703*** 0.0247 
 (0.078) (0.028) (-0.715) (-2.995) (-3.880) (0.776) 
CapEx intensity 0.0474 0.0536* -0.2572** -0.0552*** -0.0396** 0.0414** 
 (1.577) (1.839) (-2.501) (-2.703) (-2.206) (1.978) 
IA intensity 0.0252** 0.0244*** 0.0104 0.0023 0.0042 0.0086 
 (2.479) (2.836) (0.329) (0.549) (1.135) (1.010) 
Sales growth 0.0054 0.0042 -0.0947*** 0.0004** 0.0003*** 0.0115*** 
 (1.070) (1.193) (-2.728) (2.272) (3.083) (4.294) 
US cross-listing -0.0028 0.0030 0.0187 -0.0024 -0.0018 0.0028 
 (-0.448) (0.838) (1.169) (-0.934) (-0.783) (1.045) 
Firm age 0.0017* 0.0012* 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0013** 
 (1.787) (1.873) (0.420) (1.969) (2.931) (2.139) 
Strategic holdings 0.0064 0.0086 -0.0174 -0.0310*** -0.0283*** 0.0034 
 (0.679) (0.905) (-0.402) (-7.603) (-7.885) (0.474) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No Yes No No No 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Country No No No Yes Yes No 
Observations 1,335 1,335 153 2,348 2,348 2,348 
R-squared 0.410 0.476 0.635 0.360 0.402 0.415 
Prob>F   0.0965    
Prob>2   0.8535    
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Interaction 
(IR*Country) is the product of the IR ranking and the country dummy that equals one for the German firms and zero for the UK companies. Implied cost of equity 
capital is estimated applying the approach proposed by Claus and Thomas (2001) (in (2), (5), and (6) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Firm size is measured 
as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. 
Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and 
development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA 
intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US 
cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the 
firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms.  
 
Specification 1 in table 20, which relies on the firm FE estimation, indicates a negative but only 
marginal and statistically insignificant link between IR rankings and the implied cost of equity 
capital for UK firms. Similar insights are provided by the results of specification 2, which 
accounts for extreme values of the dependent variable. In addition, the IV analysis in the third 
column (the overidentification test is passed with Prob>2: 0.8535) still indicates a negative but 
insignificant coefficient on IR quality. These results are in line with the elaborations of Leuz and 
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Verrecchia (2000) and the expectation of the H5.2 hypothesis, which assumes that a generally 
lower information asymmetry component is incorporated into the capital costs of UK firms on 
average and it can consequently only be marginally affected by IR activities that result in the 
absence of a significant link between IR quality and equity costs.524 The higher firm visibility 
attributed to better IR and its contribution to the lower cost of equity capital can be partially 
responsible for the ascertained negative regression coefficients, but the effect seems to be 
insufficient to provide them with statistical power. 
Columns 4, 5, and 6 in table 20 report the results of the interaction analysis for German and UK 
firms. In models 4 and 5, the OLS regression coefficients on the interaction term are negative in 
both specifications (-0.0001), which is in line with the more pronounced negative link between 
IR and capital costs identified in the German sample in the previous analyses. However, this 
difference between Germany and the UK appears to be statistically insignificant. By addressing 
endogeneity concerns and the data’s panel structure in model 6 (which relies on the FE 
estimation), the even higher interaction effect (-0.0002) turns significant at the 5% level. As such, 
it provides strong support for hypothesis H5.3, which expects a higher relevance of IR quality in 
Germany and can overall be seen as confirmed. Insights on other variables that are significantly 
linked to the cost of equity capital in both countries are described below. 
The regression results concerning the link between implied equity costs and firm size indicate a 
positive relation between both variables for German and UK firms, although as Hope (2003) 
suggests this may be attributable to a number of factors proxied by firm size.525 The prominent 
positive link between sales growth and cost of equity capital in the German sample can be 
particularly ascribed to the fact that younger firms with higher growth are subject to more 
uncertainty and risk, which is reflected in higher equity premiums.526 This explanation is in line 
with the finding on firm age, which exhibits a negative link to the cost of capital. In the case of 
UK firms, the IA intensity in particular appears to be strongly positively linked to equity costs, 
which can be attributed to a lesser transparency of intangible assets accompanied by higher 
uncertainty.527 The findings on the contribution of IR quality to M&A and SEO performance, 
which is a topic that has not yet been examined by any other empirical study on IR, are presented 
in the next chapter. 
                                                          
524 cf. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), p. 92. 
525 cf. Hope (2003), p. 250. 
526 cf. Kirk and Vincent (2014), p. 1422. 
527 cf. Barth et al. (2001), p. 2. 
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7 Results on M&A and SEO performance 
7.1 Link between IR quality and M&A performance 
Table 21 provides the results on the link between IR quality and M&A performance for German 
acquirers. All specifications rely on three-day CAR as the measure of value effects and account 
for year, industry, and index FE as well as for deal and firm characteristics. Specifications 5 and 
6 additionally control for alternative explanations. Finally, column 7 reports the results of the first 
stage of the IV analysis. Specification 1 indicates that IR quality is positively linked to abnormal 
announcement returns attributed to M&A transactions. The OLS regression coefficient on IR 
rankings is 0.0009 and significant at the 5% level. As such, a 10 ranks better IR quality is 
accompanied (ceteris paribus) by a 0.9% higher M&A performance on average. This effect 
appears to be reliable and economically significant. A similar link is indicated by model 2, which 
accounts for extreme values of the dependent variable. The respective coefficient on IR rankings 
is only slightly lower than in the first specification (0.0008) and still significant at the 5% level. 
Specification 3, which relies on the IV analyses using IR resources as instruments, still indicates 
a positive and significant link (at the 1% level) between IR rankings and abnormal announcement 
returns. However, it should be noted that this model is based on only 41 observations, which 
reduces its overall reliability; as such, that the respective results are reported primarily for the 
sake of completeness. To further alleviate endogeneity concerns and substantiate the previous 
results, an additional IV analysis that relies on a significantly higher number of observations is 
conducted using the distances to Frankfurt and the next airport as instruments. As expected in 
chapter 5.2, the first stage in column 7 indicates that both proximity measures are negatively and 
significantly (at the 5% level) linked to IR rankings. Higher distances—which should reflect 
worse conditions for face-to-face communication with market participants related to higher costs 
and lower meeting frequency—thus accompany lower IR quality on average. These instruments 
appear to be valid according to the test for the joint significance of instruments (Prob>F: 0.0225) 
and the overidentification test, which fails to reject the H0 hypothesis and indicates the 
exogeneity of all instruments (Prob>2: 0.2163). The results of the corresponding second stage 
are reported in column 4. In line with the findings from the previous models, the coefficient on 
IR rankings is still positive (0.003) and significant at the 10% level, which indicates an even 
more pronounced positive relation between IR quality and announcement performance attributed 
to M&As. Specifications 5 and 6 additionally account for the financial experience of CEOs and 
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the analyst experience of heads of IR. The regression coefficients on both variables are positive 
but statistically insignificant. Moreover, the inclusion of these measures in the analysis does not 
affect the previous results on the effect of IR quality, which has the same magnitude as in model 
1 (0.0009) and remains significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In summary, these 
findings provide strong support for hypothesis H6.1, which predicts that better IR quality is 
accompanied by higher announcement returns for German acquirers. As extensively discussed in 
chapter 4.3.1, the positive contribution of better IR to M&A performance can be explained by the 
reduction of information asymmetry between an acquiring firm and investors with regard to a 
deal’s future benefits as well as its conditions.528 Furthermore, good IR may allow a firm to 
conduct transactions on better terms, which in the case of deals paid with stock can be achieved 
through a stock price run-up before a transaction.529 Finally, higher firm visibility in the case of 
major corporate events, inter alia in the media, can generally be used in more sophisticated IR to 
disseminate information about a firm and attract investors and analysts.530 Insights on IR’s 
contribution to the M&A performance of UK acquirers are provided below.  
Specification 1 in table 22 indicates a positive link (0.0001) between IR quality and abnormal 
announcement returns for UK acquirers that is substantially weaker compared to the relation 
identified in the scope of the German sample. Furthermore, this result is statistically insignificant. 
Model 2, which relies on winsorized dependent variables, supports this finding by showing the 
absence of a significant link between IR quality and acquirers’ M&A performance. The IV 
analysis in specification 3 even indicates a negative regression coefficient on IR rankings, 
although it is still insignificant. With regard to this IV analysis, however, it should be noted that 
its explanatory power appears to be reduced due to a lower number of observations, analogous to 
the IV model applied in the case of German acquirers. Overall, the results for UK acquirers 
support the elaborations in the scope of the H6.2 hypothesis regarding the absence of a significant 
effect of IR quality. As such, the more rigorous requirements on investor protection, 
transparency, and disclosure that are applicable to UK acquirers seem ultimately to diminish IR’s 
contribution to M&A announcement returns.531 In addition, due to the lower fraction of deals 
paid with stock in the UK sample, the previously mentioned benefits of pre-deal IR activities—
                                                          
528 cf. Healey and Palepu (2001), pp. 420–421. 
529 cf. Ahern and Sosyura (2014), pp. 277–280. 
530 cf. Draper and Paudyal (2008), p. 377. 
531 cf. Goergen and Renneboog (2004), pp. 38–39. 
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which can contribute to better transaction terms—may be less applicable to the investigated 
firms.  
Table 21: Results on the link between IR quality and M&A performance in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CAR -1_1 OLS OLS  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
IV  
Distances 
OLS 
Alternative  
1 
OLS 
Alternative  
2 
First stage  
IV  
Distances 
        
IR ranking 0.0009** 0.0008** 0.0083*** 0.0030* 0.0009** 0.0009*  
 (2.107) (2.098) (5.075) (1.863) (2.230) (1.816)  
        
Relative deal size 0.0272*** 0.0258*** -0.0780** 0.0273*** 0.0258** 0.0241** -0.0089 
 (2.723) (2.700) (-2.472) (2.877) (2.563) (2.166) (-0.004) 
Cross-border deal 0.0080 0.0072 -0.0529** 0.0061 0.0074 -0.0074 1.0736 
 (0.810) (0.775) (-2.412) (0.622) (0.744) (-0.667) (0.407) 
Intra-industry deal -0.0011 -0.0039 -0.0270** -0.0068 0.0009 -0.0023 2.7399 
 (-0.089) (-0.365) (-2.278) (-0.567) (0.078) (-0.217) (1.152) 
Cash payment 0.0160** 0.0156** 0.0334*** 0.0195** 0.0152** 0.0045 -2.0311 
 (2.114) (2.158) (3.936) (2.567) (2.007) (0.542) (-1.117) 
Stock payment -0.0189 -0.0173 -0.3581*** -0.0137 -0.0222 0.0012 -1.1995 
 (-0.779) (-0.768) (-5.629) (-0.660) (-0.931) (0.040) (-0.273) 
Public target -0.0300** -0.0301** 0.1214** -0.0320** -0.0288** -0.0121 0.3027 
 (-2.301) (-2.337) (2.102) (-2.560) (-2.130) (-0.845) (0.095) 
Final ownership 0.0425 0.0426 -0.1073 0.0761* 0.0352 0.0336 -11.8690 
 (1.193) (1.219) (-1.492) (1.697) (0.970) (0.865) (-1.231) 
Asset deal -0.0010 -0.0029 0.0198 -0.0027 0.0001 -0.0026 -0.1930 
 (-0.110) (-0.354) (0.707) (-0.294) (0.014) (-0.274) (-0.085) 
Firm size -0.0058 -0.0057 -0.0117* -0.0090* -0.0033 -0.0061 1.1588 
 (-1.041) (-1.079) (-1.903) (-1.698) (-0.591) (-0.947) (0.992) 
ROE -0.0170 -0.0150 -0.3470*** -0.0190 -0.0194 0.0148 4.9646 
 (-0.615) (-0.611) (-3.821) (-0.707) (-0.738) (0.615) (0.774) 
Leverage 0.0016 0.0014 0.1168*** 0.0037 0.0014 0.0023 -0.7143 
 (0.534) (0.528) (3.184) (1.103) (0.499) (0.738) (-0.797) 
R&D intensity -0.0119 0.0056 1.2478*** -0.0481 -0.0305 -0.0476 36.3889 
 (-0.080) (0.041) (3.082) (-0.328) (-0.209) (-0.308) (1.305) 
CapEx intensity -0.1008 -0.1051 -2.2230*** -0.1255 -0.0632 -0.1300 13.4993 
 (-0.959) (-1.011) (-7.264) (-1.346) (-0.568) (-1.110) (0.350) 
IA intensity -0.0071 0.0006 -0.7790*** -0.0296 0.0053 -0.0071 4.6502 
 (-0.233) (0.021) (-7.187) (-0.820) (0.181) (-0.220) (0.518) 
Sales growth 0.0568*** 0.0406** -0.5266*** 0.0457** 0.0573*** 0.0135 6.2046* 
 (2.860) (2.539) (-5.018) (2.447) (2.966) (0.194) (1.808) 
US cross-listing 0.0116 0.0095 -0.1329*** 0.0194 0.0134 0.0047 -1.7642 
 (0.967) (0.823) (-2.810) (1.387) (1.109) (0.367) (-0.570) 
Firm age 0.0005** 0.0005** -0.0021** 0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0002 -0.0189 
 (2.364) (2.419) (-2.017) (2.420) (2.375) (0.505) (-0.296) 
Strategic holdings -0.0987** -0.0920** -0.4883*** -0.1636** -0.0878** -0.1025** 27.0097*** 
 (-2.282) (-2.299) (-8.424) (-2.473) (-2.112) (-2.126) (3.224) 
Financial expert CEO     0.0162   
     (1.532)   
Head of IR analyst      0.0053  
      (0.521)  
Distance to airport       -3.1763** 
       (-2.144) 
Distance to Frankfurt       -2.9641** 
       (-2.284) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Prob>F  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 0.0225 
Index FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Prob>2 
       0.2163 
Observations 148 148 41 147 148 122 147 
R-squared 0.435 0.428 0.975 0.254 0.451 0.356 0.542 
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. CAR -1...1 is the 
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acquirer’s three-day cumulated abnormal stock return around the M&A announcement (in (2) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Relative deal size is defined as 
the ratio of the deal value and the acquirer’s market value of equity. Cross-border deal is a dummy variable that equals one in the case of the acquisition of a foreign 
target and zero otherwise. Intra-industry deal is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target firm operate in the same industry and zero otherwise. 
Cash payment is a dummy variable that equals one if cash is used as the deal currency and zero otherwise. Stock payment is a dummy variable that equals one if stock 
is used as the deal currency and zero otherwise. Public target is a dummy variable that equals one if the target firm is a publicly traded company and zero otherwise. 
Final ownership is measured as the equity stake in the target firm held by the acquirer after the transaction. Asset deal is a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is 
conducted via the acquisition of target’s assets and zero otherwise. All of the following corporate characteristics refer to the acquiring firm. In addition, all accounting 
variables refer to the fiscal year prior to the transaction. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE 
is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the 
shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as 
the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. 
Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by 
other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. Distance to airport is the natural logarithm of the 
distance between the firm’s headquarter location and the next international airport. Distance to Frankfurt is the natural logarithm of the distance between the firm’s 
headquarter location and Frankfurt.  
 
Table 22: Results on the link between IR quality and M&A performance in the UK and on cross-country 
differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CAR -1_1 OLS OLS  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
OLS  
interaction 
OLS  
interaction  
winsorized 
      
IR ranking 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0053 0.0001 0.0001 
 (1.169) (1.364) (-1.469) (0.991) (1.233) 
      
Interaction (IR*Country)    0.0005* 0.0005* 
    (1.732) (1.790) 
      
Relative deal size 0.0246* 0.0173 0.2637 0.0146** 0.0114* 
 (1.760) (1.347) (1.000) (2.088) (1.881) 
Cross-border deal 0.0051 0.0042 0.0537* 0.0044 0.0040 
 (1.499) (1.409) (1.902) (1.392) (1.424) 
Intra-industry deal -0.0034 -0.0026 -0.0326* -0.0017 -0.0018 
 (-1.070) (-0.879) (-1.666) (-0.561) (-0.648) 
Cash payment 0.0017 0.0019 0.0052 0.0033 0.0030 
 (0.508) (0.641) (0.426) (1.099) (1.162) 
Stock payment -0.0056 0.0016  -0.0115 -0.0069 
 (-0.187) (0.081)  (-0.586) (-0.523) 
Public target -0.0122** -0.0084 -0.0126 -0.0120** -0.0091** 
 (-2.007) (-1.603) (-0.299) (-2.374) (-2.064) 
Final ownership -0.0159 -0.0184 0.0944 -0.0125 -0.0118 
 (-1.125) (-1.400) (0.632) (-0.884) (-0.919) 
Asset deal -0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0264 -0.0019 -0.0019 
 (-0.584) (-0.433) (-0.763) (-0.516) (-0.580) 
Firm size -0.0034 -0.0035* -0.0215 -0.0032* -0.0032** 
 (-1.528) (-1.828) (-1.174) (-1.763) (-1.999) 
ROE 0.0029 0.0018 -0.0989 0.0022 0.0017 
 (0.672) (0.556) (-1.223) (0.545) (0.559) 
Leverage 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0039 0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.815) (0.681) (-0.845) (0.851) (0.862) 
R&D intensity -0.0137 -0.0031 1.1655 0.0015 0.0091 
 (-0.382) (-0.090) (0.797) (0.041) (0.275) 
CapEx intensity -0.0057 -0.0063 1.2053 -0.0226 -0.0168 
 (-0.136) (-0.165) (1.322) (-0.588) (-0.483) 
IA intensity -0.0036 -0.0060 0.0515 -0.0120 -0.0122 
 (-0.295) (-0.571) (0.452) (-1.222) (-1.417) 
Sales growth -0.0031 -0.0006 0.2530 0.0253 0.0153 
 (-0.169) (-0.039) (0.841) (1.229) (1.223) 
US cross-listing -0.0088 -0.0087 0.0811 -0.0060 -0.0067 
 (-1.133) (-1.334) (1.125) (-1.025) (-1.340) 
Firm age -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 
 (-0.239) (-0.041) (-0.231) (0.695) (0.772) 
Strategic holdings -0.0172 -0.0257 0.1348 -0.0577*** -0.0539*** 
 (-0.582) (-0.971) (0.231) (-3.393) (-3.583) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Index FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country No No No Yes Yes 
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Observations 553 553 64 701 701 
R-squared 0.108 0.108 - 0.131 0.130 
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Interaction 
(IR*Country) is the product of the IR ranking and the country dummy that equals one for the German firms and zero for the UK companies. CAR -1...1 is the acquirer’s 
three-day cumulated abnormal stock return around the M&A announcement (in (2) and (5) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Relative deal size is defined as 
the ratio of the deal value and the acquirer’s market value of equity. Cross-border deal is a dummy variable that equals one in the case of the acquisition of a foreign 
target and zero otherwise. Intra-industry deal is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer and the target firm operate in the same industry and zero otherwise. 
Cash payment is a dummy variable that equals one if cash is used as the deal currency and zero otherwise. Stock payment is a dummy variable that equals one if stock 
is used as the deal currency and zero otherwise. Public target is a dummy variable that equals one if the target firm is a publicly traded company and zero otherwise. 
Final ownership is measured as the equity stake in the target firm held by the acquirer after the transaction. Asset deal is a dummy variable that equals one if the deal is 
conducted via the acquisition of target’s assets and zero otherwise. All of the following corporate characteristics refer to the acquiring firm. In addition, all accounting 
variables refer to the fiscal year prior to the transaction. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE 
is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the 
shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as 
the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. 
Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by 
other firms.  
 
While the results for the two samples indicate that the relevance of IR for M&A performance 
differs between German and UK acquirers, the matter is further assessed in specifications 4 and 
5, which rely on the interaction analysis. Model 4 in table 22 reveals a positive (0.0005) and 
significant (at the 10% level) regression coefficient on the interaction term, which indicates that 
better IR quality contributes more to abnormal stock performance for German acquirers than for 
UK acquirers on average, which is in line with the prior findings. The investigation of winsorized 
CAR in specification 5 yields the same statistically significant result. In summary, hypothesis 
H6.3, which expects this difference between the German and UK samples due to the 
aforementioned country-specific characteristics, receives strong empirical support in the present 
analysis. Findings on the relations between important M&A characteristics (as introduced in 
chapter 4.3.2) and the abnormal performance attributed to deal announcements are briefly 
discussed below.  
As expected, relative deal size is widely positively and significantly linked to M&A performance 
in Germany and the UK. First, this relation could be attributable to the fact that a deal’s larger 
size could simply be related to higher expected benefits for a firm and its shareholders.532 
Furthermore, the identified effect may arise because the relative deal size should be higher for 
smaller acquirers (ceteris paribus), who Moeller et al. (2004) assert tend to pay lower premiums 
and be less involved in value-destroying M&As—which is more beneficial for shareholders.533 
This argument is also supported by the negative link ascertained for firm size and abnormal stock 
performance in both countries. In line with the previous prediction, the empirical results indicate 
                                                          
532 cf. Asquith et al. (1983), p. 123. 
533 cf. Moeller et al. (2004), pp. 208, 226. 
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a negative relation between the public status of target firms and the announcement returns of both 
German and UK acquirers. This finding can be ascribed to both the higher price frequently paid 
for publicly listed targets due to their liquidity and the higher number of potential bidders in 
comparison to private firms that are in turn typically subject to respective discount.534 
Furthermore, the choice of payment method also appears to matter for value effects attributed to 
the deal announcements of German acquirers. In accordance with the common theoretical 
prediction, cash as the deal currency is associated with a significantly positive abnormal stock 
price reaction for bidders on average. This finding can be attributed to the positive signaling 
effect of cash payments, which are typically preferred when management perceives the acquiring 
firm’s stock as being undervalued.535 As the relevance of other control variables is less clear due 
to changes in the signs of the respective regression coefficients or a lack of significance, these 
variables are not further discussed. In the next chapter, empirical evidence related to the 
contribution of IR quality to the SEO performance of German and UK firms is provided and 
discussed.  
 
7.2 Link between IR quality and SEO performance 
Table 23 presents the results on the link between IR quality and abnormal announcement 
performance for German issuers. Analogous to the M&A analysis, the three-day CAR is used as 
the dependent variable and all specifications—except for model 3—account for year, industry, 
and index FE as well as for firm and equity offering characteristics. Column 7 contains the results 
of the first stage of the IV analysis. Specification 1 reveals a positive coefficient of 0.0003 on IR 
rankings, which indicates that a 10 ranks better IR quality is accompanied (ceteris paribus) by a 
0.3% higher abnormal SEO announcement performance on average. However, this link is not 
statistically significant, as indicated by the low value of the test statistic (0.452). A lack of 
significance of the positive coefficient on IR quality (0.0002) can also be observed in model 2, 
which accounts for outliers. The IV analysis in specification 3, which relies on IR resources as 
instruments, also reveals an insignificant and even negative relation (-0.0001) between the three-
day CAR and IR rankings. However, similar to the elaborations in the scope of the M&A 
analysis, the insights provided by this IV model suffer from less explanatory power due to the 
                                                          
534 cf. Fuller et al. (2002), pp. 1765, 1784, 1792. 
535 cf. Travlos (1987), pp. 944–945. 
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low number of observations.536 The IV analysis in specification 4, which is based on the 
distances to both the next airport and Frankfurt as instruments, should make it possible to 
overcome the aforementioned concern using a significantly higher number of observations. 
Furthermore, the proximity instruments appear to be valid according to the test for their joint 
significance (Prob>F: 0.0676) as well as the overidentification test (Prob>2: 0.8734). 
Nonetheless, the results of this additional analysis still indicate a negative (-0.0002) and 
insignificant link between IR quality and CARs. Models 5 and 6, which introduce alternative 
explanations, also suggest the absence of a significant relation between both variables of interest. 
In summary, the empirical results provide evidence against hypothesis H7.1, which predicts a 
(significantly) positive association between IR quality and abnormal stock price reactions 
attributed to SEO announcements in Germany. This finding may be attributed to the fact that 
German companies, which are subject to a bank-based financial system and consequently 
pronounced debt financing (as also indicated by the descriptive statistics in chapter 4.2.4),537 
ascribe lower capacities to communication in the scope of announcements of overall relatively 
smaller scaled SEOs (as suggested by the descriptive statistics in chapter 4.4.3); as such, no 
consistent or significant IR effect can be inferred from the analyses. Whether a significant 
relation between SEO performance and IR quality exists for UK companies is evaluated in table 
24. 
Specification 1 reveals a positive link (0.0018) between better IR quality and three-day CAR for 
UK firms, which is much stronger than the effect identified for German companies. Furthermore, 
the regression coefficient is significant at the 10% level. This result indicates that a 10 ranks 
better IR quality is accompanied (ceteris paribus) by a 1.8% higher abnormal SEO announcement 
performance on average. This effect appears to be highly economically significant. Specification 
2, which accounts for extreme values of the dependent variable, provides a somewhat lower 
coefficient (0.0012) that is statistically significant at the 5% level and still economically relevant. 
The IV analysis in model 3, which relies on a very small number of observations and is 
considered only for the sake of completeness, supports the previous finding of a positive and 
significant relation between IR rankings and CARs in the UK sample.538 In summary, the H7.2 
hypothesis, which expects the empirically identified positive effect of IR for UK issuers, can be 
                                                          
536 In addition, due to collinearity issues, the index and year FE as well as all firm-level controls are not considered in 
this model. 
537 cf. Aktas et al. (2016), pp. 1–2. 
538 Due to collinearity issues, the index and time FE as well as all firm-level controls are not considered in this model. 
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seen as confirmed. The ascertained relation can be ascribed to IR’s positive contribution to either 
the information environment or market participants’ awareness of the issuing firm (or both).539 
As such, more forthcoming communication with investors can help to reduce the information 
asymmetry related to a firm’s true value and thereby alleviate concerns stemming from the 
potential overvaluation signal sent to the market in the case of an equity offering 
announcement.540 In addition, IR can contribute to resolving doubts on the usage of additional 
funds, which in line with the agency theory could be assumed to be utilized by self-interested 
managers to pursue their own goals.541 It can also help firms to raise funds on better terms by 
contributing positively to higher stock prices before equity offers (e.g., by enhancing firm 
visibility).542 As suggested by the results in tables 23 and 24, the IR effect with regard to SEO 
performance differs across the two investigated samples. Further insights on these cross-country 
differences are provided by specifications 4 and 5 in table 24, which rely on the interaction 
analysis.  
Model 4 reveals a negative (-0.0019) and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient on the 
interaction term. This result indicates that the contribution of better IR quality to SEO 
announcement performance is significantly higher in the UK sample than in the German sample 
on average. This finding is supported by the negative (-0.0012) and significant (at the 10% level) 
coefficient identified in the scope of model 5, which is based on a winsorized version of the 
CARs. In summary, hypothesis H7.3 can be seen as confirmed regarding a stronger (positive) 
relation between IR quality and SEO performance for UK issuers. The ascertained difference 
could be attributed to the more significant role that equity financing plays in the UK’s market-
based system,543 where greater importance is assigned to IR activities in the case of SEO 
events—which results in their higher contribution to announcement returns. 
  
                                                          
539 cf. Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 630. 
540 cf. Walker and Yost (2008), pp. 376–377; Myers and Majluf (1984), pp. 188, 220. 
541 cf. Walker and Yost (2008), pp. 376–377. 
542 cf. Lang and Lundholm (2000), p. 630; Merton (1987), p. 501. 
543 cf. Aktas et al. (2016), pp. 1–2; Foley and Greenwood (2010), pp. 1231, 1259. 
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Table 23: Results on the link between IR quality and SEO performance in Germany 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CAR -1_1 OLS OLS  
winsorized 
IV 
IR 
resources 
IV  
Distances 
OLS 
Alternative  
1 
OLS 
Alternative  
2 
First stage  
IV  
Distances 
        
IR ranking 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0009  
 (0.452) (0.383) (-0.037) (-0.066) (0.826) (-1.087)  
        
Relative offer size -0.0433 -0.0468 -0.1998** -0.0484 -0.0462 -0.0599 -4.8411 
 (-1.152) (-1.450) (-2.341) (-1.476) (-1.305) (-1.584) (-1.096) 
Use: Debt -0.0446 -0.0448* 0.0071 -0.0409* -0.0440 -0.0758** -2.6051 
 (-1.614) (-1.748) (0.125) (-1.654) (-1.581) (-2.071) (-0.450) 
Use: Working capital -0.0145 -0.0074 0.1289*** -0.0165 -0.0165 -0.0223 1.4409 
 (-0.674) (-0.403) (3.016) (-0.923) (-0.783) (-0.839) (0.192) 
Use: Acquisition 0.0209 0.0094 -0.0079 0.0199 0.0162 0.0322 -1.4433 
 (1.193) (0.631) (-0.242) (1.345) (0.970) (1.409) (-0.430) 
Firm size -0.0197* -0.0110  -0.0195** -0.0205** -0.0179 1.5990 
 (-1.963) (-1.291)  (-2.309) (-1.990) (-1.544) (0.995) 
ROE -0.0475* -0.0309  -0.0545** -0.0450* -0.0669** 3.3058 
 (-1.736) (-1.345)  (-2.381) (-1.703) (-2.160) (0.758) 
Leverage -0.0008 -0.0018  -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0012 0.0755 
 (-0.183) (-0.446)  (-0.236) (-0.103) (0.200) (0.162) 
R&D intensity -0.0603 -0.0092  -0.1783 -0.0656 -0.1080 18.7585 
 (-0.487) (-0.090)  (-1.532) (-0.544) (-0.765) (0.741) 
CapEx intensity -0.0949 -0.0927  -0.1169 -0.0841 -0.2242 -22.1519 
 (-0.729) (-0.808)  (-0.892) (-0.697) (-0.993) (-0.817) 
IA intensity 0.0325 0.0210  0.0288 0.0329 0.0287 -4.7770 
 (0.512) (0.378)  (0.556) (0.533) (0.358) (-0.444) 
Sales growth 0.0067 0.0059  0.0065 0.0060 0.0119 2.3688 
 (0.539) (0.561)  (0.521) (0.521) (0.763) (1.273) 
US cross-listings -0.0002 -0.0204  0.0128 -0.0003 -0.0135 0.5642 
 (-0.005) (-0.837)  (0.495) (-0.011) (-0.343) (0.103) 
Firm age 0.0009* 0.0005  0.0009** 0.0009* 0.0013*** -0.0868 
 (1.908) (1.302)  (1.994) (1.932) (2.715) (-1.276) 
Strategic holdings -0.0993** -0.0634  -0.0945** -0.1091** -0.0935 11.2187 
 (-2.009) (-1.600)  (-1.988) (-2.181) (-1.458) (1.491) 
Financial expert CEO     -0.0225   
     (-1.327)   
Head of IR analyst      -0.0158  
      (-0.466)  
Distance to airport       -3.2505** 
       (-2.295) 
Distance to Frankfurt       0.5854 
       (0.496) 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Prob>F  
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 0.0676 
Index FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Prob>2 
       0.8734 
Observations 130 130 27 129 130 105 129 
R-squared 0.459 0.401 0.558 0.460 0.471 0.566 0.473 
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. CAR -1...1 is the 
issuer’s three-day cumulated abnormal stock return around the SEO announcement (in (2) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Relative offer size is defined as 
the ratio of the amount of SEO proceeds and the issuer’s market value. Use: Debt is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for the debt 
reduction and zero otherwise. Use: Working capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for the strengthening of working capital 
and zero otherwise. Use: Acquisition is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for M&A activities and zero otherwise. All accounting 
variables below refer to the fiscal year prior to the SEO. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE 
is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the 
shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as 
the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. 
Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by 
other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst is 
a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. Distance to airport is the natural logarithm of the 
distance between the firm’s headquarter location and the next international airport. Distance to Frankfurt is the natural logarithm of the distance between the firm’s 
headquarter location and Frankfurt. 
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Table 24: Results on the link between IR quality and SEO performance in the UK and on cross-country 
differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CAR -1_1 OLS OLS  
winsorized 
IV  
IR 
resources 
OLS 
interaction 
OLS  
interaction 
winsorized 
      
IR ranking 0.0018* 0.0012** 0.0515** 0.0015** 0.0008** 
 (1.847) (2.097) (2.245) (2.239) (2.366) 
      
Interaction (IR*Country)    -0.0019** -0.0012* 
    (-2.382) (-1.968) 
      
Relative offer size 0.0445 0.0341 2.7618* 0.0112 0.0119 
 (0.924) (0.848) (1.654) (0.392) (0.476) 
Use: Debt -0.0132 -0.0225 -1.0717** -0.0186 -0.0170 
 (-0.369) (-0.689) (-2.491) (-0.953) (-1.082) 
Use: Working capital 0.1159** 0.0895** 0.8347*** 0.0714*** 0.0428** 
 (2.472) (2.532) (5.974) (2.683) (2.441) 
Use: Acquisition -0.0015 0.0087 0.0626 0.0016 0.0010 
 (-0.046) (0.351) (0.806) (0.122) (0.102) 
Firm size -0.0192 -0.0101  -0.0261** -0.0140** 
 (-1.033) (-0.909)  (-2.469) (-2.579) 
ROE 0.0485 0.0165  0.0051 -0.0032 
 (0.730) (0.386)  (0.174) (-0.178) 
Leverage 0.0042 0.0015  0.0011 0.0001 
 (0.802) (0.434)  (0.485) (0.073) 
R&D intensity -0.2531 -0.3418  -0.1286* -0.1197* 
 (-0.916) (-1.479)  (-1.755) (-1.874) 
CapEx intensity -0.1065 -0.1190  -0.0828 -0.0575 
 (-0.411) (-0.466)  (-0.605) (-0.552) 
IA intensity 0.0276 0.0400  -0.0210 -0.0143 
 (0.294) (0.555)  (-0.491) (-0.406) 
Sales growth 0.0008 0.0097  -0.0074 -0.0063 
 (0.026) (0.356)  (-0.761) (-0.855) 
US cross-listings -0.0556 -0.0223  -0.0050 -0.0006 
 (-0.818) (-0.475)  (-0.181) (-0.034) 
Firm age -0.0003 -0.0003  0.0003 0.0002 
 (-0.552) (-0.868)  (1.313) (0.905) 
Strategic holdings -0.0076 0.0560  -0.0160 -0.0085 
 (-0.045) (0.439)  (-0.382) (-0.255) 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Index FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 120 120 10 250 250 
R-squared 0.352 0.389 0.742 0.246 0.229 
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking is obtained from the Extel survey and is multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates a better IR quality. Interaction 
(IR*Country) is the product of the IR ranking and the country dummy that equals one for the German firms and zero for the UK companies. CAR -1...1 is the issuer’s 
three-day cumulated abnormal stock return around the SEO announcement (in (2) and (5) winsorized at the 2.5% and 97.5% levels). Relative offer size is defined as the 
ratio of the amount of SEO proceeds and the issuer’s market value. Use: Debt is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for the debt 
reduction and zero otherwise. Use: Working capital is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for the strengthening of working capital 
and zero otherwise. Use: Acquisition is a dummy variable that equals one if the SEO proceeds should be used for M&A activities and zero otherwise. All accounting 
variables below refer to the fiscal year prior to the SEO. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance sheet. ROE is 
defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the shareholder’s 
equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as the ratio of 
the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. Sales growth 
is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ 
and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by other firms. 
 
With regard to the performance relevance of different equity offering characteristics, the 
strengthening of working capital as the intended use of proceeds appears to be positively linked 
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to stock price reactions attributed to SEO announcements by UK firms, whereas a negative but 
insignificant relation can be stated for German companies. This result is in line with the 
prediction that due to Germany’s lower investor protection, the potential benefits ascribed to a 
higher amount of liquid funds at the disposal of a firm’s management can be offset by related 
agency concerns.544 In addition, a negative and partially significant relation is apparent between 
debt reduction as the stated use of proceeds and CARs in both samples. This finding, which 
meets the previous expectation, can be ascribed to both the negative signal of debt reduction on 
management’s perception about a firm’s future financial situation and the fact that self-interested 
entrenched managers typically prefer lower leverage.545 In the last empirical section of this thesis, 
the robustness of the IR measure used in this analysis is ascertained. 
  
                                                          
544 cf. Mikkelson and Partch (2003), pp. 275, 277; Kalcheva and Lins (2007), p. 1087. 
545 cf. Masulis (1983), pp. 115, 125; Masulis and Korwar (1986), p. 93.; Berger et al. (1997), pp. 1411, 1414, 1436. 
Robustness check  154 
 
8 Robustness check 
The practical relevance of Extel IR rankings as a measure of IR quality has been extensively 
discussed in chapter 4.1.2. Furthermore, hypothesis H1.3 has been derived to empirically test the 
validity of the IR proxy. This hypothesis predicts that if IR rankings actually reflect the level of 
firms’ IR quality, a better position in this ranking should be related to a lower head of IR turnover 
probability. Table 25 provides results regarding this prediction, relying on logistic regressions 
applied in the scope of the German sample. Analogous to other models used in this thesis, the 
regressions include industry, index, and year FE and firm characteristics. The coefficient on one-
year lagged IR rankings is negative (-0.0243) and significant at the 5% level, which indicates that 
the probability of head of IR turnover is inversely related to IR quality in the preceding year. This 
statistically significant negative relation also remains present in specifications 2 and 3, which 
account for the previous occupation of former head of IR and actual CEO. Finally, to confirm the 
robustness of the previously ascertained link, specification 4 uses changes in IR rankings as 
explanatory variable. This analysis is based on the idea that the positive (less negative) difference 
between IR rankings in the last two years indicates an improvement (lesser decline) in a firm’s IR 
quality—which should be related to a lower head of IR turnover probability. The negative            
(-0.0240) and significant (at the 10% level) coefficient on the changes in the IR ranking (i.e., 
Delta IR ranking) empirically confirms this expectation and substantiates the findings of models 
1 to 3. In conclusion, it can be stated that hypothesis H1.3 is supported by the present study’s 
results and that the IR rankings applied in this thesis appear to be an appropriate proxy for a 
firm’s IR quality.  
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Table 25: Results on the head of IR turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Head of IR turnover 
 
Logistic Logistic  
Alternative  
1 
Logistic  
Alternative  
2 
Logistic  
Alternative  
3 
     
IR ranking (lagged) -0.0243** -0.0214** -0.0243**  
 (-2.562) (-2.000) (-2.565)  
     
Delta IR ranking    -0.0240* 
    (-1.700) 
     
Firm size 0.1359 0.2036 0.1309 0.2663 
 (1.187) (1.627) (1.137) (1.638) 
ROE -0.0444 -0.2954 -0.0261 0.2321 
 (-0.065) (-0.451) (-0.038) (0.311) 
Leverage -0.1066** -0.0865 -0.1083** -0.0089 
 (-2.298) (-1.547) (-2.331) (-0.095) 
R&D intensity 3.5015 1.4928 3.3692 -1.6314 
 (0.851) (0.296) (0.817) (-0.239) 
CapEx intensity -1.3966 -2.0373 -0.7382 -1.7911 
 (-0.509) (-0.660) (-0.241) (-0.440) 
IA intensity 1.4845* 1.8312** 1.5202* 2.1977* 
 (1.777) (2.021) (1.772) (1.953) 
Sales growth -0.0012 -0.0615 -0.0094 0.7218 
 (-0.004) (-0.155) (-0.028) (0.788) 
US cross-listing -0.1398 0.0858 -0.1477 -0.7633 
 (-0.275) (0.152) (-0.292) (-1.048) 
Firm age -0.0029 -0.0067 -0.0029 -0.0074 
 (-0.535) (-1.155) (-0.537) (-1.038) 
Strategic holdings 0.3945 0.3371 0.3817 -0.5666 
 (0.775) (0.595) (0.749) (-0.854) 
Head of IR analyst (lagged)  -0.2046  -0.8527* 
  (-0.582)  (-1.882) 
Financial expert CEO   0.0024 -0.1353 
   (0.010) (-0.379) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Index FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 964 756 957 599 
Pseudo R-squared 0.071 0.086 0.070 0.111 
 
Robust test statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
IR ranking (lagged) is obtained from the Extel survey referring to the preceding year and multiplied by minus one; as such, the higher (less negative) ranking indicates 
a better IR quality. Delta IR ranking measures the difference between the firm’s IR rankings of the last two years. Head of IR turnover is a dummy variable that equals 
one in the case of a change of the head of IR and zero otherwise. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of assets reported on the balance 
sheet. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income and the average shareholder’s equity. Leverage is calculated as the sum of long- and short-term debt divided by the 
shareholder’s equity. R&D intensity is measured as the ratio of the research and development expenses and the book value of total assets. CapEx intensity is defined as 
the ratio of the capital expenditures and the book value of total assets. IA intensity is calculated as the ratio of the intangible assets and the book value of total assets. 
Sales growth is the average sales growth for the last three fiscal years. US cross-listing is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ and zero otherwise. Firm age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Strategic holdings measure the percentage of the firm’s issued shares held by 
other firms. Financial expert CEO is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s CEO has a significant financial expertise and zero otherwise. Head of IR analyst 
(lagged) is a dummy variable that equals one if the (former) firm’s head of IR was previously employed as analyst and zero otherwise. 
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9 Summary and conclusion 
The empirical evidence on IR’s economic relevance provided by previous studies is not fully 
consistent, which could be attributed to the differences in sample compositions, the origins of the 
investigated firms, and not least to endogeneity issues. The objective of the present thesis was to 
empirically investigate the relevance of IR in German and UK firms, which are subject to 
different legal and financial systems. By considering a broad panel dataset that covers a 
substantial part of the equity markets in two countries (one with a civil law and bank-based 
system, the other with a common law and market-based system), the present thesis contributes to 
a deeper understanding of differences in IR’s impact on major corporate characteristics and 
outcomes. Furthermore, this empirical study relies on FE and IV regressions to alleviate 
endogeneity concerns and provide more clear-cut evidence. In addition to investigating the 
overall value relevance of IR quality and its impact on related value-generating channels, the 
present analysis is the first to shed light on IR’s contribution to firm performance in the case of 
specific corporate events. The related hypotheses developed in the scope of this thesis have been 
widely supported by the empirical results, which are summarized below. 
The analysis of the link between Tobin’s Q and the IR rankings of sample firms has revealed a 
positive and economically substantial relation between firms’ market performance and better IR 
quality in Germany and the UK that is still apparent after either deducing firm FE or applying 
different sets of instrumental variables. However, the magnitude of the IR effect differs in the two 
countries. In particular, the interaction analysis shows that better IR quality provides a 
significantly higher contribution to the market valuation of German firms compared to UK 
companies on average. This finding is in line with the expectation that higher levels of investor 
protection and private enforcement mechanisms, as elaborated by La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) and 
Djankov et al. (2008), as well as the general market characteristics applicable to common law and 
market-based system result in an already lower base level of information asymmetry in the UK—
which in turn leaves less space for IR contribution. In addition, the results of this study provide 
insights into the specific channels through which IR can positively contribute to firm value. In the 
case of German companies, better IR quality is widely and significantly linked to lower equity 
capital costs, lower stock volatility, higher stock liquidity, higher analyst following, lesser 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, and lower forecast error; however, the effects on stock volatility 
and liquidity appear to be of a lesser magnitude. The ascertained significant economic relevance 
of IR in Germany can be primarily attributed to the reduction of existing information 
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asymmetries and the enhancement of firm visibility among market participants. The findings on 
the aforementioned channels for UK firms diverge from those for the German market. While the 
relations between better IR and the cost of equity capital, stock volatility, and liquidity as well as 
forecast error have almost the expected signs, they appear to be mainly not significant. On the 
other hand, better IR quality is widely significantly associated with a lower forecast dispersion 
and higher analyst coverage, which is typically related to firm visibility. On average, the 
magnitude of these IR effects in the UK sample is significantly lower in comparison to in 
German firms, as indicated by the interaction analyses. Overall, the findings support the 
prediction of IR’s lower economic relevance in the UK—particularly with regard to the 
alleviation of information asymmetry—due to that country’s legal and market environment. The 
present analysis further provides evidence concerning whether IR quality matters in relation to 
M&As and SEOs conducted by German and UK firms. 
To assess the relevance of IR in the scope of respective transaction and offering announcements, 
this thesis relies on abnormal stock returns as the performance measure. The analysis of M&As 
conducted by German firms provides strong evidence of a significantly positive link between 
better IR quality and abnormal announcement returns. The positive contribution of better IR to 
shareholder wealth can be attributed to reduced information asymmetries between German 
acquirers and investors concerning a deal’s future benefits as well as its transaction conditions 
through more forthcoming communication and disclosure. Furthermore, IR activities can help 
acquiring firms to achieve better deal terms or attract new investors by taking advantage of 
increased market attention. On the other hand, no significant, systematic relation between IR 
quality and abnormal announcement returns has been identified for UK acquirers. This result, 
which is also supported by the significant cross-country differences identified in the scope of the 
interaction analysis, could again be primarily related to the higher base level of investor 
protection and disclosure in the UK compared to Germany, which diminishes IR contribution on 
average.  
However, entirely different patterns have been identified for the relation between IR quality and 
announcement performance attributed to SEOs in both countries. While better IR quality in the 
UK sample is positively and significantly linked to abnormal announcement returns, a lack of a 
systematic relation has to be stated for German companies. The interaction analysis has 
substantiated these results by showing that IR’s contribution to SEO performance in the UK 
sample is significantly higher compared to the German sample on average. This result can be 
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particularly attributed to the crucial role that equity financing plays for firms that are acting in a 
market-based system, which appears to be of a lesser magnitude in the case of a bank-based 
environment that is characterized by more pronounced debt financing. These elaborations are 
widely supported by descriptive statistics in the present thesis that indicate a larger debt 
component in the financing structures of German firms compared to UK companies as well as a 
smaller average size of SEOs for the German market. In consequence, greater importance of this 
specific event type in the UK could be related to a stronger effect of IR quality. In this regard, IR 
can contribute to SEO performance, for instance by alleviating concerns with regard to a firm’s 
true value that arise due to an overvaluation signal potentially being sent to the market by a 
company’s choice to issue equity or by clarifying the equity offering’s purpose to reduce 
concerns regarding a firm’s management using collected funds opportunistically. The 
contribution of IR to better conditions of equity offerings through stock marketing techniques can 
be seen as an additional value driver.  
In summary, significant differences have been identified in this thesis with respect to the 
relevance of IR in the two markets investigated (i.e., Germany and the UK). These insights do not 
only contribute to the state of knowledge in the scientific literature; they also have implications 
for practitioners related to how their activities can contribute to corporate success on capital 
markets. As such, the findings could be helpful for organizing the (costly) IR function in a more 
efficient way, depending not least on the corresponding legal and market environment. 
Additional research on individual components of IR activities, such as one-to-one meetings 
between investors and IR officers, could further extend the understanding of this complex 
corporate function. Moreover, IR’s relevance may differ not only between common and civil law 
countries; it may also vary within the legal families of civil law itself. As such, investigation and 
comparison of IR effects in countries in the French, Scandinavian, and German legal families 
could yield further valuable insights. Another interesting research question that was derived from 
the interviews with IR practitioners and could be addressed by future empirical studies deals with 
IR’s contribution to a firm’s shareholder base quality (i.e., an appropriate mix of long- and short-
term investors). Finally, further research could be conducted on the relevance of IR quality in the 
case of other important corporate events that affect shareholder wealth, such as the introduction 
of share repurchase programs. In this context, the elaborations and findings in the present thesis 
suggest that legal and market factors as well as endogeneity issues should also be taken into 
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careful account in future research to ensure that the subsequent findings provide conclusive 
empirical evidence related to IR. 
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